CENTRE for MEDITERRANEAN, MIDDLE EAST & ISLAMIC STUDIES

Qaboos bin Said al Said is the absolute monarch of the Sultanate of Oman reigning the small Gulf state for more than forty years. Most recent rumor has it that Qaboos has been suffering from terminal cancer and thus a succession speculation crisis has been looming for some time. Oman holds one of the most bizarre ways of passing down the reign. The crisis that may occur in the royal family, as well as in the Majlis al Shura (local parliament), might exacerbate the already obscure—according to economic estimations and figures—future of the citizens of the heretofore powerful Sultanate.  

Nowadays, the Palestinian protests are mainly another reaction to the long-standing oppressive Israeli policies implemented against the Palestinian people. Although one cannot tell yet, whether this unrest will evolve into a third Intifada, several similarities to the first Intifada (1987-1993) are being noticed, as well as some differences. Specifically, the similarities are the Israeli government coalition’s synthesis and its objectives on the eve of the revolts: namely, the economic circumstances of the Israeli economy and its influence on Palestine, due to the interconnection of the two economies; the social, educational and economic status of the Palestinian youth and its role in the revolts; and finally, the stance of the Palestinian leadership. As for the differences, the most noteworthy is the Israeli settlers’ influence on the policy making and its execution.

While the United States revise their troop withdrawal plans from Afghanistan, the future of the country remains precarious. Violence still flourishes on the ground, the Afghan government seems unstable in contrast with the Taliban movement which looks stronger than ever, and, at the same time, al Qaeda tries to rebuild its presence in the region by opening the way for young Islamic extremists to join. In the meantime, thousands of Afghan refugees leave their country and enter Europe, while others, living in Pakistan, are being forced to return to their homeland.

The successful negotiations of the Nuclear Deal are strengthening the Iranian government domestically and are repairing the country’s reputation internationally. The forthcoming removal of sanctions is aspiring to bring economic prosperity in the country, even if this benefits Iranian elites rather than the wider population. The overcoming of distrust between Iran and the West might lead to wider negotiations on other issues in the future, especially the resolution of the Syrian Crisis and the countering of ISIS, although it is unlikely that Iran will abandon its traditional allies in the Middle East, such as Bashar al-Assad.

The Syrian war has been affecting Jordan directly and indirectly for the past few years. The refugee crisis and the rise of jihadism in the region has challenged both its political system and its social cohesion. The inability to cope with the constantly growing needs of the refugee population, along with the simmering political unrest, is threatening the social cohesion of the country, while the rise of Salafism poses a threat to the stability of the regime. The way with which the state reacts to these challenges will shape Jordan’s future for the next years to come.

The rise of chief General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in power signaled some major strategic shifts in Egyptian foreign affairs. The main goals which dictate the current government’s foreign policy are domestic stability and regime survival. These targets are best served by Sisi’s anti-Islamist and pro-status quo approach in an era of growing anti-terrorism concerns across the region. In general, Sisi wants to portray his regime to the world and his people as a safe, moderate and reliable island of stability in the midst of turmoil.

The 2015 National Security Strategy states that the United States will face world’s complex challenges with “strategic patience”. As the United States has been stepping back from the Middle East and pivoting to the Far East, the current article examines how the doctrine of strategic patience is exercised in practice, and presents the risks that this policy is running through.

Boko Haram famously came to the forefront in 2009 with a string of attacks in Northern and Central Nigeria. At its early beginnings in 2002, it was merely identified as a Sunni religious anti-western movement attempting to fill the void left by the progressive parties of Nigeria. However, successive Nigerian administrations, through a series of misguided political decisions, eventually turned the movement into an insurgent, radical and brutally violent group that would demand the spotlight in the African continent for the better part of the 21st century. Often regarded as sub-Sahara’s greatest security threat, the name “Boko Haram” translates as “forbidden book” or “western education is a sin” in the Hausa language, and represents the will to reject any and all “westernization” of Nigerian society and culture.

Saudi Arabia and the Middle East have yet again attracted the globe’s attention, as the ongoing crisis in nearby Yemen, which has virtually left it ungoverned and its population in despair, seems to be evolving into an all-our war. 

Hezbollah’s growth in the past years has been evident on many levels. It is the dominant political force in Lebanon and has been using its growing confidence to spread its influence beyond Lebanese borders. Hezbollah has been assisting Shiite movements across the region, and has taken an active role in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar al-Assad, shaping developments on the ground. The increasing importance of non-state actors, like Hezbollah and the al-Nusra Front in the shaping of the reality on the ground cannot be ignored. Regional politics are transforming and the Middle East follows suit.