Lebanon is in a state of numbness. The deadlock over the presidential election and the Saudi pressure has fired up a political debate and animosity between the two opposing camps, the March 14 alliance and the March 8 alliance. Sa’ad Hariri has attempted to create some sort of momentum towards electing a president and, at the same time, to protect his interests, but it has not bore any fruits. Hezbollah on the other side, continues to essentially control the political developments, by boycotting the election process and perpetuating the stalemate.

The successful negotiations of the Nuclear Deal are strengthening the Iranian government domestically and are repairing the country’s reputation internationally. The forthcoming removal of sanctions is aspiring to bring economic prosperity in the country, even if this benefits Iranian elites rather than the wider population. The overcoming of distrust between Iran and the West might lead to wider negotiations on other issues in the future, especially the resolution of the Syrian Crisis and the countering of ISIS, although it is unlikely that Iran will abandon its traditional allies in the Middle East, such as Bashar al-Assad.

The Syrian war has been affecting Jordan directly and indirectly for the past few years. The refugee crisis and the rise of jihadism in the region has challenged both its political system and its social cohesion. The inability to cope with the constantly growing needs of the refugee population, along with the simmering political unrest, is threatening the social cohesion of the country, while the rise of Salafism poses a threat to the stability of the regime. The way with which the state reacts to these challenges will shape Jordan’s future for the next years to come.

Hezbollah’s growth in the past years has been evident on many levels. It is the dominant political force in Lebanon and has been using its growing confidence to spread its influence beyond Lebanese borders. Hezbollah has been assisting Shiite movements across the region, and has taken an active role in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar al-Assad, shaping developments on the ground. The increasing importance of non-state actors, like Hezbollah and the al-Nusra Front in the shaping of the reality on the ground cannot be ignored. Regional politics are transforming and the Middle East follows suit. 

The way the Arab and Muslim people in the region react to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)reveals the boundaries of the Islamic State (IS) identity formation. Even though ISIS aspires to supplant other religious, Arab and national identities, in reality the IS cannot unshackle itself from these identities.

As the United States has been undertaking an air strike campaign in Iraq and Syria for several weeks, the familiar question in US foreign policy debates reappeared: can airpower alone do the job? Wrong questions, though, lead to wrong answers. Too much focus on military means and ways results in the tacticization of strategy and the neglect of the political context. The United States should strive to defeat the Islamic State strategically, employing military force if necessary, but not by force alone, because weapons can win battles but cannot win wars.

Throughout its history, Lebanon has always seemed to be fighting the wars of others at the expense of its national unity. Due to the current surge in violence, analysts and politicians have been expressing fears of its descent into a civil war for a long time now. The question is: how come it hasn’t erupted yet?

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Syrian crisis and its regional repercussions in three circles. The first circle refers to Syria’s neighbourhood i.e. Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon. The second circle concerns the Arab-Israeli conflict comprising Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan. The third one is the great regional circle, which refers to the antagonism for regional hegemony and includes Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and of course the USA.

In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon that came into force provided the EU with a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a newly devised European External Action Service that was formed in January 2011.  The Arab uprisings and the civil wars in Libya and Syria constituted early and delicate test benches for the new CFSP. Nevertheless, assessing the CFSP during the Syrian crisis cannot be decoupled from the role played by the European member states most involved in the events on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

The article is about the Iraqi stance on the Syrian crisis and in particular of the official government, the Sunni minority in Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds and the tribes in Iraq. Each party has its own goals and interests in the outcome of the Syrian civil war and we will see them unfold below.