Approximately half of the 59 million people living in the six member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are immigrants. Some remain for a few years, while others stick there for their whole careers. The majority enters the country based on the assumption that they will have to leave eventually. Despite their numbers, migrants have restricted rights in the Gulf states' destination countries: they have temporary residence and limited involvement in society. The prospect of granting citizenship to foreigners has long agitated the Gulf states. For the vast majority of foreign employees, life in the Gulf consists of a succession of short-term work permits; by stop being productive, you stop being a resident. Nevertheless, this situation is gradually and slowly changing; the need for diversification of the economy has forced some of the Gulf states to break this citizenship taboo.

As white smoke was coming out two years ago to signify the formation of a new Hariri government in Beirut, the dangers of an economic collapse, and protracted political and social instability were looming over the country. Now, as white smoke came up again with the formation of Najib Mikati’s government last September, several converging crises have brought the country to its knees. The galloping economic breakdown, precipitated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and last year’s blast in Beirut’s port has created asphyxiating conditions that put Lebanon in completely uncharted waters.

Despite the latest ceasefire in Idlib, tensions are once again rising across Syria. In the northwest, the high mobility in Idlib indicates that renewed fighting is rather a matter of timing, while in the south and east, escalating assassination campaigns in Daraa and Deir ez-Zor generate new dangerous dynamics. In central and eastern Syria, the resurgence of ISIS cells further exposes a severe security vacuum that opens way for intensive influence competition between the Kurds and the regime. Last but not least, the unprecedented economic crisis that face the country threatens to derail even the minimum stability enjoyed in Syria at the moment.

As the Syrian civil war nears its end, the regime’s imminent victory against the remaining opposition forces in Idlib tends to be overshadowed by several emerging issues that threaten to trigger a new circle of instability. In the meantime, irrespective of any outcome in the north, another ‘war’ still rages and will continue to rage in the country. The one between Iran, which struggles to recover from the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, and Israel, which meticulously tries to fend off the former’s entrenchment in the country.

Protests across Sudan are well into their fourth month, consistently defying President Omar al-Bashir’s suppressive response, as well as his superficial political appeasing efforts. That persistence, stemming from economic and political demands highly similar to those expressed in several Arab countries during the so-called “Arab Spring”, interestingly underscores a relevant continuity of the transformative dynamics that emerged back in 2011. In Sudan, similar peaceful revolts have twice -in 1964 and 1985- ended up in the collapse of military dictatorships. Nevertheless, despite the protesters’ determination, the existence of a particularly rigid pro-status quo regional political landscape further complicates the equation that could lead to actual political change. 

Countries with only one economic sector developed, such as the oil one, are very vulnerable to economy shifts and face many problems when the oil prices fall. Algeria could not be the exception to the rule. With the oil prices slumping during the past two years, the Algerian economy has had to face a budget crisis as hydrocarbons make up roughly 60% of the state income, representing 40% of the Algerian GDP and 90% of its export earnings.[1] The Dinar has depreciated, all the while expenses on daily needs have risen for the Algerian people who are once again demonstrating on the streets. What are the Algerian regime’s next moves? How will the Algerian people react to austerity?