CENTRE for MEDITERRANEAN, MIDDLE EAST & ISLAMIC STUDIES

The long-awaited new strategy on Afghanistan seems to be an ill-fated reproduction of the strategy employed in Iraq. Not only does it take for granted that the Iraqi case is successful in the long run, but it also fails to grasp the fundamental differences between the two cases. Most importantly, although it notes the interconnection between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it fails to address the latter properly. Consequently, even a limited-aims strategy of defeating al-Qaeda and entering a political compromise with the Taliban seems unattainable.

The drama is old; its acts change regularly while its protagonists stay the same embodied by Egypt and Iran. It is a play about regional power which has not reached its final yet as it is perpetuated by envious divas, capricious artists and dangerous stunts. Its audience epitomized by the U.S. and Israel, interferes constantly in its events and hence nurtures its maintenance. The play?s newest act deals with the recent war on Gaza and a Hizbullah cell lately discovered by Egyptian authorities, which has been accused of attempting to overthrow Mubarak?s regime.

Part of the ingrained and predominant discourse of Lebanese politics is characterized by visionary and promising elements which culminate in the image of a dream: the dream of building up Lebanon, a viable Lebanon, a stable and flourishing one and above all a sovereign Lebanon. This notion of a dream has been used by many politicians - prominent among them former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri - as one of their favourite buzzwords and has turned into a useful rhetorical means which captures Lebanese sentiments as it nurtures hope of a better future. Against the background of forthcoming elections and prearrangements for the launching of an international tribunal aimed at convicting al-Hariri's murderers the question arises what has happened to the dream: has it been deferred, become extinct or lived on?

The ongoing war in Gaza is a typical case of a war that is not meant to offer any significant change to the general equilibrium of the conflict. It is a strategic ?World War I?, an inconclusive trench war which was born out of the impasse of a truce and is destined for the stalemate of another one. It is an escalation towards a situation of limited options. Moreover, it is asymmetrical not only in terms of means and actors but also and most importantly in terms of aims: the Israeli side strives for military goals while Hamas? objectives are political.

Rioting in Athens became headlines around the world as the ?holy babies? of the ancient cradle of democracy came to signal a long awaited death of a societal paradigm. To become clearer there are three types of problems behind the phenomenon of youth rioting in Greece: structural, strategic and tactical. The first, which I call it structural, has to do with the system of values, moral codes, social norms that glue together the state, civil and social institutions, create certain collective expectations and set generally approved limitations in political and social action.

?I call upon all of you, politicians and citizens, to start a new phase called Lebanon and the Lebanese ? in order to achieve the interests of the nation.? This was General Suleiman?s appeal at his swearing-in ceremony in Beirut last May. His election as president was the result of the Doha accord which brokered a deal to end clashes between Hizbullah and its allies against Future Movement militias which brought back haunting memories of the civil war. However, recent developments imply that Sleiman?s words do not reverberate in politicians? ears anymore. May?s euphoria seems to be fading away as the problem of power sharing in Lebanon is still visible. Lebanese factions still draw strength and support from outside while allowing foreign forces to use them for the advancement of their cause