"ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror" follows ISIS throughout the years of its existence, with the scope of defining not only its origins but also the dynamics that transformed it from a minor jihadist group to a powerful worldwide menace. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan track ISIS since its very beginning as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) up until the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, using the method of original interviews with US military intelligence and officers and western diplomats, as well as with ISIS fighters or people who got in touch with key people of the group. Their goal is to offer the readers the chance to form their own judgment about the growth of ISIS, by presenting the facts objectively and staying to the point.

Under different circumstances Abu Musíab al-Suri could have been an established academic as he is characterized by strict methodological adherence, intellectual arrogance, inclination to self-citation, strained relations with colleagues and thirst for recognition. Nevertheless, the current international situation renders his candidacy for a university chair out of question. Hence, he rightfully occupies a position in the unofficial intelligencia of militant jihadi Islamism and he holds the undisputed chairmanship in the ëdepartment of strategics. However, more than that and besides his intellectualism, he is an ëadeptí heir of the tradition of field guerrilla warfare theoreticians. If unconventional warfare is doomed to irrelevance in the face of superior technology, organization and intelligence of the modern armies, Suri appears to give it a new breath.

Η κρίση στη Συρία αποτελεί από τη μία πλευρά μέρος της καθυστερημένης ένταξης της περιοχής στην καπιταλιστική παγκοσμιοποίηση και από την άλλη το τέλος του νεωτερικού πολιτικού-ιδεολογικού προγράμματος του αραβικού εθνικισμού. Ο ανταγωνισμός για την περιφερειακή ηγεμονία συμπλέκεται με προ-νεωτερικές συγκρούσεις δημιουργώντας ένα πολύ προβληματικό γεωπολιτικό σκηνικό.

The revolutions and the uprisings in the Middle East changed the balances in the region and, consequently, Russia’s perspective on it. Russia had to face the risk of losing relatively new gains, as well as dilemmas on which side to favour, especially in the case of Libya and Syria. It can be said that Moscow generally remained a “royal realist,” standing on the side of its interest and trying to adapt its policies to the ad hoc developments. The way Russian policy will develop and the extent to which the already made choices have been successful or not are both still “under process.”

Authors: Evangelos Diamantopoulos, Costas Faropoulos, Maria Kourpa, Iris Pappa, Charitini Petrodaskalaki, Aliki Sofianou