Even though, during the past year, developments in Syria have entered a stabilization trajectory, the country remains fragmented and a “playground” where different regional and national interests collide. The Assad regime has managed to maintain and extend its control in most of the Syrian territories around Damascus and in the south. However, there are still challenges from opposition forces in the northwest, the Kurdish-controlled areas in the northeast and a re-emerging ISIS threat looming both from previously ISIS-controlled enclaves as well as prisons and camps.
In 2021, Syria entered a state of a fragile power equilibrium with minor changes regarding territorial control between the main players of the conflict. Currently, the Assad regime seems to be consolidating power and projecting a sense of – somewhat false – stability. The regime’s overwhelming victory in the May 21 elections (with 95% of the votes), as well as the relative normalization of ties between Syria and its neighbors (with the reopening of the Jaber border crossing and the resuming of flights with Jordan and a visit by UAE’s Foreign Minister in Syria) may serve as an indication that the conflict is coming to an end. This claim can also be endorsed by a recent statement from the U.S. Envoy to Syria stating that regime change is not necessary and that the country is stable under the Assad rule, while stressing the importance of maintaining the country’s sovereignty. This substantial shift in the international narrative regarding Syria’s future enhances the regime’s legitimacy, implying that the West has no intention of disrupting the current status quo.[2]
Albeit these seemingly positive developments, Syria remains fragmented and divided in different spheres of influence between Turkey, the Kurds (and the U.S.), Iran and Russia. The current power balance is not only fragile but also very much temporary as there are several actors undermining the regime on the ground. In reality, the country is still a hotbed hosting several different militias, providing fertile ground for the aspirations of local, regional and international actors, while a great number of micro-conflicts make Syria a powder keg that could blow up at any given point. The stalemate of most of the conflicts taking place in the country and the low-level clashes are not an indicator of permanent peace, but rather highlight the fragility of the current equilibrium. Even more, the country’s economy is facing immense pressure from COVID19, years of sanctions and the economic impact of the war. The bleak future of the Syrian economy is depicted in this year’s draft budget that is $1.5bn less than that of 2021, even though the government claims that it will not “tamper” with social support and subsidies on basic necessities to relieve the Syrian people.[3] Not to mention that Syrian’s sovereignty under the Assad regime is by no means a solution to the challenges the Syrian people faced prior to 2011. In the following lines, we will look into the status of Syria’s regions of interests, the role and goals of the main players in the country as well as the challenges that could determine the strategic patterns that will affect the country going into 2022.
Looking into the northwestern parts of the country that hosts the last enclaves of the opposition, it looks like there will be no significant developments in the areas around Idlib. Even though Turkey has been bombarding areas in the M4 highway and Ain Issa, the ceasefire that followed between Turkey in Russia seems to be holding on, allowing Tahrir al-Sham to consolidate its power in the region and rebrand itself in order to gain more international recognition – a rather fruitless effort. Given the regime’s power limitations and the security challenges Turkey would face in the possibility of renewed clashes in the north, it appears as no side is willing to escalate the conflict.[4]
Interestingly, Russia and Iran, who are considered the two major “winners” of the conflict along with the Assad regime – are now in the process of limiting each other’s influence to ensure they have the lion’s share in the post-war Syria scene. Iran is utilizing its soft power to enhance bilateral cooperation with the regime by establishing joint investments, partnerships in the fields of housing, public works and the private sector.[5] At the same time, reports indicate that Tehran is in the process of building a Lebanon-like “southern-suburb” through alliances with Sunnis from the region, buying land and facilitating the settlement of Shias (mainly militias and their families from Iraq). This strategy is not only alerting for the Syrian opposition but has also caused friction within the Russian-Iranian alliance, which Tehran is attempting to downplay as a Western/Zionist “conspiracy”, while presenting Syria as “a scene of convergence for Iran and Russia”.[6]
Moscow, however, seems to have a different perspective. In the face of growing Iranian presence in post-war Syria during the last couple of years, Russia has been trying to consolidate its power at the expense of its former ally and ensure Iranian influence will be curbed in the following period. With that in mind, Moscow is reviewing its strategy in south Syria by trying to reduce the power of the Eighth Brigade and ensure its support to the government, a process that has not yet been successful. At the same time, the Russian regime is turning a blind eye in recently escalating Israeli attacks against Iranian targets, particularly in the Port of Latakia, which is currently under Iranian control. Russia and Israel share the goal of limiting Iranian influence and, according to an opposition source, Russia saw the attacks as an opportunity to further cooperate with the regime by participating in joint patrols with the Syrian forces and possibly eventually expelling Iran from the port.[7] From its side, Israel’s escalating attacks against targets of Iran and Hezbollah are part of the country’s wider strategy of reducing the Iranian threat in the region. From its side, Tehran is facing another challenge as it has suffered strikes from US troops following attacks it conducted against US targets near Green Village.[8] It is evident that Iran’s key role in the Syrian conflict has turned the country to a significant threat both for its traditional enemies and for its allies.
As for Turkey’s plans in Syria, Ankara’s main challenge lies in the northeastern parts of the country, where it has extended its control through the Operation Peace Spring. Throughout 2021, Turkish President Erdogan has been engaging in a constant intervention rhetoric, which may indicate that a future large-scale operation could, in fact, be in the cards for Ankara, according to a Turkish analyst. What is more important, however, is how this intervention will play out considering the role and interests of U.S. and Russia in the region. While Russia and Turkey have found some common ground due to their shared strategic interests concerning Turkstream and the sale of the S-400 missile systems, Moscow would not allow any further Turkish escalation in Syria. At the same time, the new U.S. administration is certainly more engaged with protecting the SDF and opposing Turkey’s plans against the Kurds.[9]
Even though the SDF’s preferred strategic ally is the U.S., they are in fact keeping all their options open, amid the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which could be a signal for Washington’s strategic direction in Syria as well. The primary goal of the SDF would be to achieve a political settlement with the regime through U.S. mediation as the conflict seems to be frozen for the time being. However, the Kurds have been prepared for the fallout of this strategy. SDF is engaging in talks with the Russians and the regime in an effort to reach some sort of long-term agreement, while they are also holding negotiations with the pro-Turkish national Kurdish Council.[10]
The re-emergence of the ISIS threat is also an issue of concern both for the Kurds as well as for the rest of the Syrian population. There is growing concern that ISIS has utilized the past year to rebuild its networks and forces as it is engaging in a “slow buildup” with increasing attacks mainly in the eastern parts of the country.[11] These claims seem to be verified with the growing violence in al-Hol Camp that led to a security operation by SDF in March 2021 and the recent fighting that erupted in Hasakah prison in the early days of 2022. Even though the battle ended with the victory of the SDF and the surrender of ISIS members inside the prison, many fighters were able to escape and could possibly regroup in former ISIS-controlled enclaves. What is more, this incident raises concerns regarding the breeding of extremism in camps with a large number of young people and the possible repercussions for the country’s future. [12]
Despite the low-intensity conflicts, it is highly unlikely that an all-out war in Syria will take place in the foreseeable future. Yet, stability is temporary and relative. Even though Assad’s regime has managed to maintain its grip to power, Syria remains fragmented and a fertile ground for external actors to pursue their own goals carving up their own spheres of influence. Under this light, it is certain that the future of the Syrian people is still at stake and normality has not returned to the country.
All links accessed on 1/2/2022.
[1]Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), “Mapping territorial control in Syria,” 2022, https://acleddata.com/mapping-territorial-control-in-syria/.
[2] Alicia Medina, “A sketch of Syria’s 2021 and what to expect in 2022,” Syria Direct, December 27, 2021, https://syriadirect.org/a-sketch-of-syrias-2021-and-what-to-expect-in-2022/ and Middle East Monitor, “UN Envoy says Syria does not need regime change, country is safe under Assad,” January 17, 2022, https://bit.ly/32Jrzbf.
[3] Middle East Eye, “Syria approves $5.3bn budget for 2022 as economic crisis hits finances,” December 15, 2021, https://bit.ly/33RlVEM.
[4] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Al-Raqqah | Turkish forces bombard “M4″ highway and areas in Ain Issa countryside,” January, 17, 2022, https://bit.ly/3G822Gq and Alicia Medina, op.cit.
[5] SANA, “Assad, Iran Minister Discuss New Projects.” The Syrian Observer, January 13, 2022, https://syrianobserver.com/news/72566/assad-iran-minister-discuss-new-projects.html and SANA, “Syria, Iran Discuss Cooperation in Public Works, Housing,” January 13, 2022, https://bit.ly/3r5sA6X.
[6] Khaled Yacoob Oweis, “Big-power rivalries deepen Syria’s fragmentation,” The National, January 5, 2022, https://bit.ly/3u4OYzh and Morteza Ahmadi Al Hashem, “Syria 'scene of convergence of coop. between Iran, Russia',” Mehr News Agency, January 19, 2022, https://bit.ly/3Hd4Jbc.
[7] North Press, “Russia Reviews South Syria Strategy,” The Syrian Observer, January 18, 2022, https://syrianobserver.com/features/72704/russia-reviews-south-syria-strategy.html and Middle East Monitor, “Russia strengthens its influence in Syria following Israel strikes”, January 20, 2022, https://bit.ly/3IBo6Lg.
[8] Barbara Starr and Oren Liebermann, “US conducts strikes in Syria after indirect fire threatens troops,” CNN, January 4, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/04/politics/us-strikes-syria/index.html.
[9] Alicia Medina, op.cit. and Umar Farooq, “In new Syrian operation, Turkey faces a Gordian knot,” Al Jazeera, November 4, 2021, https://bit.ly/3rRbFnC.
[10] Alicia Medina, op.cit. and Khaled Yacoob Oweis op.cit.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Sirwan Kajjo and Zana Omer, “US-Backed Syrian Forces Launch Anti-IS Campaign in al-Hol Camp,” Voice of America, March 29, 2021 https://bit.ly/3G7LApM and Shelly Kittleson, “Syrian prison battle leaves hundreds dead and many IS free”, Al Monitor, January 26, 2022, https://bit.ly/3ALRxaH.
