ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΜΕΣΟΓΕΙΑΚΩΝ, ΜΕΣΑΝΑΤΟΛΙΚΩΝ & ΙΣΛΑΜΙΚΩΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΩΝ

Lebanon is in a state of numbness. The deadlock over the presidential election and the Saudi pressure has fired up a political debate and animosity between the two opposing camps, the March 14 alliance and the March 8 alliance. Sa’ad Hariri has attempted to create some sort of momentum towards electing a president and, at the same time, to protect his interests, but it has not bore any fruits. Hezbollah on the other side, continues to essentially control the political developments, by boycotting the election process and perpetuating the stalemate.

Professor Roussos spoke to Greek News Agenda* about the study of the Muslim World, the Syrian crisis and its repercussions, the Islamic State, Turkey, Iran, and the European stance on the refugee crisis:

The forthcoming presidential elections in the United States are possibly the most crucial of the last decades. As the presidency of the extremely popular Barack Obama is coming to its end, the presidential candidates are going to extremes. Whilst the Democratic Party is proposing its most “socialist” candidate in years, the Republican Party participates in a festival of xenophobia and bigotry with aggressive international policies outside the United States and dangerous immigration policies inside them. But what if the next U.S. president is a Republican? What would be the implications on the political situation in the Middle East and the Muslims within the U.S.?

In the last decade and a half, most analysts argue that the Russo-Iranian relation is primarily driven by external factors, particularly their desire to counter the US hegemony in the broader region, rather than the bilateral relations. Seen under the prism of a zero-sum game, the rapprochement of Tehran with the West brings many analysts to re-evaluate and question the Russian-Iranian ties. The arguments seem to lean towards Iran shunning Russia, disregarding multiple crucial factors related to the Iranian domestic political scene, their collaboration in Syria and even in the Caucasus. Despite the limitations and the ‘watchfulness’ between Moscow and the Islamic Republic, these factors will hinder any serious regression in their cooperation in the near future.

Nowadays, Islam is gaining popularity in everyday life in North Caucasus. The Islamic revival that started with the collapse of the Soviet Union has led to a rapid Islamization of the society and has provided a fertile ground for political Islam as well. The language of political Islam is used extensively and in various forms, with local authorities and the religious opposition both deriving their arguments from Islam. Hence, in North Caucasus Islamic discourse unfolds on various levels, from Ramzan Kadyrov’s “official state” Islam in Chechnya up to the radical salafi-jihadi Islamism espoused first by the Caucasus Emirate and, more recently, by ISIS affiliates.

Ακόμη και στις πιο σκοτεινές στιγμές διεθνούς απομόνωσης και δυτικών πιέσεων ένα πράγμα δεν μπορούσε να ισχυριστεί κάποιος, ότι είναι δυνατόν να αγνοήσει το Ιράν χωρίς να πληρώσει ιδιαιτέρως βαρύ τίμημα. Σήμερα η συζήτηση για το συριακό ζήτημα περιστρέφεται γύρω από την συμπεριφορά κρατών, όπως η Ρωσία, η Τουρκία ή ακόμη και η Γαλλία, ενώ φαίνεται να παραγνωρίζει τον κεντρικό ρόλο του Ιράν. Θα τολμούσαμε να ισχυριστούμε ότι χωρίς κάποιες από τις παραπάνω ή και όλες τις παραπάνω δυνάμεις το συριακό ζήτημα μπορεί να επιλυθεί, χωρίς όμως την Τεχεράνη (και βεβαίως τη Ριάντ και την Ουάσιγκτον) δεν μπορεί.

Qaboos bin Said al Said is the absolute monarch of the Sultanate of Oman reigning the small Gulf state for more than forty years. Most recent rumor has it that Qaboos has been suffering from terminal cancer and thus a succession speculation crisis has been looming for some time. Oman holds one of the most bizarre ways of passing down the reign. The crisis that may occur in the royal family, as well as in the Majlis al Shura (local parliament), might exacerbate the already obscure—according to economic estimations and figures—future of the citizens of the heretofore powerful Sultanate.  

Nowadays, the Palestinian protests are mainly another reaction to the long-standing oppressive Israeli policies implemented against the Palestinian people. Although one cannot tell yet, whether this unrest will evolve into a third Intifada, several similarities to the first Intifada (1987-1993) are being noticed, as well as some differences. Specifically, the similarities are the Israeli government coalition’s synthesis and its objectives on the eve of the revolts: namely, the economic circumstances of the Israeli economy and its influence on Palestine, due to the interconnection of the two economies; the social, educational and economic status of the Palestinian youth and its role in the revolts; and finally, the stance of the Palestinian leadership. As for the differences, the most noteworthy is the Israeli settlers’ influence on the policy making and its execution.

While the United States revise their troop withdrawal plans from Afghanistan, the future of the country remains precarious. Violence still flourishes on the ground, the Afghan government seems unstable in contrast with the Taliban movement which looks stronger than ever, and, at the same time, al Qaeda tries to rebuild its presence in the region by opening the way for young Islamic extremists to join. In the meantime, thousands of Afghan refugees leave their country and enter Europe, while others, living in Pakistan, are being forced to return to their homeland.

The successful negotiations of the Nuclear Deal are strengthening the Iranian government domestically and are repairing the country’s reputation internationally. The forthcoming removal of sanctions is aspiring to bring economic prosperity in the country, even if this benefits Iranian elites rather than the wider population. The overcoming of distrust between Iran and the West might lead to wider negotiations on other issues in the future, especially the resolution of the Syrian Crisis and the countering of ISIS, although it is unlikely that Iran will abandon its traditional allies in the Middle East, such as Bashar al-Assad.