On February 22, 2014, Matteo Renzi, Secretary of the Democratic Party, was appointed as Prime Minister by the President of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, and was nominated to form a new coalition government. A few months later, Daesh militants declared an Islamic State in the territories of Syria and Iraq, further complicating the ongoing Syrian crisis. The above raise the question of what are the Italian interests at stake in Syria? Is the Renzi government’s position on the Syrian conflict in contrast or not with the policy adopted by the previous administration? Is an Italian involvement in Syria still possible and realistic considering the traditional importance of Libya for the country?
The civil war in Yemen began in March 2015, after the overthrow of the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi by the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia-led movement and the commencement of an air campaign against the former by a Saudi-led coalition. The conflict has a distinctly international undertone, as it involves all important regional actors and hasn’t escaped the attention of international ones. In addition, it is fought for both pecuniary interests (securing unimpeded access to the Red Sea through the Bab al-Mandab strait, where much of the world’s oil shipments pass through)[1] and ideological ones (checking what is seen by the Gulf States as Iran’s burgeoning hegemonic ambitions following the July 2015 nuclear deal). Not too dissimilar to Syria, regional power projection has left an already poor country in tatters and led to one more humanitarian disaster. The Guardian’s Simon Tisdall put it best when he wrote that Yemen today has become “another Syria, on a smaller scale”.[2]
Since its auto-proclamation of independence, Somaliland has committed itself to democratic principles and has maintained relative peace and stability within its territory. Southern Somalia, on the contrary, has thus far been unable to form any kind of government and to bring peace to its population. Yet what forms a complete paradox is that, today, while the Republic of Somalia (which de facto disintegrated in 1991 and whose southern part constitutes a perfect example of a “failed state”) is still recognized as a State by the international community, whereas Somaliland, which has a functioning and democratically elected government, remains unrecognized.
Hezbollah’s direct or indirect involvement in the regional conflicts with Shia elements, namely Syria, Iraq and Yemen, has altered the public perception of the group in the Middle East. At the same time, it has taken a sharp turn against the Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia, as an extension of its fighting against jihadist groups in Syria, but also because of the group’s closer cooperation with Iran.
The coup of the 15th of July was a real coup and marked the most violent moment in the Erdogan-Gulen conflict. The event as such and its aftermath are complicated and multilevel analysis is needed. The character of the armed forces, the balance of power in the political and the military field, the political and social reality and the possible implications for the future are aspects to be studied.
Nowadays, Islam is gaining popularity in everyday life in North Caucasus. The Islamic revival that started with the collapse of the Soviet Union has led to a rapid Islamization of the society and has provided a fertile ground for political Islam as well. The language of political Islam is used extensively and in various forms, with local authorities and the religious opposition both deriving their arguments from Islam. Hence, in North Caucasus Islamic discourse unfolds on various levels, from Ramzan Kadyrov’s “official state” Islam in Chechnya up to the radical salafi-jihadi Islamism espoused first by the Caucasus Emirate and, more recently, by ISIS affiliates.
Το Κέντρο Μεσογειακών,Μεσανατολικών και Ισλαμικών Σπουδών φιλοξενεί πληθώρα διαφορετικών απόψεων στα πλαίσια του ελεύθερου ακαδημαϊκού διαλόγου. Οι απόψεις αυτές δεν αντανακλούν υποχρεωτικά τις απόψεις του Κέντρου. Η χρήση και αναπαραγωγή οπτικοακουστικού υλικού για τις ανάγκες της ιστοσελίδας του ΚΕΜΜΙΣ γίνεται για ενημερωτικούς, ακαδημαϊκούς και μη κερδοσκοπικούς σκοπούς κατά τα προβλεπόμενα του Νόμου 2121/1993 (ΦΕΚ Α' 25/4-3-1993) περί της προστασίας της πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας, καθώς και του άρ.8 του Νόμου 2557/1997 (ΦΕΚ Α' 271/1997).
