In 2011, Ethiopia unilaterally began construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile, triggering a dispute between Addis Ababa and Cairo and, to a lesser extent, Khartoum. The dispute has raised fears of a wider conflict among Nile basin countries, as a series of diplomatic efforts have failed to produce any agreement for the management and sharing of the Nile resources, with the GERD now nearing operational status.
The Nile Basin, a network of lakes and rivers spanning eleven countries, underscores the geopolitical significance of the Eastern Nile Basin, which is shared by Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. The White and Blue Nile tributaries converge in Khartoum, joined by the Atbarah River before flowing into Egypt. At the centre of the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over control of the Nile’s waters is the GERD, a twin-reservoir hydro-electric dam, located on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, which contributes approximately 85% of the Nile’s total flow.
Egypt’s control over the Nile water resources was solidified through colonial-era agreements. In 1929, through an exchange of notes, Britain, acting on behalf of its colonies in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, recognised “the natural and historical right of Egypt to the waters of the Nile” and agreed to observe these rights “irrespective of time and circumstances”, thus granting Egypt the right to veto any upstream projects that could affect its share of the waters.[1] The 1959 Nile River agreement between Egypt and Sudan allocated all Nile waters between the two countries, 66% to Egypt and 22% to Sudan annualy and paved the way for the construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, completed in 1970.
These agreements, by denying upstream access to Nile waters, effectively established Egypt’s position as the dominant hydro-power in the region. Ethiopia, whose own ambitions of building a dam were held back by decades of internal and regional conflict, challenges these agreements, arguing that they are not based on the principle of equitable sharing. Contemporary agreements have sought to bring Nile riparian states, particularly Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, into negotiations. In response to the perceived inequities of the colonial-era agreements, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was established in 1999 as a coordination mechanism for sustainable management among the eleven countries that share the basin and its resources.[2] Under the NBI, the Cooperative Framework Agreement was signed in 2010, to outline cooperative mechanisms. Egypt and Sudan, however, have not yet signed it.
The parties involved in the negotiations are divided. Upstream countries, led by Ethiopia, advocate for an agreement that favours “equitable utilisation” of the Nile’s waters. Downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan, view this position as a threat to their long-held control over the waters, established under the 1959 agreement, and argue that any agreement needs to consider water security, effectively requiring advanced notice for all major development projects in the Nile basin. Perceived as a reformulation of veto rights, upstream countries object.[3]
Following a diplomatic stalemate and a period of relative stability, Ethiopia, under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, announced the unilateral construction of the dam in 2011. In March 2015, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP) intended to guide tripartite negotiations on the filling and operation of the GERD.[4] The DOP included key compromises: Egypt promoted the principle of not causing significant harm to downstream countries and Ethiopia supported the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation.[5] A big point of contention between Egypt and Ethiopia was the filling rate of the dam, with Ethiopia favouring a rapid filling schedule and Egypt advocating for a more gradual approach.
In the absence of an agreement following negotiations, Ethiopia once again acted unilaterally and between 2020 and 2024 completed the five-phase filling of the dam. However, regional conflicts added another layer of complexity on the political stalemate. The Tigray war, which erupted in November 2020, just after the first filling of the dam, threatened to derail negotiations among the three parties, who were racing to reach an agreement before the start of the second filling.
Meles Zenawi's decision to build the GERD was driven by economic and political imperatives. Economically, the dam was intended to address Ethiopia's severe energy deficit, where two-thirds of the population lack electricity, and to generate revenue through electricity exports. Politically, the project aimed to consolidate Zenawi's power domestically, particularly following the contested 2005 elections, and to foster national unity. The GERD became a symbol of national pride, uniting diverse segments of Ethiopian society, who helped finance the dam and hence are heavily invested in its completion. Moreover, the loss of sea access following Eritrean independence, dealt Ethiopia a significant geopolitical blow. Subsequently, the GERD is seen as a means of bolstering Ethiopia’s position in the region vis a vis Egypt, with Addis Ababa seeking to control Nile water flow and ultimately replace Egypt as the basin’s primary power.[6]
Egypt and Sudan initially opposed the project but were caught in their own domestic upheavals. Although Sudan has voiced its concern about the potential impact of the GERD to its share of Nile waters, it also hopes that the dam will be instrumental in regulating annual floods and thus help boost agricultural production. Nonetheless, Sudan has been caught in a series of brutal civil wars. The war in Darfur (2003-2020), the conflict in South Sudan (2011-2020) and the ongoing fight that broke in 2023 between the Sudanese National Army (SNA) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum and the Darfur region, have weakened both Khartoum and Cairo’s negotiation stance.
In 2011 Egypt was still reeling from the political and social upheaval caused by the Arab Spring uprisings. It was not until President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi assumed power in 2014 that a more a robust diplomatic response was initiated, resulting in the tripartite talks that led to the 2015 DOP. Egypt relies on the Nile for over 90% of its water, with around 95% of Egyptians living along its banks. As such, any significant reduction in downstream water flow raises the spectre of a catastrophic food and water crisis.[7] There is fear that the dam will drastically reduce water flow downstream and cause diminished irrigation, threatening Egypt’s agricultural land with desertification.
Moreover, for Egypt, the Nile is the very lifeline of the nation and an inseparable part of its history, culture and civilisation. This deep-seated connection, spanning millennia, renders any perceived threat to the Nile an existential one.[8] Therefore, the GERD is viewed as a threat to Egypt’s fundamental security. The GERD is also a challenge to its established role as the dominant power in the region. Geopolitically, the GERD signifies a shift in the regional power dynamics as Egypt’s historical dominance over the Nile and its political and economic superiority is being challenged. A symbol of power competition for hegemony over the Nile water resources, the dam undermines centuries of Egypt’s hydro-hegemony over the Nile Basin.[9]
In the absence of independent studies, the precise impact of the GERD to downstream countries remains uncertain. To date, fears of a reduction in downstream water flow have not materialised. The dam is a fait accompli, but there are still no guidelines to regulate its operation or any future fillings.[10] What is now imperative is reaching an agreement to share the water resources in an equitable manner.
A wider management framework becomes even more urgent if factors such as climate change and population growth are to be considered. Due to climate change, rainfall is less predictable and floods more frequent. The urban population in the region is expected to grow to over 40% and 50% of the total population in most Nile basin riparian countries, driving water scarcity in the Nile.[11] Population growth and climate change affecting water supply means geopolitical competition over the Nile resources will intensify, shaping future relations among the riparian states.
Furthermore, contextualising the dam as a national security issue, locked in the geopolitical competition between Egypt and Ethiopia, obscures the human security issues pertaining to its construction and operation. Namely, dams have a great social and environmental impact that is currently not part of the public debate regarding the GERD. Hydroelectric dams offer a seemingly clean energy source, but they can cause significant environmental damage and increased water insecurity. Moreover, in the process of filling the dam, over 20,000 Gumuz farmers were displaced, disrupting their access to adequate housing, healthcare and educational services.[12] Any future agreement under the auspices of the NBI should address both the environmental and social impacts of the GERD.
All links accessed on 30/3/2025.
[1] International Water Law Project. “Exchange of Notes between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government on the Use of Waters of the Nile for Irrigation,” May 7, 1929. https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Egypt_UK_Nile_Agreement-1929.html
[2]Nile Basin Initiative. “Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework,” https://nilebasin.org/sites/default/files/attachments/CFA%20-%20English%20FrenchVersion.pdf
[3] International Crisis Group, “Bridging the Gap in the Nile Waters Dispute,” Africa Report 271, March 20 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/271-bridging-gap-nile-waters-dispute
[4] Khalil Al-Anani, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Limited Options for a Resolution”, Arab Center Washington DC, September 16, 2022 https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-limited-options-for-a-resolution/
[5] Agreement on Declaration of Principles between The Arab Republic of Egypt, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia And The Republic of the Sudan On The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP) signed at Khartoum, Sudan, March 23, 2015, https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bi203275.pdf
[6] International Crisis Group, ibid.
[7] Al Jazeera Interactives, “Saving the Nile”, Al Jazeera, January 23, 2020, https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/saving-the-nile/index.html
[8] Gashaw Ayferam, “The Nile Dispute: Beyond Water Security”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 19, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2023/01/the-nile-dispute-beyond-water-security?lang=en
[9] Ron Matthews and Vlado Vivoda, “Water Wars: strategic implications of the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”, Conflict, Security & Development 3, Νο 4, September 20, 2023, 333–366. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137
[10] Doaa El-Bey, “GERD: Failed opportunities”, Al-Ahram Weekly, March 19, 2025, https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1201/543211/AlAhram-Weekly/Egypt/GERD-Failed-opportunities.aspx
[11] Interactive Al Jazeera, ibid.
[12] Yosra Elgendi, “Ethiopia: The GERD dam, the Gumuz community and the escalation of conflict in Metekel,” Minority and Indigenous Trends 2023: Focus on Water, June 20, 2023, 192-196 https://minorityrights.org/app/uploads/2023/12/minority-and-indigenous-trends-2023-focus-on-water.pdf
