Iran has consistently attempted to portray the Arab spring as an "Islamic Awakening" and a continuation of its own Iranian revolution of 1979, in an attempt to further its main goal, the consolidation of its role as regional power. By choosing to ignore the clearly political, and not religious, context of the Arab uprisings, Iran has failed to mobilize the Muslim world under its wing. Its goal of achieving a "leader" status in the region, could be threatened even more by the risk of failure of the ongoing nuclear talks, and also by the menacing presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

As the United States has been undertaking an air strike campaign in Iraq and Syria for several weeks, the familiar question in US foreign policy debates reappeared: can airpower alone do the job? Wrong questions, though, lead to wrong answers. Too much focus on military means and ways results in the tacticization of strategy and the neglect of the political context. The United States should strive to defeat the Islamic State strategically, employing military force if necessary, but not by force alone, because weapons can win battles but cannot win wars.

During most of its modern history, Egypt seemed to follow a more or less similar path in its foreign policy: it would align with one major power after another and would thus gain an advantageous position in the region. During the past two centuries, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States have replaced one another in more or less the same role. Amid the “new Cold War” trend being covered lately in the international press and Sisi’s recent visit to Moscow where he signed the first arms deal with Russia since the 1960’s, many have begun speaking of a renewal of the strategic relationship between the two countries and a consequent chill between Cairo and Washington.

US President Barack Obama’s announcement regarding the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan has necessitated a reshuffling of the geostrategic relations of neighbouring countries in the region. The decision to hand security management back to Afghan authorities has raised questions concerning the stability of the country after the withdrawal of US troops. Afghanistan, Pakistan and India are now compelled to re-evaluate their policies towards each other.

Experiencing a fast economic growth for approximately the past thirty years, China has in the last decade felt strong enough to play a much more active role compared to the recent past. Amid a debate regarding whether China will or will not be the next superpower challenging the US global hegemony, the Middle East is considered as among the first regions the potential Sino-American rivalry will take place. However, despite the truth such scenarios entail, reality is arguably more complex, especially in the now changing socio-political landscape of the Middle East.

The Libyan Arab Spring led to the inauguration of a new chapter in the country's history. What is most challenging in the foreseeable future is who is going to be the leading player of the transitional process or else who is going to set the hierarchy of needs in the Libyan state in order to prevent further confrontation and polarization. The rule of law and democratic principles cannot be instilled into Libyan people overnight. Tremendous effort is needed in order to fulfil “the responsibility to protect the civilians”.

After nine months of protes ts, escalating violenc e, and an es timated 5 ,0 0 0 civilian deaths, it appears that government and anti-regime forc es have reac hed a s talemate. T hough on the brink of a “slow motion collapse”, the Assad regime is determined to remain in power, and will continue its bloody campaign agains t dissenters at all cos ts. In the interes t of s tability and the regional balanc e of power, the United S tates and the international community have several potential polic y options to address the growing turmoil. T he urgenc y of the situation grows daily, as ac tors settle in for a “long winter of Arab discontent”, amids t signs of an emerging civil war.

“It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of c hanging the map of the Middle E as t, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar”, says Edward Said in Orientalism. T he lates t threats for the region are –no surprise- direc ted agains t Iran and with US elec tions fas t approac hing the various candidates are busy in talking themselves into a possible US -backed Is raeli s trike. In case this psyc hological warfare leads to war, a Global Armageddon Sc enario could be in the offing.

The “Arab Spring” and the uprisings ac ross the region led to two “paradoxes” that few antic ipated at the outset. F irst, the ascent of the Saudi Kingdom as the Sunni regional hegemon and the second, the newrole of the USA as the mainstay of democ ratic change not against radical regimes, as it was the neo-conservative case, but at the expense of regional friendships and allegiances in E gypt, Tunisia and Yemen. In other words, the democ ratic wave has strengthened the regional position of the most undemoc ratic and pre-modern political and soc ial system in the Middle E ast and has enhanced the American soft power in a region where antiAmericanism was skyrocketing.

The 2011 Arab Spring has not only tested the Turkish and the American role in the MiddleEast. Rather, it constitutes a major challenge to the consistence and the achievements of the AKP’s (Justice and Development Party) “zero-problems” foreign policy, and threatens the preservation of Turkish and American regional interests. However, the Arab uprisings also have the potential to engender other, more positive changes in the context of the Turkish-American relationship.