This article tracks domestic and foreign policy developments in Tunisia during the past three years, on the occasion of the latest election results, with Saied being reelected with 90% of the vote. A series of undemocratic discrepancies, a continuum of socioeconomic precarity and growing xenophobic practices are leading to the characterization of Tunisia as a state steadily moving towards authoritarianism.
Three years have passed since Tunisian President Kais Saied proceeded to suspend the government, freeze parliamentary activity and dismiss the Prime Minister. As a Constitutional Law Professor himself, Saied has been accused of organising a “self-coup” in order to concentrate power, reversing the political freedoms established following the Jasmine Revolution and leading Tunisia towards authoritarianism.[1] In the October 2024 elections, Saied was elected for a second term, with an overwhelming 90% of the vote, albeit with an 11% voter turn-up. Saied seems to work around opposition to his authoritarian rise with the cooptation of xenophobia in Tunisian streets, electoral meddling, a heavy hand in mass media and the instrumentalization of foreign relations with regional partners.
Democratic deficit, food insecurity and xenophobic attacks
The strikingly high electoral results seem to bolster deeper justifications rather than being merely the outcome of a fraudulent or distorted election process. More specifically, Saied set the pre-conditions for the elections, jailing the majority of political opponents and de facto excluding them from running against him. Key members of the main opposition party Ennahda were sentenced to prison, with intellectual leader Rached Ghannouchi being prosecuted with terrorism charges. Similar were the charges against Chaima Issa of the National Salvation Front (NSF), who publicly spoke against the “police state” and the military’s alleged interference in the electoral process.[2] Besides numerous additional imprisonments of journalists and activists, Saied empowered military courts and reformed the judicial system. The High Judicial Council got undermined via the arbitrary appointment of judges by the President himself, similarly to the Electoral Commission.[3] Following the Commission’s decision, only two opponents to Saied remained at the 2024 elections: Ayachi Zammel, eventually imprisoned with the accusation of falsifying electoral papers, and, formerly loyal to the President, Zouhair Maghzaoui, as the only legitimate political opponent. This concentration of power to the President should be read within the context of his strategy since 2019, called al-binaa al-kayidi, which loosely translates to “construction from the bottom-up”. In theory, this reads as a “democracy from the base” procedure where instead of politicians, it is the people that hold the power to reshape and enhance representation within democratic fora. While this narrative can be interpreted as paradoxical when compared to reality, it can be argued that it isn’t. By supporting localized forms of political participation and giving importance to the impoverished population living in rural areas, Saied sought to construct a “savior” leader image, while simultaneously excluding elites or other political opponents from adopting this populist narrative.[4] This approach also doubled as a distraction from the growing anti-democratic policies. In principle, democratic institutions exist, but remain hollow or distorted.
The fight against corruption remains the predominant governmental objective. Saied argued that to tackle the imminent threat of corruption, it is crucial to gather sufficient power under his thumb. According to Transparency International, Tunisia’s corruption score decreased from 43 in 2019 to 40 in 2023.[5] The situation still remains problematic, due to a growing undermining of freedom of the press, via the constitutional reform “Decree 54”.[6] The aim of this development is to combat fake news and rumors that spread online and might falsely accuse the government and its policies. The reform gives significant liberty to authorities to interpret it at their own discretion. This has sparked popular outcry regarding a direct attack to freedom of speech and a growing securitization of Tunisian public dialogue.
Recalling the past years’ food insecurity, shortages and poverty levels, little has changed. The poverty rate has slightly decreased to almost 17%, similarly to the unemployment rate at 15.11% in 2023. Food inflation remains at a high percentage of 9.2, with 16.6% of Tunisians living below the poverty line and more than 1.5 million experiencing food insecurity. Moreover, migration towards European countries remains high. The government is shifting blame for these grievances to political opponents and, all the while maintaining the pledge to resolve them. Adhering to his pro-lower-class rhetoric and his deus ex-machina persona, Saied rejected a 2bn USD bail-out package from the IMF, arguing for taxing the rich, instead of bowing to foreign aid.[7]
This leftist-leaning populist rhetoric is paired with a narrative against migratory flows from sub-Saharan states. Black migrants are used as scapegoats to explain the economic crisis and stagnation.[8] Recalling a mix of a pan-Arabist discourse with the “Great Replacement theory”, the government and affiliated media are reproducing the narrative that, if migration is not halted, Tunisia will be further impoverished, crime will rise and its population will be replaced by black Africans – as a conspiracy to alter demographics. Following this thought line, Saied stated at the Tunisian National Security Council that the country would be “just another African country, divorced from its Arab and Islamic roots”.[9] The above have legitimized a wave of violent attacks and everyday discrimination against black migrants, whose living conditions were already highly deplorable. National security forces deny committing themselves or turning a blind eye to these human rights violations against Tunisia’s black population, while the state of mass media allow for little to no challenging the racist and xenophobic commentary.
Foreign policy as a means for further domestic empowerment?
This anti-immigration discourse has also been a point of reference regarding Tunisia’s relations in the region and with the EU. Tunisia signed a multi-million migration deal with the European Commission to prevent migratory flows from crossing EU borders. This has generated backlash within the EU, with some condemning a deal that leads to severe violations of human rights by Tunisian authorities.[10] Although Saied’s pre-election rhetoric centered around domestic issues, he has not presented a solid foreign policy strategy. Instead, he maintained a populist agenda that focuses on non-alignment and anti-imperialism despite notable relations with France, a former colonial power, stating that Tunisia will not become a “traitor” as others in the region and subordinate to the West.[11] Moreover, the security situation in bordering Libya still remains a priority. Algeria stands as one of Tunisia’s partners and lenders, while reciprocity with other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt has been observed. Considering rising instability and tensions in MENA, it is critical for regional actors that Tunisia remains stable domestically, to avoid a spill-over that could further inflame the broader geopolitical environment. Saied’s foreign policy seems twofold: limited but extroverted with regard to securing loans, and, used as a tool for the broader rhetoric aiming at centralizing power in the hands of the President.
The objective for Tunisians is to solidify the legacy of the 2011 uprisings and foster a democratic system that can reshape socioeconomic inequalities and protect human rights and freedom of press. There is growing danger that a dispersed culture of repression and fear can backtrack Tunisian politics from the birthplace of the Arab Spring to an era of person-centered authoritarianism.[12] Development is to be achieved through a complex and long-term process, while what is a substantial indicator for a non-authoritarian regime is not the mere existence of elections, but how freely the sociopolitical pre-conditions are set for these elections to be conducted in the first place. To conclude, Tunisia’s transition to democracy demands persistent diligence. While it is evident that there is -deliberate or not- lack of alternatives to Kais Saied, the question whether economic justice can be attained without democracy remains. It certainly seems that the Tunisian case attests against this claim.
All links accessed 23/11/2024.
[1] Thomas Hill and Sarah Yerkes, “Tunisian foreign policy under Kais Saied”, CEIP, January 11, 2023https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/01/tunisian-foreign-policy-under-kais-saied?lang=en
[2] Simon Speakman Cordal, “Does Tunisia’s presidential election matter?”, Aljazeera, October 5, 2024https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/10/5/whats-at-stake-in-tunisias-presidential-election-on-sunday
[3] Bassam Khawaja, “Tunisia’s EC paves the way for Kais Saied’s second term”, Human Rights Watch, September 4, 2024https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/04/tunisias-electoral-commission-paves-way-kais-saieds-second-term
[4] Chamseddine Mnasri, “Tunisia’s December 2023 local elections and the twisting path to ‘bottom-up’ democracy”, The Journal of North African Studies 29, no. 5 (2024): 787-796
[5] Kinda Hattar, “Dysfunctional approach to fighting corruption undermines progress”, Transparency International, January 30, 2024https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2023-middle-east-north-africa-dysfunctional-approach-fighting-corruption
[6] Amnesty International, “Tunisia: authorities escalate clampdown on media, freedom of expression”, Amnesty International, May 30, 2024 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/05/tunisia-authorities-escalate-clampdown-on-media-freedom-of-expression/
[7] Eirini Giannopoulou, “Is Tunisia transforming from a democratization case study to an autocracy?”, CEMMIS, April 1, 2021https://shorturl.at/jd0Qf; Tarek Amara, “Tunisia President rejects IMF ‘diktats’, casting doubt on bail-out”, Reuters, April 6, 2023 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tunisian-president-rejects-imf-dictats-says-public-peace-not-game-2023-04-06/
[8] Ornella Moderan, “Tunisia’s xenophobic plans backfire on its fragile economy”, ISS Today, April 6, 2023 https://issafrica.org/iss-today/tunisias-xenophobic-plans-backfire-on-its-fragile-economy
[9] Tariq Nafi, “Racism and repression in Kais Saied’s Tunisia”, Aljazeera Listening Post, May 4, 2023 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UV7X6RwMJc0
[10] Eddy Wax, “EUC Schmit lambasts bloc’s migration deal with Tunisia”, Politico, May 23, 2024 https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-commissioner-nicolas-schmit-lambasts-migration-deal-tunisia/
[11] Thomas Hill and Sarah Yerkes, op.cit.
[12] Marina Ottaway, “The Tunisian Transition and Authoritarianism in the Middle East” in A fledgling democracy, ed. Mohamed Zayani (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), 31-56
