The recent assassination of general Soleimani, has to be viewed as the latest phase within the framework of the ongoing game that goes back to 2001, or 1979, or 1953 depending on your historical perspective.

As the war in Syria is coming to an end, it appears that the US have been attempting to rebalance the region and create a new equilibrium. The Trump Doctrine is being forged by a series of unorthodox unilateral actions, from the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel to unquestioned support of Saudi Arabia, regardless of the latter's actions. In addition, President Trump has supported the formation of an energy axis among Israel, Cyprus and Greece, effectively blocking Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and has chastised Turkey's decisions and association with Russia, while he has allowed Turkey to invade, occupy and set a zone within Syria. Last but not least, the US administration has been trying to put Iran “back in the box”, as Iran has benefited from US interference in the region since 2001, especially following the war against the Islamic state.

The economic recession, the dysfunctional political system and the refugee crisis have made Lebanon a vulnerable player in the Middle East region. The economic reforms that the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri, tried to introduce, caused a massive cross-sectarian wave of demonstrations which lead Lebanon to political instability and to the Prime Minister’s resignation. Moreover, Hezbollah’s reaction and the developments in Syria make the situation in Lebanon even more complicated. Rapid developments in Lebanon are leading to a significant alteration in Lebanon’s political system which are affecting the citizens’ lives.

The October 2019 protests that took place in Iraq resulted in hundreds of casualties and thousands of injuries reported. The protesters mainly reclaim dignified life conditions, higher employment rates and a political system liberated from corruption and external interference. The identity of the protests is not the usual one and the nature of the protesters’ demands also seems to be changing. The authorities had a spasmodic response launching an excessive wave of violence and exposing the government. However, various state and non-state actors participated in the protests and contributed each one in its way.

The Iranian leadership remains trapped in a revolutionary ideology that is sustained by a nationalist narrative, especially in times of hardship. Appealing to the patriotic sentiment of the people has worked in the past, but in the current circumstances the public, especially the millennial generation who have no memory of the Revolution or the Iran-Iraq war, have lost faith in this narrative. Faced with a stifling economic and employment crisis, excruciating sanctions and mounting international pressure, the Iranian political, military and clerical establishment is more than ever challenged to adapt to the changes that have driven the society in 40 years, or face protests that could get out of the control of Tehran. Although the regime is aware of the crucial momentum, any promises for reform remain unfulfilled, as a wide array of unelected bodies is still capable of blocking any initiative of the elected government. The US stance boosts the narrative and the anti-US sentiment, thus making an implosion or a regime change à la US unlikely to materialize anytime soon.

The Khashoggi case has put a magnifying glass on the instability of relations among Middle East countries and especially on the turbulent relationship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is in no position to take head on the Saudi kingdom regarding the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi; at the same time Erdogan cannot ignore such an overpublicized incident. Khashoggi may be the opportunity Erdogan was looking for in order to re-approach Saudi Arabia and the US, and establish Turkey as a strong middle power in the region. Only time will show if the rapprochement will be considered as a prudent diplomatic move by Erdogan.

Την ώρα που οι δυτικές μητροπόλεις βυθίζονταν στην εορταστική φρενίτιδα και μέθη των ημερών, το Ιράν βυθιζόταν στην αβεβαιότητα. Εν μέσω των βίαιων διαδηλώσεων που μεταδίδονταν σαν “κολλητική ασθένεια” από τη μία πόλη στην άλλη, η παραμονή πρωτοχρονιάς του 2017-2018 έφερε ένα έντονο άρωμα “Αραβικής Άνοιξης” και σίγουρα θα μείνει αξέχαστη. Παρά την βιασύνη κάποιων να προεξοφλήσουν την αρχή ενός νέου '79 και το τέλος των Ayatollah, η Ισλαμική Δημοκρατία διαχειρίστηκε την κρίση αυτή σχετικά αναίμακτα. Αυτό δε σημαίνει βέβαια ότι δεν είναι υπαρκτή, ωστόσο πως μπορούμε να την αναγνώσουμε;

Where a rather detailed visit to the adjoining regions of Southwest Asia and the Gulf allows one to reconnect with the friends, fellow thinkers and civil society activists, it also affords a sought-after opportunity to observe first-hand all the vital developments. Dubai’s unending sky rises, its boulevards infested with endless and often flashy cars, private residences surrounded by meticulously manicured lawns, and principality’s Western food joints and ever growing shopping malls exhibit modernity with its unchallenged invincibility on this side of the Gulf. But it also hides the regional tensions and sordid volatilities across the blue waters, which have sadly become region’s more apparent characteristics over the past four decades. Dramatic and equally traumatic developments including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq-Iraq War, the Second Gulf War, 9/11 and the Western invasion of Afghanistan—longest of its kind in recent history and with no victors but endless victims—have bequeathed millions of widows, orphans and refugees in Southwest Asia.

The decision of the Kurdistan Regional Government to proceed with the independence bid on September 25, precipitated a serious crisis in the region. Seemingly, one important question to be addressed is the consequences the Kurdish referendum engenders to the recently shaped Iran-Turkey-Russia axis, particularly on the Syrian issue. Whereas Iran and Turkey often find themselves at loggerheads over regional issues, their shared concern in preventing Kurdish statehood, seems to provide the necessary fuel towards cooperation, if not alliance-building. Russia, in the meanwhile, has adopted a “wait-and-see” policy on the matter. Still, the extent to this cooperation can be much constrained by their own diverging interests in the region.