Following the large-scale protests that swept the country in 2019, Algeria is attempting to reclaim its diplomatic clout in international affairs. The country’s policy continues to reflect support for anticolonial movements, using its renewed influence at the UNSC to promote the Palestinian and Western Saharan issues. At the same time, its influence is declining in the very unstable Sahel region, where multiple terrorist organisations are active and coups d’état take place. Algiers has to balance between safeguarding its border security and keeping its foreign policy tenets intact.
After three decades of self-isolation and international sidelining, Algeria seems set on reclaiming its historical role as a respected diplomatic actor. Broadly acknowledged by the Third World and the West for its restrained approach and its effective commitment to the cause of decolonisation, providing material and political support to a range of causes, Algeria’s international role dwindled during its decade-long civil war (1992-2002) and the subsequent four terms of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. After the latter’s resignation following the 2019 Hirak movement protests, his successor, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, has been trying to reclaim Algiers’ prestige in the international and regional fora. Yet, its balancing act between the archetype of Algerian foreign policy, and the safeguarding of its national interests and security, might turn out to be unsustainable in the future, as tensions rise in the region.
Rooted in its independence war from France during 1954-1962, Algeria’s foreign policy reflected its support of anti-colonial movements, and belief on the Westphalian principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs. The above are echoed best in Algiers’ support over Sahrawi and Palestinian nationalism, two of the main driving forces behind its foreign policy. In addition, being among the prominent members of the Non-Aligned movement, to this day, Algeria manages to maintain good relations with both the Western (the US and the EU) and the Russia - China blocs. However, recent regional and global developments, such as the war in Ukraine and in Gaza, or the insurgencies in the Sahel region, show that it is increasingly difficult for Algiers to maintain this delicate balance since Algeria has stepped in as a non-permanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council (UNSC) for a two-year term from January 2024.
The Algerian foreign policy agenda
Algeria’s steadfast support to the Palestinian cause is the cornerstone of its foreign policy, as a prime example of anticolonial struggle. In the words of the late President Houari Boumediene in 1974, “We stand with Palestine, whether right or wrong.” The continuous Algerian commitment to the Palestinian people was manifested in the mediation that brought a reconciliation agreement between Palestinian resistance organisations, including Hamas, Fatah and 12 other groups in 2022.[1] Support for the Palestinian cause has not changed after October 7, 2023, with Algeria repeatedly expressing its full solidarity, and calling the international community to support the Palestinians. What is more, the country is utilizing its new role in the UNSC by advocating for Palestinian rights, including people’s right to self-determination, and highlighting Israeli human rights violations. This has helped in keeping the Palestinian issue at the top of the UNSC’s agenda, whether in emergency or regular meetings.[2]
The second major issue in Algeria’s foreign policy agenda is the situation in Western Sahara and its support for the Polisario Front. This has contributed to the poor relations with neighboring Morocco, which considers its sovereignty over Western Sahara as a non-negotiable national cause. Tensions between the two countries rose in 2020 with the Abraham Accords, when Rabat normalized its relations with Israel in exchange for US recognition of the Kingdom’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Once Israel recognized the same claims in 2021, Algiers decided to sever all diplomatic relations.[3]
Despite the situation being stable for many years, fear of direct military intervention was raised ever since the Polisario Front ended the cease-fire in November 2020 and resumed its armed struggle against Morocco. In both 2022 and 2023, the UN mission in Western Sahara was prepared for withdrawal, which would bring Moroccan and Algerian troops face to face on the border. In 2023, President Tebboune said the deteriorating relations between the countries have reached “the point of no return.”[4] Tensions subsequently eased, but according to Crisis Group, even if Algeria and Morocco managed to avoid a military clash, the danger still looms.
However, Algiers has made significant progress in the rapprochement with another neighbour. In 2022, the land borders between Algeria and Tunisia reopened after two years, following the visit of Tunisian President Kais Saied to Algiers. What is more, they influenced Tunis to reverse its neutrality over the Western Saharan conflict, with the Tunisian President meeting with leaders of the Polisario front.[5] In addition, a tripartite Tunisian-Algerian-Libyan grouping, that noticeably excluded Morocco, was formed in March 2024 in order to foster close cooperation in the region, and is set to meet every three months. This formation can also be viewed as a way to counterbalance Algeria’s growing diplomatic isolation from its West African neighbours.[6]
The third foreign policy issue rests within the Sahel. As a regional power, Algeria has interests in the Sahel due to geographical contiguity, strategic depth and historical ties. In Mali, Algeria has brokered multiple peace efforts, including the “Algiers Process” in 2015, between the government and ethnic Tuareg armed groups since the Malian state collapsed in 2012. However, Malian-Algerian relations have been seriously eroded, as the former cancelled the agreement earlier this year, accusing the latter of interfering in its internal affairs and sponsoring terrorist organisations. Furthermore, Niger rejected Algeria’s proposal of mediation, following the military coup against elected President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023.[7]
Safeguarding the Sahel remains crucial for Algeria, as the region has witnessed a number of domestic and terrorist insurgencies as well as eight coups d’état since 2020. The presence of violent extremists in its borders with Mali and Niger pose a direct threat to Algerian national security. At the same time, its position as member of the UNSC requires close cooperation with Western partners for solutions. This coincides with emerging anti-western, pro-Russian sentiments in the region, with the regional forces operating side by side with the Wagner group.[8] Yet Algiers rejects military solutions in the Sahel, as it believes that the roots of Sahel’s crises are economic, and has therefore allocated special funds to sponsor and organize a development conference to appease socio-economic grievances while safeguarding its own and its international partners’ interests.[9]
Non-interference revisited
The above approach stands as a staple of Algeria’s longstanding foreign policy of insisting on diplomatic solutions and rejecting military intervention. Yet, this is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, as Algiers cannot push for mediated solutions while insisting it has no role in the negotiations over the Western Sahara issue, or when it is actively pursuing mediating roles in Libya and Mali.[10]
Respecting the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference on others’ domestic affairs is among the key pillars of Algeria’s foreign policy, and is embedded in its constitution. However, the constitutional amendment of 2019 reversed this long-standing stance; It reads: “Algeria, within the framework of the United Nations, the African Union and the Arab League, and in full compliance with its principles and objectives, can participate in peace-keeping and restoration operations.”[11] Taking into account the fragility of neighbouring states, and the insecurity in the wider region, this shift might bring changes to Algerian foreign policy going forward. Moreover, it is a direct response to the country’s inability to react to the Libyan crisis, paving the way for proactiveness should a similar crisis occur, and opening the door for exploring other possible options for reaction.
While diplomatic revival is important, domestic stability is key for foreign policy to thrive. Despite Tebounne’s landslide reelection in September 2024, the regime has severed all ties with the Hirak movement that brought it to power, and has almost returned to its pre-2019 situation. The political scene is still dominated by the old ruling class, lacking fundamental changes or the emergence of new political actors, with the right of freedom of expression and association being suppressed, and used to imprison Hirak activists, journalists and researchers. As the demands of the Hirak movement remain unfulfilled and are combined with popular discontent over the cost of living and other issues, they pose a serious concern for the administration.[12]
Even if Algeria is using its position to exert influence over the Palestinian issue and the situation in Western Sahara, with relatively positive results, it cannot achieve similar results in the highly unstable Sahel region. Its own security remains a priority both on the domestic and international front, and it is likely that, should the situation on its borders with Mali and Niger deteriorate, Algiers will revisit its policy of non-intervention. At the end of the day, the security issue is the one that will primarily dictate Algeria’s strategies going forward, with its elevated international prestige helping in rallying allies.
All links accessed on 10/1/2025.
[1] Al Jazeera, "Palestinian factions sign reconciliation agreement in Algeria," October 13, 2022 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/13/palestinian-factions-sign-reconciliation-agreement-in-algeria.
[2] Madjid Serrah, "With Tebboune re-elected, will Algeria's foreign policy change?," The New Arab, September 17, 2024 https://www.newarab.com/analysis/tebboune-re-elected-will-algerias-foreign-policy-change.
[3] Ilhem Rachidi "Morocco and Algeria: A Long Rivalry," Carnegie Endowment, May 3, 2022 https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2022/05/morocco-and-algeria-a-long-rivalry?lang=en.
[4] International Crisis group, "Managing Tensions between Algeria and Morocco," Report 247, November 29, 2024 https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/247-algeria-morocco-western-sahara/managing-tensions-between ; see also ADF, "‘New Level of Escalation’ Between Algeria, Morocco," April 2, 2024 https://adf-magazine.com/2024/04/new-level-of-escalation-between-algeria-morocco.
[5] Patricia Karam, "In Algeria, the More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same," Arab Center Washington DC, October 3, 2023 https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/in-algeria-the-more-things-change-the-more-they-stay-the-same.
[6] The Arab Weekly, "Wary of growing regional isolation, Algeria seeks closer ties with Tunisia and Libya," March 5, 2024 https://thearabweekly.com/wary-growing-regional-isolation-algeria-seeks-closer-ties-tunisia-and-libya.
[7] Ibid ; see also Center for Preventive Action, "Violent Extremism in the Sahel," Global Conflict Tracker, October 23, 2024 https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel ; see also Thomas M. Hill, "For Peace in the Sahel, Can the U.S. Work with Algeria?," United States Institute of Peace, November 29, 2023 https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/peace-sahel-can-us-work-algeria.
[8] Center for Preventive Action, op.cit. ; see also Zine Labidine Ghebouli, "Policy shifts and political challenges as Algeria prepares for upcoming elections," Middle East Institute, January 11, 2024 https://www.mei.edu/publications/policy-shifts-and-political-challenges-algeria-prepares-upcoming-elections.
[9] Zine Labidine Ghebouli, "The Road Ahead of Algeria’s Elections: A Changing Status Quo?," Arab Reform Initiative, March 15, 2024 https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-road-ahead-of-algerias-elections-a-changing-status-quo/.
[10] Sabina Henneberg, "Global Ambitions and Tunisia’s Crisis Could Spur Algeria to Rethink Its Non-Intervention Policy," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 27, 2023 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/global-ambitions-and-tunisias-crisis-could-spur-algeria-rethink-its-non.
[11] Lofti Sour, "Algeria’s Role in the African Sahel: Toward a New Security Paradigm," IJEMS 15, No 2 (2022), 172-173 https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.155-177.pdf.
[12] Zine Labidine Ghebouli, op.cit, ; see also Simon Speakman Cordall, "In its presidential elections, Algeria prepares for ‘business as usual’," Al Jazeera, September 7, 2024 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/7/in-its-presidential-elections-algeria-prepares-for-business-as-usual.
