Approximately half of the 59 million people living in the six member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are immigrants. Some remain for a few years, while others stick there for their whole careers. The majority enters the country based on the assumption that they will have to leave eventually. Despite their numbers, migrants have restricted rights in the Gulf states' destination countries: they have temporary residence and limited involvement in society. The prospect of granting citizenship to foreigners has long agitated the Gulf states. For the vast majority of foreign employees, life in the Gulf consists of a succession of short-term work permits; by stop being productive, you stop being a resident. Nevertheless, this situation is gradually and slowly changing; the need for diversification of the economy has forced some of the Gulf states to break this citizenship taboo.
The civil war in Libya has been in progress for more than eight years and the recent conferences in Berlin and Moscow seemed unable to provide a reliable solution. Both efforts aimed at putting an end tο the civil war and agreeing on a ceasefire. Consequently, both conferences were deemed ineffective, especially since the one side of the Libyan civil war, General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA), refuses to compromise with the officially recognized government of Libya, the General National Accord (GNA), which, as the civil war rages on, gradually loses domestic legitimacy and weakens.[1]
Despite speculations of a rocky transition of power, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said’s succession at the Omani throne was swift and according to the wishes of the late Sultan. While he declared that he will follow the principles set by Qaboos in terms of foreign policy, the new ruler will have to prove Oman’s commitment to neutrality and its position as intermediary in negotiations, at a time of great regional turmoil. Meanwhile, Oman has to tackle its economic and social challenges at home, in order to continue to project its international soft power.
The Iranian leadership remains trapped in a revolutionary ideology that is sustained by a nationalist narrative, especially in times of hardship. Appealing to the patriotic sentiment of the people has worked in the past, but in the current circumstances the public, especially the millennial generation who have no memory of the Revolution or the Iran-Iraq war, have lost faith in this narrative. Faced with a stifling economic and employment crisis, excruciating sanctions and mounting international pressure, the Iranian political, military and clerical establishment is more than ever challenged to adapt to the changes that have driven the society in 40 years, or face protests that could get out of the control of Tehran. Although the regime is aware of the crucial momentum, any promises for reform remain unfulfilled, as a wide array of unelected bodies is still capable of blocking any initiative of the elected government. The US stance boosts the narrative and the anti-US sentiment, thus making an implosion or a regime change à la US unlikely to materialize anytime soon.
The decision of the Kurdistan Regional Government to proceed with the independence bid on September 25, precipitated a serious crisis in the region. Seemingly, one important question to be addressed is the consequences the Kurdish referendum engenders to the recently shaped Iran-Turkey-Russia axis, particularly on the Syrian issue. Whereas Iran and Turkey often find themselves at loggerheads over regional issues, their shared concern in preventing Kurdish statehood, seems to provide the necessary fuel towards cooperation, if not alliance-building. Russia, in the meanwhile, has adopted a “wait-and-see” policy on the matter. Still, the extent to this cooperation can be much constrained by their own diverging interests in the region.
Countries with only one economic sector developed, such as the oil one, are very vulnerable to economy shifts and face many problems when the oil prices fall. Algeria could not be the exception to the rule. With the oil prices slumping during the past two years, the Algerian economy has had to face a budget crisis as hydrocarbons make up roughly 60% of the state income, representing 40% of the Algerian GDP and 90% of its export earnings.[1] The Dinar has depreciated, all the while expenses on daily needs have risen for the Algerian people who are once again demonstrating on the streets. What are the Algerian regime’s next moves? How will the Algerian people react to austerity?
The broader Middle Eastern and Northern Africa region has entered an extended period of turmoil where states are collapsing and regimes are being overthrown. While the roots of these conflicts are long-established, eruptions since 2001 are recurring with a ferocity implying that none will come together again in a capacity of state unity. Patrick Cockburn's indefatigable coverage provides a crucial tour d'horizon of the civil wars and insurgencies that have been shattering the societies' central core while demonstrating the variety of reasons as to why these conflicts are ongoing and foremost, as to why religion in the Middle East is now the glue that holds societies together.
Το Κέντρο Μεσογειακών,Μεσανατολικών και Ισλαμικών Σπουδών φιλοξενεί πληθώρα διαφορετικών απόψεων στα πλαίσια του ελεύθερου ακαδημαϊκού διαλόγου. Οι απόψεις αυτές δεν αντανακλούν υποχρεωτικά τις απόψεις του Κέντρου. Η χρήση και αναπαραγωγή οπτικοακουστικού υλικού για τις ανάγκες της ιστοσελίδας του ΚΕΜΜΙΣ γίνεται για ενημερωτικούς, ακαδημαϊκούς και μη κερδοσκοπικούς σκοπούς κατά τα προβλεπόμενα του Νόμου 2121/1993 (ΦΕΚ Α' 25/4-3-1993) περί της προστασίας της πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας, καθώς και του άρ.8 του Νόμου 2557/1997 (ΦΕΚ Α' 271/1997).