Almost 6 years since the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, the long-term and largely neglected conflict, is still going strong, albeit turning to several internal conflicts between local actors benefiting from the weakness of central government and the numerous divisions of societal and state structures that favor the prevalence of local authorities. Even though frontlines have not changed significantly over the last couple of years and most local actors have established their authority in certain regions, the war has not been called and conflict persists in key areas of the country. In the governorates of Marib, Taiz, Hadramawt and Al- Hudeydah, clashes persist and neither of the two main conflicting parties has consolidated its authority in these areas, despite Houthis gaining significant ground over the last year.

Saudi Arabia seems to slowly lose grip of its allies in the Gulf, and it is getting more evident in the war in Yemen. What started as a matter of a few months’ time and a strategic win for the new Prince turned into a headache for the Saudi monarchy. The country is losing the war against the Houthi insurgents day by day, but is also having a hard time holding the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) together, as well as continuing to persuade the West on its mission against Iranian influence in the region. Saudi Arabia remains as the head of the coalition in Yemen, while the rest of the GCC countries are pursuing their own agendas and pushing for their own views on the region’s stability. In the meantime, soft powers within the GCC, such as the Kingdom of Oman, move forward as a new, soft, temperate player and Qatar wins the PR war against the Saudis in the West. The Yemen war seems to be the place where Gulf political elites exercise their clout for regional prevalence.

The civil war in Yemen began in March 2015, after the overthrow of the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi by the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia-led movement and the commencement of an air campaign against the former by a Saudi-led coalition. The conflict has a distinctly international undertone, as it involves all important regional actors and hasn’t escaped the attention of international ones. In addition, it is fought for both pecuniary interests (securing unimpeded access to the Red Sea through the Bab al-Mandab strait, where much of the world’s oil shipments pass through)[1] and ideological ones (checking what is seen by the Gulf States as Iran’s burgeoning hegemonic ambitions following the July 2015 nuclear deal). Not too dissimilar to Syria, regional power projection has left an already poor country in tatters and led to one more humanitarian disaster. The Guardian’s Simon Tisdall put it best when he wrote that Yemen today has become “another Syria, on a smaller scale”.[2]

Hezbollah’s direct or indirect involvement in the regional conflicts with Shia elements, namely Syria, Iraq and Yemen, has altered the public perception of the group in the Middle East. At the same time, it has taken a sharp turn against the Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia, as an extension of its fighting against jihadist groups in Syria, but also because of the group’s closer cooperation with Iran.

Saudi Arabia and the Middle East have yet again attracted the globe’s attention, as the ongoing crisis in nearby Yemen, which has virtually left it ungoverned and its population in despair, seems to be evolving into an all-our war. 

Last week’s popular protests in Bahrain and Yemen have revived some strategic questions. The regimes of both countries are important U.S. military allies in the region and their internal affairs have strong reverberations on Saudi Arabia's security. The possibility of Iran exploiting the situation to expand its influence in the region and the penetration of Al Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula are further elements of concern.