On October 7, 2023, President Biden declared his administration’s “rock-solid and unwavering support” to Israel. More than nine months into the Gaza war, his adherence to his initial promise is unquestionable. This article will examine US foreign policy vis-à-vis the war on Gaza, focusing on its prospective objectives and its implications on domestic, regional, and international levels. It will also argue that American foreign policy on the issue is primarily reactive rather than proactive.

Israel’s normalizing relations with various Arab countries brought the Palestinians once again before the bitter realization that time is working against them. It appears that this realization triggered a process of reconciliation among the Palestinians. Yet, will these efforts suffice to influence the course of the Palestinian Question within a rapidly changing regional environment?

 

 

 

 

 

 

Among the promises the U.S. President Donald J. Trump has made is the formulation of a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. To that end, the task was assigned to Jared Kushner, senior adviser to the White House and his son-in law.[1] However, the details of the plan known as the “Deal of the Century” are yet to be released. In the meantime, recent developments, generated by the actions taken by the U.S. administration and their implications on the both Israel and Palestine need to be taken seriously into consideration, as they directly influence the already fragile situation on the ground.

In most of Egypt, the revolution that broke out on January 25th, 2011, took the form of non-violent protest but in Sinai, which has historically been more turbulent and unstable, the rebellion became a full-blown military insurgency. Since the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi on the 3rdof July, 2013, the situation in the Sinai Peninsula has become even more critical. The tense relations between the Egyptian army and Gaza, the declared war of the Generals against the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jihadists, and the necessity of the Egyptian government’s compliance with the peace treaty of 1979 with Israel, all serve as factors to make things more complicated in times when the spirit of uprising is apparent all over the region.

The ongoing war in Gaza is a typical case of a war that is not meant to offer any significant change to the general equilibrium of the conflict. It is a strategic ?World War I?, an inconclusive trench war which was born out of the impasse of a truce and is destined for the stalemate of another one. It is an escalation towards a situation of limited options. Moreover, it is asymmetrical not only in terms of means and actors but also and most importantly in terms of aims: the Israeli side strives for military goals while Hamas? objectives are political.

Notwithstanding the political boundaries that were successfully concocted by internal clannish and private interests as well as by external hegemonies, the phenomenon of the Social Contract (Ummah), regardless of its constituents or size, still plays a most significant role in propelling hopes for better economic, political and social justice among the disbursed subjects. Such nostalgic hopes turn into apathy and frustration, depending on the prevailing events of the times. If however, the post Arab-Spring experience in Egypt or Libya or Iraq, Yemen or Syria, just to name a few, puts down firm roots over the region, then it goes without saying that a New Middle East, politically and culturally very different from the one we know today, will arise.

Η επιχείρηση του ισραηλινού στρατού στη Γάζα και οι συνεχιζόμενες επιθέσεις εντός της Δυτικής Όχθης από παραστρατιωτικές ομάδες Ισραηλινών εποίκων εναντίον Παλαιστινίων δεν αποτελούν βέβαια «απάντηση» στην δολοφονία των τριών Ισραηλινών εφήβων. Προφανώς αποτελούν τα δύο σκέλη ενός σχεδίου του Ισραήλ για αποδυνάμωση ή και εξάλειψη της Χαμάς ως στρατιωτικής και πολιτικής δύναμης. Σημαντικές δεξαμενές σκέψης που καλύπτουν σχεδόν όλο το πολιτικό φάσμα του Ισραήλ, προτρέπουν όχι απλά για αεροπορικές επιθέσεις και επιλεκτικές χερσαίες επιχειρήσεις αλλά για ανακατάληψη της Λωρίδας της Γάζας για ορισμένο χρονικό διάστημα ώστε να εφαρμόσουν τις τακτικές που εφαρμόστηκαν το 2002 κατά την επιχείρηση «Αμυντική Ασπίδα» εναντίον της δεύτερης παλαιστινιακής Ιντιφάντα.