The civil war in Libya has been in progress for more than eight years and the recent conferences in Berlin and Moscow seemed unable to provide a reliable solution. Both efforts aimed at putting an end tο the civil war and agreeing on a ceasefire. Consequently, both conferences were deemed ineffective, especially since the one side of the Libyan civil war, General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA), refuses to compromise with the officially recognized government of Libya, the General National Accord (GNA), which, as the civil war rages on, gradually loses domestic legitimacy and weakens.[1]

A lot of ink has been spilt on the role of political Islam in post-Arab Spring politics. In the beginning, there was an assumption of an almost teleological nature whereby the democratic renaissance of the region would at a minimum bring the forces of political Islam to the fore. There was even the potential for it to be rendered the single most important socio-political actor in part of the region. While the first premise has certainly proved true, Alison Pargeter’s book is a detailed, eloquent attempt at explaining the second: political Islam’s inability to ensconce itself in power, once in its antechamber.