Pakistani politics is deeply divided with urban violence being again on the rise[1] . Karachi, a poor city of multiple ethnic, tribal, and sectarian collectivities[2], constitutes an explosive mix with targeted political killings occurring daily[3]. Located close to the historical gateway of Khyber Pass and traditionally used as a passage by armies and traders, Peshawar has been turned into the headquarters, a meeting point and a benchmark for jihadi militants. At the same time and due to the increasing urbanisation, many tribe-affiliated migrants from the surrounding mountains bring to the city their tribal way of living, acting and thinking. Constituting a junction of the region’s three main ethno-linguistic groups (Sunni Pashtuns, Sunni Baluchs and Shia Hazaras), as well as the centre of the six decades-long Baluch insurgency[4], Quetta (Baluchistan) seems destined to be consumed by constant sectarian and ethnic tensions, while the Afghan refugees (both civilians and militants) do all but help the situation. Nevertheless, the tensions are not as bloody as one would expect, given the Baluch opposition to the Pashtun leaders’ wish for control, as well as the presence of Islam’s different dogmas, sects and schools of thought. The military’s increased presence does not help either, since paramilitary networks —organised mainly along tribal and ethno-sectarian linesconstantly spring up. Lahore is in no better situation. Sectarian violence thrives, both expressed by jihadis, as well as by non-organised groups of people. Purges against religious minorities (Christians, Shia, and Hindu among others) are not a rare phenomenon in this mainly Punjabi city. Attacks against state institutions are also quite common in the everyday life of the city, while there are also severe socio-economic disparities.
With corruption being alarmingly widespread and systemic, Pakistan continuously performs poorly on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International[5] , while the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators are not suggesting particular progress overtime[6]. Surveys carried out in 2002 have shown that “a remarkable 100% of the respondents who had any type of contact with the police… were confronted with corruption”[7]. Furthermore, “in terms of basic services, 44% of the respondents were only able to access electricity by paying a bribe while the rest had to rely on other forms of influence to obtain a connection. When it came to the country’s tax authorities, nearly every respondent (99%) had encountered corruption”[8]. Corruption, therefore, is not only a matter of money; it is also, if not primarily, a matter of identity and loyalty. A Pashtun public servant is more likely to serve a Pashtun citizen, while a Sindhi police officer will more likely arrest a Muhajir rather than a fellow Sindhi. Pakistanis tend to owe their loyalty not primarily to the state or nation, but to other networks based on other stronger collective identities at the level of neighbourhood, tribe, village, sect or even guild: apart from a largely state-bred and relatively small middle class[9], being Punjabi, Sindhi, Sariaki, Muhajir or Balochi and Sunni, Shia, Ahmadi, Hindi or Christian seems to count more than being a Pakistani. This also becomes evident in the linguistic map of the country with over sixty different languages being used.
Furthermore, Pakistan maintains a quite unique feudal system, which too is embedded in the tribal/sectarian division. Landlords in possession of huge areas of agricultural land hire peasants of the same tribal background, thus gaining a prodigious influence over them[10] . These networks and identities existed before the creation of the state which, recognising their deep roots in the subcontinent, never tried to replace them, thus always remaining “foreign” in the people’s conscious and subconscious; a token used only to secure the position of a network. Consequently, state institutions and political parties started taking sides, in an effort to take advantage of the local networks in order to achieve stability, as well as to further their own interests[11]. The Sindhi-Muhajir violence, the Pashtun-Muhajir clash, and the intra-Muhajir violence[12] in Karachi have all been reinforced by the conflict between the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the Pakistan People's Party which was built on them. Constituting a local power, Peshawar jihadi militants tend to be approached by any provincial government wishing to achieve relative stability. Anti-Pashtun Baluch insurgency in Quetta has been taken over by the state structure which sided with the Pashtuns.
However, such motifs are prevalent in many Middle Eastern countries[13] (Yemen, Syria, Libya). The Pakistani middle class is not as developed as in Tunisia or Iran where networks are also present, only to a lesser extent. And in a country where autocratic and military regimes constitute more the rule than the exception, it is these very networks that substitute for democracy. Apart from connecting people horizontally (i.e. with people sharing common tribal, sectarian or ethnic background), these networks also connect them vertically, thus both with their special group’s dominant elite, as well as with the state. Whatever relationship (request, transaction, welfare or other) people may have with the state, it is more likely that it will be through and because of these networks. The low-class majority therefore is not exactly isolated from the source of power; it is just connected to it through alternate channels and networks. According to this reading of Pakistani political processes, a political upheaval might not be something to expect.
Nevertheless, a sectarian-tribal clash cannot be ruled out, especially when one bears in mind the several criminal networks[14] engulfing sectarian and tribal identities in search for greater legitimisation and support. Sectarian urban violence has lately intensified, meaning that people carry their alternative allegiances and networks in the cities where they massively migrate. In the limited space of a mega-city, a spark may be enough to detonate a most violent explosion; especially in conditions of high poverty and inequality, and even more so when one keeps in mind that it is exactly through these sectarian channels that the means (welfare, infrastructure, subsidies etc.) to counter poverty and inequality are to be offered. It is not simply a matter of faith, identity or allegiance; it is also a matter of who will survive by gaining access to the state’s resources and power. Sunnis against Shias in Karachi; Baluchs against Pashtuns in Quetta; Muhajirs against Sindhis in Karachi; Waziristan’s tribes against jihadi militants; Muhajirs against Pashtuns again in Karachi; the al-Qaeda affiliated and possibly state supported[15] TTP[16]; the extremist Sunni alliance Muttahida Deeni Mahaz (MDM); a Sunni extremist group, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ); jihadi groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and many more are already into a quite bloody conflict against their sectarian rivals.
What averted this clash in the past was the military’s interferingly balancing role, the existence of a relatively small but quite vivid middle class, as well as a fairly good economic condition, which allowed most people to not starve to death. Nevertheless, the middle class is shrinking[17] mainly due to the increasing effects of the economic crisis[18], which has discouraging repercussions to the rest of Pakistani society too; finally, there is an “Egyptian” or “Turkish” crisis in the state, i.e. a covert conflict between several of its branches; namely the military, the executive power and the judicial[19]. This has been going on throughout Pakistan’s modern history, but ever since the democratisation process has been launched it has been intensified, probably due to the change in the balance of power, the consequent decrease of their share of power, as well as the perceived instability of a more democratic system. In any case, with the three “safety valves” gone or reduced, what remains to prevent a clash is the self-control of the sectarian and tribal leaderships and their followers, something which, frankly, is all but reassuring.
Finally, such high levels of corruption[20] strengthen the role of sectarian leaderships. As the International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences suggests, “knowledge of religion in general and practicing religion in particular was found as a source of revival of social values, for which, the respondents suggested a major role on the part of religious leaders”[21]. In other words, religiosity is perceived as a proof of honesty and religious leaders seem uncorrupted and above all corrupted state officials. Sectarian leaders like Malik Ishak (LeJ leader), Hafez Saeed (LeT leader), Tariq Afridi (TTP’s Dara Adam Khel chapter leader) thus gain a clear momentum over the official state’s representatives. Ιf only one group decides to move towards power, either indirectly through placing its people in the state mechanism or directly through force, the others will react, that being the end of a fragile, yet long kept, modus vivendi.
All links accessed on 11/03/2014
[1] ICG, “Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan”, Asia Report No 255, (23/01/2014), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/255-policing-urban-violence-in-pakistan.pdf
[2] This is a term used in Pakistan to describe the immigrants from other parts of the subcontinent and their descendants.
[3] Daily Times, “2013 in focus: target killing remains most used tool to silence opposition”, (06/01/ 2014), http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/sindh/06-Jan-2014/2013-in-focus-target-killing-remains-most-used-tool-to-silence-opposition ; Khan, Faraz & Ashraf, Gibran, “Karachi 2013: the deadliest year of all”, The Express Tribune, (06/01/ 2014), http://tribune.com.pk/story/653889/karachi-2013-the-deadliest-year-of-all/
[4] ICG, “Pakistan: the worsening conflict in Balochistan”, Asia Report No 119, (14/09/2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/119_pakistan_the_worsening_conflict_in_balochistan.pdf
[5] Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Results 2013”, (2013), http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/
[6] The World Bank, “Pakistan Data”, (2014), http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan
[7] Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, “Overview of corruption in Pakistan”, (08/08/2008), p. 4, http://issuu.com/cmi-norway/docs/expert-helpdesk-174?e=1246952/2658016#search
[8] Ibid.
[9] Durr-e-Nayab, “Estimating the Middle Class in Pakistan”, Pakistan Institute for Development Economics, PIDE Working Papers 2011:77, http://pide.org.pk/pdr/index.php/wp/article/viewFile/2958/2907
[10] Ahmad, Alayna, “Politics in Pakistan – Failed by the Feudal System”, Huffington Post, (30/05/2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alayna-ahmad/pakistan-election-results_b_3355689.html
[11] Mufti, Mariam, “Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan”, CSIS, (06/2012), https://csis.org/files/publication/120628_Mufti_ReligionMilitancy_Web.pdf ; Yusuf, Huma, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s greatest security threat?”, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, (07/2012), http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/949e7f9b2db9f947c95656e5b54e389e.pdf
[12] Baixas, Lionel, “Thematic Chronology of Mass Violence in Pakistan, 1947-2007”, Online Encyclopaedia of Mass Violence, (27/06/2008), http://www.massviolence.org/Thematic-Chronology-of-Mass-Violence-in-Pakistan-1947-2007?artpage=5-12
[13] Ayubi Nazih, “Overstating the Arab State”, I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1995; Zubaida Sami, “Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East”, London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1989
[14] ICG, “Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan”, Asia Report No 255, (23/01/2014), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/255-policing-urban-violence-in-pakistan.pdf
[15] Farooq, Umar, “Afghanistan-Pakistan: The Covert War”, The Diplomat, (01/01/2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/afghanistan-pakistan-the-covert-war/
[16] Tehreek-e-Taliban (Taliban Movement of Pakistan), an umbrella organisation of predominantly Pashtun militant groups in KPK (KhyberPakhtunkhwa, formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province - NWFP) and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)
[17] Mansoor, Ahmed, “Middle class shrinking rapidly”, The International News, (21/09/2013), http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-3-203314-Middle-class-shrinking-rapidly
[18] Asian Development Bank, “Pakistan Economy”, (2013), http://www.adb.org/countries/pakistan/economy
[19] The Economist, “Pakistan’s Armed Forces: Out of driving seat”, (30/11/2013), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21590963-prime-minister-wants-put-army-its-place-out-driving-seat?zid=306&ah=1b164dbd43b0cb27ba0d4c3b12a5e227 ; Shah, Aqil, “Derailing Democracy in Islamabad”, Foreign Affairs, (17/01/2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137764/aqil-shah/derailing-democracy-in-islamabad
[20] Singh, Gurharpal, “Religion, Politics and Governance in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania: An Overview”, School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion, University of Birmingham, Religions and Development Research Programme, Working Paper 55 – 2011, http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/ReligionDev_RPC/working_paper_55.pdf
[21] Ullah, Asad & Shah, Mussawar, “Does Pakistani Society Accept Corruption as a Changed Value with Reference to Religious Perspective?”, International Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences IJBAS-IJENS, Vol. 13, No. 01, (2013), p. 73 http://www.ijens.org/Vol_13_I_01/137201-8484-IJBAS-IJENS.pdf