Lebanon’s size has always been inversely proportional to the magnitude of its turbulence. More of a mirror of the region’s intricacies than a catalyst, the country offers a unique regional case; although in ever-simmering tension, it manages to escape the contours of a country-wide flare-up. This is more often than not attributed to the country’s bitter memories of the civil war (1975-1990). For others, it is the product of an ill-thought out, yet relatively balanced consociational mechanism of power-sharing.

Having been repressed or used for decades by the local regimes, Salafism is on a definite rise, raising security and political threats primarily in the Middle East, while the West sees the chance for democratization drifting away. The many faces of Salafism make us address questions regarding its origins, its present dynamics and also whether it can be a viable political alternative and a part of a democratic transition.

The aftermath of the Arab spring not only saw a difficult regime transition in Tunisia and Libya but contributed to the revival of old and new security challenges in the Maghreb and the Sahel. The secessionist conflict that broke out in 2012 in northern Mali, followed by a military coup in Bamako and the French intervention a year later, is paradigmatic of how the fallout effects of the Libyan civil war and the difficult political transitions in Tripoli and Tunis affected the internal stability of neighbouring countries.

The Arab Spring and the 2012 Malian coup brought to surface a new threat in North Africa; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a once weak node of Al-Qaeda, has upgraded its capabilities, and it seems to be a growing threat for the local security and political stability. This article aims to present the structure of Al-Qaeda’s terrorist network in N. Africa, and to comment on its political and security pressure in the region.