Recently, Israel has improved its relations with the Gulf. This development was formalized via the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain and the silent approval of Saudi Arabia. The normalization between Israel and the Gulf is the result of a process some 20 years in the making, as 27 years have passed since Rabin, Arafat and Clinton signed the Oslo Declaration of Principles, which for the most part is now inactive. The questions that arise are how these accords can potentially affect the regional balance and whether more accords are likely to come.

As the Syrian civil war nears its end, the regime’s imminent victory against the remaining opposition forces in Idlib tends to be overshadowed by several emerging issues that threaten to trigger a new circle of instability. In the meantime, irrespective of any outcome in the north, another ‘war’ still rages and will continue to rage in the country. The one between Iran, which struggles to recover from the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, and Israel, which meticulously tries to fend off the former’s entrenchment in the country.

During the past few weeks, it seems that the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on January 3, 2020, should have sent Middle Eastern relations and the fragile regional equilibrium into a spiral. Nonetheless, the repercussions of the US administration’s decision have not yet been observed on a larger international scale, but rather on the domestic one.

Despite speculations of a rocky transition of power, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said’s succession at the Omani throne was swift and according to the wishes of the late Sultan. While he declared that he will follow the principles set by Qaboos in terms of foreign policy, the new ruler will have to prove Oman’s commitment to neutrality and its position as intermediary in negotiations, at a time of great regional turmoil. Meanwhile, Oman has to tackle its economic and social challenges at home, in order to continue to project its international soft power.

The recent assassination of general Soleimani, has to be viewed as the latest phase within the framework of the ongoing game that goes back to 2001, or 1979, or 1953 depending on your historical perspective.

As the war in Syria is coming to an end, it appears that the US have been attempting to rebalance the region and create a new equilibrium. The Trump Doctrine is being forged by a series of unorthodox unilateral actions, from the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel to unquestioned support of Saudi Arabia, regardless of the latter's actions. In addition, President Trump has supported the formation of an energy axis among Israel, Cyprus and Greece, effectively blocking Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and has chastised Turkey's decisions and association with Russia, while he has allowed Turkey to invade, occupy and set a zone within Syria. Last but not least, the US administration has been trying to put Iran “back in the box”, as Iran has benefited from US interference in the region since 2001, especially following the war against the Islamic state.

The economic recession, the dysfunctional political system and the refugee crisis have made Lebanon a vulnerable player in the Middle East region. The economic reforms that the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri, tried to introduce, caused a massive cross-sectarian wave of demonstrations which lead Lebanon to political instability and to the Prime Minister’s resignation. Moreover, Hezbollah’s reaction and the developments in Syria make the situation in Lebanon even more complicated. Rapid developments in Lebanon are leading to a significant alteration in Lebanon’s political system which are affecting the citizens’ lives.

The October 2019 protests that took place in Iraq resulted in hundreds of casualties and thousands of injuries reported. The protesters mainly reclaim dignified life conditions, higher employment rates and a political system liberated from corruption and external interference. The identity of the protests is not the usual one and the nature of the protesters’ demands also seems to be changing. The authorities had a spasmodic response launching an excessive wave of violence and exposing the government. However, various state and non-state actors participated in the protests and contributed each one in its way.

The Iranian leadership remains trapped in a revolutionary ideology that is sustained by a nationalist narrative, especially in times of hardship. Appealing to the patriotic sentiment of the people has worked in the past, but in the current circumstances the public, especially the millennial generation who have no memory of the Revolution or the Iran-Iraq war, have lost faith in this narrative. Faced with a stifling economic and employment crisis, excruciating sanctions and mounting international pressure, the Iranian political, military and clerical establishment is more than ever challenged to adapt to the changes that have driven the society in 40 years, or face protests that could get out of the control of Tehran. Although the regime is aware of the crucial momentum, any promises for reform remain unfulfilled, as a wide array of unelected bodies is still capable of blocking any initiative of the elected government. The US stance boosts the narrative and the anti-US sentiment, thus making an implosion or a regime change à la US unlikely to materialize anytime soon.