Κατά την τελευταία δεκαετία, τα εμπόδια για την ανατροπή του καθεστώτος Άσαντ στη Συρία διαμορφώθηκαν κυρίως από την εξωτερική παρέμβαση δύο βασικών παραγόντων: της Ρωσίας και της Χεζμπολάχ. Η Μόσχα παρείχε κρίσιμη αεροπορική υποστήριξη στην κυβέρνηση της Συρίας, ενώ η Χεζμπολάχ, με την υποστήριξη του Ιράν, πρόσφερε χερσαίες δυνάμεις που βοήθησαν στη διατήρηση της εξουσίας του Άσαντ. Από την άλλη πλευρά, το Ισραήλ και τα κράτη του Κόλπου, όπως η Σαουδική Αραβία, είχαν τις δικές τους επιφυλάξεις σχετικά με το ποιος ή τι θα μπορούσε να διαδεχθεί τον Άσαντ. Για το Ισραήλ, το ενδεχόμενο να αναλάβει τη Συρία η Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα, με την υποστήριξη της Τουρκίας, ήταν πιο ανησυχητικό από τη συνέχιση της διακυβέρνησης του Άσαντ. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, η προτίμηση του Ισραήλ ήταν «ο διάβολος που γνωρίζουν» —ο Άσαντ— παρά ένα αβέβαιο μέλλον με τη Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα.
The ongoing war in Gaza has intensified regional tensions, drawing strong reactions from neighboring Jordan. The country is home to a large Palestinian population and has always been a proponent of Palestinian rights, while -at the same time- holding a peace treaty with Israel since 1994. The war’s impact on Jordan may lead to a significant risk of destabilization, as the country is striving to balance between its support of the Palestinians and its national security interests.
This article tracks domestic and foreign policy developments in Tunisia during the past three years, on the occasion of the latest election results, with Saied being reelected with 90% of the vote. A series of undemocratic discrepancies, a continuum of socioeconomic precarity and growing xenophobic practices are leading to the characterization of Tunisia as a state steadily moving towards authoritarianism.
For Jordan, Israel’s war on Gaza is all but a foreign policy issue. It reverberates heavily on its domestic and foreign politics due to the stark contrast between the Jordanian deep support for the Palestinian cause and the state’s relation with Israel, compounded by its strong alliance with the United States. This article examines the variables that inform the Jordanian regime’s complex balancing act amid the ongoing regional crisis and how these impacted the outcome of the recent parliamentary elections. This article also argues that although the monarchy has managed to walk a thin line and avoid wider confrontations, the protracted crisis underscores an increasingly precarious balance that will test Jordan’s ability to deflect external and internal pressures in the face of prolonged conflict.
The death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19 triggered snap elections in Iran and brought pro-reform Masoud Pezeshkian to presidency. This article presents an overview of the election outcome and its implication for Iranian politics, economy and society.
Κατά τη διάρκεια της πρώτης περιόδου της Ισλαμικής Δημοκρατίας διαμορφώνονται δύο τάσεις στην διαμόρφωση αποφάσεων της εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Η μία είναι η πιο ριζοσπαστική και η άλλη η πραγματιστική.
On October 7, 2023, President Biden declared his administration’s “rock-solid and unwavering support” to Israel. More than nine months into the Gaza war, his adherence to his initial promise is unquestionable. This article will examine US foreign policy vis-à-vis the war on Gaza, focusing on its prospective objectives and its implications on domestic, regional, and international levels. It will also argue that American foreign policy on the issue is primarily reactive rather than proactive.
Η επίθεση του Ισραήλ στο ιρανικό προξενείο της Δαμασκού και η δολοφονία πέντε ανώτατων και ανώτερων Ιρανών αξιωματικών μπορεί να αποδοθεί σε τρεις λόγους που είναι σε μεγάλο βαθμό αλληλένδετοι. Πρώτον, είναι πιθανό ότι αποτελεί προοίμιο μιας γενικής επίθεσης του Ισραήλ κατά της Χεζμπολάχ ανάλογη με αυτή εναντίον της Χαμάς μετά το τέλος της επίθεσης στη Γάζα. Η δολοφονία των Ιρανών ανώτατων αξιωματικών που ήταν υπεύθυνοι για τη Συρία, τον Λίβανο και την Παλαιστίνη αποδυναμώνει πολύ την επιτελική αποτελεσματικότητα της Χεζμπολάχ τους επόμενους μήνες. Δεύτερον, η επίθεση είναι ένα μήνυμα προς τις ΗΠΑ μετά την στάση τους στο Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ. Το μήνυμα είναι ότι το Ισραήλ θέτει τις στρατηγικές προτεραιότητες στη Μέση Ανατολή και όχι η Ουάσιγκτον.
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues in full gear, contrary to the steadfast reactions of the western world, the regional responses from the Middle East paint a different picture. Having initially been caught off-guard with the intensifying tag between Russia and the west, most ‘heavyweight’ MENA countries have adopted a ‘sit tight and assess’ approach. Longstanding partners of the west are balancing their reactions in order to minimize the risks stemming from overtly picking sides in a conflict that they increasingly see as not their own. On the region’s eastern flank, Iran too, walks a thin line.
Tunisia is usually being referred to as one of the most successful cases with regards to social justice and democratization after the Arab Spring uprisings. However, ten years later, the country is once more facing a political and socioeconomic crisis, with President Saied’s policies becoming more and more unpopular amongst the people. Amidst the recent wave of popular upheaval in Tunisia, this article aims to analyze current domestic affairs and examine whether authoritarianism is on the rise.
Egypt has been in constant upheaval, especially in the past years, following Sisi’s rise to power. Popular struggle is becoming more and more penalized, while a series of human rights violations and growing public discontent towards the government have been observed. Popular demand seems overshadowed by a security and counter-terrorism agenda. This article will focus on the securitization strategy and examine Egypt’s current foreign policy priorities, its role in regional power struggles and whether new coalitions challenge the interests of traditional allies.
Even though, during the past year, developments in Syria have entered a stabilization trajectory, the country remains fragmented and a “playground” where different regional and national interests collide. The Assad regime has managed to maintain and extend its control in most of the Syrian territories around Damascus and in the south. However, there are still challenges from opposition forces in the northwest, the Kurdish-controlled areas in the northeast and a re-emerging ISIS threat looming both from previously ISIS-controlled enclaves as well as prisons and camps.[1] At the same time, lines are blurred in regional alliances, such as the one between Russia and Iran, as the players attempt to consolidate their power at each other’s expense. What will 2022 look like for Syria and what are the imminent threats for the country’s sovereignty?
Approximately half of the 59 million people living in the six member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are immigrants. Some remain for a few years, while others stick there for their whole careers. The majority enters the country based on the assumption that they will have to leave eventually. Despite their numbers, migrants have restricted rights in the Gulf states' destination countries: they have temporary residence and limited involvement in society. The prospect of granting citizenship to foreigners has long agitated the Gulf states. For the vast majority of foreign employees, life in the Gulf consists of a succession of short-term work permits; by stop being productive, you stop being a resident. Nevertheless, this situation is gradually and slowly changing; the need for diversification of the economy has forced some of the Gulf states to break this citizenship taboo.
As white smoke was coming out two years ago to signify the formation of a new Hariri government in Beirut, the dangers of an economic collapse, and protracted political and social instability were looming over the country. Now, as white smoke came up again with the formation of Najib Mikati’s government last September, several converging crises have brought the country to its knees. The galloping economic breakdown, precipitated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and last year’s blast in Beirut’s port has created asphyxiating conditions that put Lebanon in completely uncharted waters.
Το Κέντρο Μεσογειακών,Μεσανατολικών και Ισλαμικών Σπουδών φιλοξενεί πληθώρα διαφορετικών απόψεων στα πλαίσια του ελεύθερου ακαδημαϊκού διαλόγου. Οι απόψεις αυτές δεν αντανακλούν υποχρεωτικά τις απόψεις του Κέντρου. Η χρήση και αναπαραγωγή οπτικοακουστικού υλικού για τις ανάγκες της ιστοσελίδας του ΚΕΜΜΙΣ γίνεται για ενημερωτικούς, ακαδημαϊκούς και μη κερδοσκοπικούς σκοπούς κατά τα προβλεπόμενα του Νόμου 2121/1993 (ΦΕΚ Α' 25/4-3-1993) περί της προστασίας της πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας, καθώς και του άρ.8 του Νόμου 2557/1997 (ΦΕΚ Α' 271/1997).
