The Iranian leadership remains trapped in a revolutionary ideology that is sustained by a nationalist narrative, especially in times of hardship. Appealing to the patriotic sentiment of the people has worked in the past, but in the current circumstances the public, especially the millennial generation who have no memory of the Revolution or the Iran-Iraq war, have lost faith in this narrative. Faced with a stifling economic and employment crisis, excruciating sanctions and mounting international pressure, the Iranian political, military and clerical establishment is more than ever challenged to adapt to the changes that have driven the society in 40 years, or face protests that could get out of the control of Tehran. Although the regime is aware of the crucial momentum, any promises for reform remain unfulfilled, as a wide array of unelected bodies is still capable of blocking any initiative of the elected government. The US stance boosts the narrative and the anti-US sentiment, thus making an implosion or a regime change à la US unlikely to materialize anytime soon.
The Algerian people massively took to the streets for a fourth consecutive Friday on March 15th 2019, protesting against the elite, despite President Bouteflika’s maneuver four days earlier, in which he sought to appease the demonstrators by withdrawing his initial candidacy for a fifth term and postponed sine die the elections scheduled for the 18th of April. The protesters, most of them young and coming from all backgrounds, appear determined, while, at the same time, cracks are visible given the multiplication of defections within the ruling party and the business elites. However, it is of note that the Algerian system, a complex civilian-military-business nexus, would not readily give up its power and profits, and, most importantly, the army’s domination within the system is not easily challenged.
Following an eight-month-long political deadlock, a new Lebanese government was ultimately formed on January 31. Although many key politicians have retained their presence in the new administration, the reflection of last May’s national election results, and the dynamics generated thereof, is evident. PM Saad Hariri’s significant electoral losses were translated into gains for the Shi’i coalition that also includes Hezbollah. Domestically, the latter’s increased cabinet share indicates a political elevation, which in turn causes considerable anxiety to the West, Israel and the Gulf. More importantly though, its growing influence, if combined with other political forces, may as well impact significantly the country’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Syria
Saudi Arabia seems to slowly lose grip of its allies in the Gulf, and it is getting more evident in the war in Yemen. What started as a matter of a few months’ time and a strategic win for the new Prince turned into a headache for the Saudi monarchy. The country is losing the war against the Houthi insurgents day by day, but is also having a hard time holding the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) together, as well as continuing to persuade the West on its mission against Iranian influence in the region. Saudi Arabia remains as the head of the coalition in Yemen, while the rest of the GCC countries are pursuing their own agendas and pushing for their own views on the region’s stability. In the meantime, soft powers within the GCC, such as the Kingdom of Oman, move forward as a new, soft, temperate player and Qatar wins the PR war against the Saudis in the West. The Yemen war seems to be the place where Gulf political elites exercise their clout for regional prevalence.
Almost two years after the imposition of a blockade to Qatar by the Anti-Terror Quartet (ATQ), what started as an effort to force Doha into the Saudi sphere of influence has now turned into a power struggle between the Gulf monarchies. Despite the fact that there is no clear winner in this rivalry, the tiny but resilient Gulf state is now posing as a strong adversary to Saudi Arabia, emerging as an aspiring leader with conflicting economic interests and significant involvement in vital Saudi operational theaters, such as the Yemeni one. In what way has the Gulf crisis reshaped conditions in the region and is there any chance for reconciliation?
Relations between Erbil and Baghdad have been ofttimes strained in the past. Lately, following the fallout of the 2017 referendum of independence, KRG lost most of its tools for leverage in negotiations with Federal government. That has been evident in the military invasion and finally re-establishment of Central government’s control over Kirkuk and most of the disputed territories, and given the international, notably US, silence. One year later, after the Iraqi and Kurdistan Region’s parliamentary elections in 2018, hopes are relatively renewed. However, as long as key issues in their disagreements remain unsolved, these hopes can easily fade away.
Recent years have witnessed warming ties between Egypt and Israel. Far from forging a deeper and more comprehensive relationship between the two countries, this rapprochement has successfully glossed over long-standing differences with an eye to addressing immediate geopolitical challenges. A natural corollary of converging strategic, economic and security interests and challenges, the rapprochement is likely to remain intact in the mid-term. It can thus be seen as a continuation of the ‘strategic peace’ established during the second decade of President Mubarak’s rule.
Among the promises the U.S. President Donald J. Trump has made is the formulation of a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. To that end, the task was assigned to Jared Kushner, senior adviser to the White House and his son-in law.[1] However, the details of the plan known as the “Deal of the Century” are yet to be released. In the meantime, recent developments, generated by the actions taken by the U.S. administration and their implications on the both Israel and Palestine need to be taken seriously into consideration, as they directly influence the already fragile situation on the ground.
The Khashoggi case has put a magnifying glass on the instability of relations among Middle East countries and especially on the turbulent relationship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is in no position to take head on the Saudi kingdom regarding the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi; at the same time Erdogan cannot ignore such an overpublicized incident. Khashoggi may be the opportunity Erdogan was looking for in order to re-approach Saudi Arabia and the US, and establish Turkey as a strong middle power in the region. Only time will show if the rapprochement will be considered as a prudent diplomatic move by Erdogan.
Once more Sudan is stricken by protest. Sudanese are on the streets due to the increase of bread prices. The government responded violently towards the dissent. Five people lost their lives, around 60 have been arrested including the leader of the Sudanese Communist Party Mokhtar al- Khatib, and the regime blocked the sale of several newspapers.
Economic reasons solely are behind the demonstrations. The prices of basic needs and commodities such as bread, medicine, electricity and fuel have increased in unprecedented levels. The government eliminated wheat subsidies from its 2018 budget. It’s adopting austerity measures in line with IMF recommendations, and inflation rose to 25 % making extremely difficult for ordinary Sudanese to buy imported goods. The country is also lacking hard currency to facilitate needed imports. The measures aim to make Sudanese economy more competitive since it can no longer depend on its oil resources since 2011 when South Sudanese separated, after a half century of war with Sudan. The longest Africa has ever seen.
While the 2018 elections are approaching, few believe that anything will change in the army’s control of the Egyptian regime. When the regime imprisoned opposing candidates General Sami Hafez Ana and Khaled Ali and others withdrew from the electoral race, it was made crystal clear that Al-Sisi’-s position would not be at stake. So, why should anyone study the upcoming Egyptian elections? Could there be a real opposition or is Sisi that untouchable?
Saudi Arabia is undergoing significant political change as it moves from family rule to a one man state. Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman is undertaking a series of reforms with implications both to Saudi society and economy and to the regional strategy of the country. His aspirations to restructure the economy and provide some freedoms to segments of society are combined with an aggressive foreign policy resulting in the war in Yemen and tensions with other neighbors such as Qatar. However, these initiatives might be an indication of the efforts for a greater concentration of power on the hands of the Crown Prince and have led to what has been described as a “palace coup”.[1]
“…consider the vast influence of accident in war before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong and, to act first, and to wait for disaster to discuss the matter…’’ (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, book one, par. 78).
40 years ago, on Saturday, November 19th, 1977 Egypt’s President Anwar el Sadat’s landed to Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Αirport.
This paper has no intention or ambition to rewrite history and/or teach diplomacy. It simply aims to recollect the facts – some at least – and proceed to the analysis of gains and losses for the protagonists of this extraordinary journey.
The decision of the Kurdistan Regional Government to proceed with the independence bid on September 25, precipitated a serious crisis in the region. Seemingly, one important question to be addressed is the consequences the Kurdish referendum engenders to the recently shaped Iran-Turkey-Russia axis, particularly on the Syrian issue. Whereas Iran and Turkey often find themselves at loggerheads over regional issues, their shared concern in preventing Kurdish statehood, seems to provide the necessary fuel towards cooperation, if not alliance-building. Russia, in the meanwhile, has adopted a “wait-and-see” policy on the matter. Still, the extent to this cooperation can be much constrained by their own diverging interests in the region.
Το Κέντρο Μεσογειακών,Μεσανατολικών και Ισλαμικών Σπουδών φιλοξενεί πληθώρα διαφορετικών απόψεων στα πλαίσια του ελεύθερου ακαδημαϊκού διαλόγου. Οι απόψεις αυτές δεν αντανακλούν υποχρεωτικά τις απόψεις του Κέντρου. Η χρήση και αναπαραγωγή οπτικοακουστικού υλικού για τις ανάγκες της ιστοσελίδας του ΚΕΜΜΙΣ γίνεται για ενημερωτικούς, ακαδημαϊκούς και μη κερδοσκοπικούς σκοπούς κατά τα προβλεπόμενα του Νόμου 2121/1993 (ΦΕΚ Α' 25/4-3-1993) περί της προστασίας της πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας, καθώς και του άρ.8 του Νόμου 2557/1997 (ΦΕΚ Α' 271/1997).
