For Jordan, Israel’s war on Gaza is all but a foreign policy issue. It reverberates heavily on its domestic and foreign politics due to the stark contrast between the Jordanian deep support for the Palestinian cause and the state’s relation with Israel, compounded by its strong alliance with the United States. This article examines the variables that inform the Jordanian regime’s complex balancing act amid the ongoing regional crisis and how these impacted the outcome of the recent parliamentary elections. This article also argues that although the monarchy has managed to walk a thin line and avoid wider confrontations, the protracted crisis underscores an increasingly precarious balance that will test Jordan’s ability to deflect external and internal pressures in the face of prolonged conflict.
Domestically, the daily suffering in Gaza has sparked widespread public outrage, leading to a massive grassroots protest movement that spans Jordan’s political spectrum. This outrage is particularly pronounced given that Jordan has held the Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel since 1994 while also hosting the largest Palestinian refugee population in the world —over 2.3 million individuals registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Unofficial estimates suggest that nearly half of Jordan's population is of Palestinian origin.[1] Protesters have not only condemned the war but have also increasingly demanded a forceful response from the government, calling for the abrogation of the peace treaty, the cancellation of trade and energy agreements with Israel, and a reevaluation of Jordan’s relations with the US, including the withdrawal of US troops from Jordanian territory. The growing discontent is evident in public opinion: by early January 2024, 84% of Jordanian responders to a survey conducted by the Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies stated that were experiencing psychological stress stemming from Israel’s war on Gaza. Additionally, an Arab Barometer survey showed that one in five Jordanians (21%) had already participated in anti-war protests during the same period. By May 2024, a NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions poll found that roughly 93% of Jordanians considered the US responsible for the war in Gaza, while more than 83% had joined calls to boycott US brands.[2]
On the state level, the war on Gaza exacerbates Amman’s concerns about the potential spillover of violence into the West Bank and the subsequent mass exodus of Palestinians to Jordan. Such an influx would place an immense burden on Jordan’s already struggling economy, which still hosts large refugee populations, primarily from Iraq and Syria, while it is still recovering from the COVID pandemic. Most importantly, Israel’s refusal to allow Palestinian repatriation from Jordan would lead to the irreversible annexation of the West Bank, thus effectively realizing the longstanding Israeli narrative of Jordan as an alternative Palestinian homeland.[3] The ensuing demographic shift could spark a debate over Jordanian identity, particularly in unfavorable terms for non-Palestinian East Jordanians, who form the backbone of the Hashemite monarchy's legitimacy. Furthermore, the loss of custodianship over Jerusalem’s Islamic and Christian holy sites would deal a significant blow to the monarchy’s posture internationally. In this context, with over 736 Palestinians killed and more than 4.600 displaced in the West Bank due to Israeli violence, coupled with a rise in state-sponsored violations of holy sites, Jordanian fears of an existential threat have been greatly intensified.[4]
Against this background, and despite strong public pressure, Jordan's capacity to respond decisively to Israel and its US ally is severely constrained. For the monarchy, this would primarily require reassessing its relationship with the US, on which it depends heavily for financial and military assistance. However, such a recalibration could jeopardize critical support. Totaling between $1.5 billion and $1.65 billion annually, US assistance accounts for over 40% of the Kingdom’s foreign aid, hence making it considerably valuable in maintaining Jordan's economic stability. Moreover, due to its strategic location bordering Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Jordan has been designated by the US as a “major non-NATO ally,” a status that underscores its importance in US regional strategy. This importance is demonstrated by the numerous times that the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken has visited Amman since October 7. Therefore, adopting a significantly confrontational position towards Israel may risk punitive cuts on US assistance. That would lead to a sharp deterioration of the economy in a country where unemployment (currently sitting at 21.4%) and poverty still outweigh all popular grievances.[5] Beyond financial aid, the presence of US troops in Jordan adds a vital layer of border security, helping to deter Syrian or Iraqi-based jihadist groups and pro-Iranian militias from operating on Jordanian soil.
Caught between conflicting pressures, the Jordanian regime follows a complex threefold balancing act. The first dimension of the balancing act aims primarily at preserving good relations with key allies, particularly the US, and avoiding direct military confrontation. To that end, King Abdullah has avoided making decisions that could satisfy domestic public opinion but risk damaging Jordan’s ties with Washington such as infringing defense cooperation agreements with the US or abrogating Wadi Araba. To appease the domestic audience, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi stressed that the treaty has become an ineffective document collecting dust. Specifically, withdrawing from the Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel would not likely redirect Israeli attention from Gaza; however, it could be used as a last resort to provoke US and regional mobilization if Jordan’s security were directly threatened. Hence, reserving its abrogation seems to reflect broader strategic considerations as echoed by former Prime Minister Bisher Khasawneh, who declared that any displacement of Palestinians or conditions leading to it in the West Bank would be considered a declaration of war. In the same context, Jordan’s balancing act was further tested during Iran’s Operations True Promise I and II against Israel in April and October 2024, when Jordan intercepted several Iranian drones and missiles. This action earned praise from Israel’s allies, but domestically, it provoked accusations of collusion with Israel. Many Jordanians viewed favorably the Iranian strikes as a legitimate response to Israel’s violations and crimes against the Palestinians and criticized their government for being unsupportive of the resistance. Notwithstanding public opinion, the government maintained that Jordan would protect its sovereignty and would not allow itself to become a battleground for any party.[6]
The second dimension of Jordan’s balancing act involves the escalation of its diplomatic efforts to rally condemnation of the war and advocate for an immediate ceasefire, as a means to address public grievances while carefully balancing this stance with its strategic dependencies. Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi has consistently highlighted the Israeli occupation as the root cause of the violence, stressing that Israel, as the occupying power, does not have the right to self-defense under international law. Both King Abdullah and Queen Rania have joined Safadi in criticizing the international community’s perceived bias against Palestinians and emphasizing the urgent need for unimpeded humanitarian aid. At the same time, Jordan has notably reduced its diplomatic engagement with Israel, limiting interactions to mid-level diplomats and suspending agreements such as the water-for-energy deal. The Kingdom has also voiced support for South Africa’s case against Israel for genocide at the International Court of Justice.[7] However, despite these diplomatic measures, Jordan continues purchasing gas from Israel and maintains a robust security cooperation, thus underscoring the limitations of its response. These actions reflect Jordan’s struggle to balance its international condemnation of Israel with its dependence on Israeli resources and security cooperation. Ultimately, given that the Jordanian diplomatic initiatives seem unlikely to influence either Israel’s actions or those of its staunchest allies, addressing domestic grievances seems to be their main aim.
The domestic management of the widespread public distress from the Israeli massacres in Gaza represents the third dimension of the monarchy’s balancing act. Initially, the security services tolerated protests, even allowing them to cross the traditional red line by reaching the Israeli embassy in Amman. However, this tolerant approach was soon replaced by a violent crackdown. By early April 2024, Amnesty International reported over 1,500 arrests, and the Cybercrimes Law was being extensively enforced to suppress online dissent.[8] Regardless, while there has been a relative decrease in protest dynamics, the main concern for the monarchy and its security establishment comes from the unprecedented levels of Hamas’ popularity. In domestic and foreign media, that rise has been widely attributed to the increasingly active participation of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood in the protests. Survey data from December 2023 to January 2024 indicated that 69% of Jordanians expressed solidarity with Hamas, and 84% supported the “Al Aqsa Flood” as a legitimate resistance operation.[9] These figures reveal a deep, cross-political commitment to the Palestinian cause and growing support for armed resistance, a stance that breaks away from the King’s established commitment to a policy of peaceful negotiations. The monarchy is particularly concerned about the risk of public defiance destabilizing Jordan’s cold peace with Israel. This concern has been amplified twice during the past two months when armed Jordanians carried out lethal attacks against Israeli security personnel along the border. However, considering the low number of such incidents during the past year, that might indicate that they still generally refrain from radical actions that would dangerously escalate the already volatile situation.
The results of the September 2024 elections saw the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, becoming the largest bloc in the Jordanian parliament. The IAF’s campaign focused heavily on economic reform, the defense of public freedoms, and a more assertive stance against Israel and the monarchy’s Western allies. This effort was rewarded with over 44% of the vote, securing 31 of the 41 seats reserved for political parties, while indicatively, in the previous elections of 2020, the party secured only 10 seats. The political landscape shift materialized under the implementation of the 2022 electoral law, which constitutes part of the King’s broader response to the 2011 Arab Spring. In line with his pledge to proceed with modernizing the Jordanian system towards parliamentarianism, there have been two electoral reforms in 2013 and 2016 that gradually led to the abolition of the ‘one-man-one-vote’ rule. The rule favored tribal representation by limiting voters to a single vote per candidate in each district, and was replaced by a system of proportional representation, based on district-level open lists. However, the latter’s limited success in the 2020 elections was instrumental in prompting a third electoral reform in 2021, under which a newly formed political modernization committee proposed a two-tiered system that would include voting for district representatives, as well as for political parties. Under the subsequently adopted electoral law, 41 seats were initially allocated to political parties, alongside quotas to promote female and youth representation with the number expected to rise to 69 in 2026 and 90 by 2030. Despite the IAF’s significant electoral gains, the law’s impact on voter participation was again limited, with turnout increasing only marginally from 30% in 2020 to 32% in 2024.[10]
However, the success of the IAF —representing a consolidation of support among Jordanians disillusioned with the monarchy’s foreign alliances— signals a shift in the country’s political dynamics. On the one hand, this growing political influence could pressure the monarchy and its security establishment, particularly if the IAF begins to mobilize popular demands that challenge sensitive state policies. Early signs of this friction are evident in the IAF's praise for attacks against Israeli soldiers by Jordanians near the South Dead Sea in October 2023.[11] Despite this rising challenge, the King still wields absolute authority, particularly in defense and foreign relations. While the IAF’s presence in parliament may challenge the monarchy’s policies, the King’s constitutional powers will likely block any substantial shifts in state policy that lack royal consent. On the other hand, the IAF’s significant parliamentary presence could mitigate criticism and project an image of unity at a time when new challenges seem to arise. Notably, Israel’s recent decisions to ban UNRWA across all its territories and to establish a new military division on the Israeli-Jordanian border are expected to aggravate Jordanian national insecurity since they are going to be perceived in the same context as Israeli deliberations to force Palestinians out of the West Bank.[12]
In conclusion, the rise of the IAF in the 2024 elections indicates a growing gap in public discourse between those who increasingly favor a more confrontational stance toward Israel and the monarchy's adherence to a stability-oriented strategy. Despite this, the Hashemite authority manages to keep domestic tensions in check with specific political reforms. Nonetheless, the unrestrained Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank, along with Donald Trump’s imminent return to the White House —whose policies are likely to be strongly pro-Israel— will continue to test the monarchy's resolve in balancing domestic expectations with foreign pressure. As the war in Gaza protracts and the crisis in Palestine deepens, only time will tell to what extent Jordan can maintain its balancing act.
All links accessed on 10/11/2024.
[1] Human Rights Watch, “Jordan: Stop Withdrawing Nationality from Palestinian-Origin Citizens,” February 1, 2010, https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/02/01/stateless-again/palestinian-origin-jordanians-deprived-their-nationality.
[2] Curtis R. Ryan, “The Impact of the Gaza War on Jordan’s Domestic and International Politics,” Pomeps, 2024, https://pomeps.org/the-impact-of-the-gaza-war-on-jordans-domestic-and-international-politics; see also Arab Barometer, “Arab Barometer Wave VIII September 2023 - July 2024,” 2024, 26, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVIII_Jordan_Report-Public-Opinions-EN-1.pdf; see also NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions, “Survey of Jordanians’ Perceptions of Key Current Affairs – Spring 2024,” 2024, 12-13, https://www.namasis.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Survey-of-Jordanians-Perceptions-of-Key-Current-Affairs_-Spring-2024.pdf; see also Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, “Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” 2024, 4, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-full-report-en.pdf.
[3] Marwan Muasher, “Jordan’s Redline on Admitting Palestinians Is Unlikely to Change,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 21, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/11/jordans-redline-on-admitting-palestinians-is-unlikely-to-change; see also The World Bank, “Jordan Economic Monitor, Summer 2024: Strength Amidst Strain: Jordan’s Economic Resilience,” 2024, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099800110012498130/pdf/IDU19a9c4c7913b4f1442c1aa381b0d42eae64d3.pdf.
[4] OCHA Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Humanitarian Situation Update #234 | West Bank,” Reliefweb, October 31, 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-234-west-bank.
[5] Jeremy M. Sharp, “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, July 1, 2024, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf; see also Namasis, op.cit., p. 5.
[6] Roya News, “Ending peace agreement will serve neither Jordan nor Palestine, says Safadi,” September, 2024, https://en.royanews.tv/news/54276; see also The Jordan Times, “Displacement of Palestinians a fundamental violation of peace treaty — Khasawneh ,” November 7, 2023, https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/displacement-palestinians-fundamental-violation-peace-treaty-%E2%80%94-khasawneh; see also Mohammad Ersan, “Jordanian authorities face backlash over role in downing Iranian missiles,” Middle East Eye, October 2, 2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-backlash-over-role-downing-iranian-missiles-heading-israel.
[7] Curtis R. Ryan, “Jordan Sees the War on Gaza in Existential Terms,” Arab Center Washington DC, November 2, 2023, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/jordan-sees-the-war-on-gaza-in-existential-terms; see also The Jordan Times, “Israel, as occupying power, has no right to self-defence — Safadi,” November 30, 2023, https://jordantimes.com/news/local/israel-occupying-power-has-no-right-self-defence-%E2%80%94-safadi; see also Imad K. Harb, “Path of Least Cost: Assuaging Public Protests in Jordan,” Arab Center Washington DC, April 1, 2024, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/path-of-least-cost-assuaging-public-protests-in-jordan.
[8] Amnesty International, “Jordan: Stop cracking down on pro-Gaza protests and release those charged for exercising their freedoms of assembly and expression,” April 11, 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/jordan-stop-cracking-down-on-pro-gaza-protests-and-release-those-charged-for-exercising-their-freedoms-of-assembly-and-expression; see also Amnesty International, “Jordan: New Cybercrimes Law stifling freedom of expression one year on,” August 13, 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/08/jordan-new-cybercrimes-law-stifling-freedom-of-expression-one-year-on.
[9] Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, op.cit., p. 7.
[10] Tariq Al-Nuaimat, “Analyzing Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections 2024,” Carnegie Sada, October 4, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/10/jordan-election-2024?lang=en; see also Camille Abescat, “Elections in Jordan: The parties’ return to parliament,” Orient XXI, October 2, 2024, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/elections-in-jordan-the-parties-return-to-parliament,7659; see also Curtis R. Ryan, “A New Cycle of Reform in Jordan.” Arab Center Washington DC, October 21, 2021, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-new-cycle-of-reform-in-jordan.
[11] Arab News, “Jordanians ‘boiling with anger’ at Gaza spurring Israel border attacks,” October 26, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2576869/middle-east; see also Mohammad Ersan, “Jordan: Authorities arrest relatives of shooters of Israeli soldiers in Dead Sea attack,” Middle East Eye, October 29, 2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-authorities-arrest-shooters-israeli-soldiers-cross-border-attack.
[12] Al Jazeera, “Israel’s parliament votes to ban UNRWA, the UN’s Palestine aid agency,” October 28, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/28/israel-parliament-approves-bill-to-ban-unrwa; see also Middle East Monitor, “Israel to establish new army division on border with Jordan,” October 31, 2024, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241031-israel-to-establish-new-army-division-on-border-with-jordan.
