“A nation is a guarantee for confessions but confessions are not a guarantee to the nation” Michel Chiha[1]
The so-called “Arab Spring” seems to have taken almost every MENA country by the storm. Lebanon was not much affected by the uprisings in the Maghreb countries as it was in the case of the Syrian unrest which started in 2011 and has developed into a virtual civil war. The Syrian influence comes not only a result of geographic 
proximity but also of a historical interplay between the political scenes of the two countries. Furthermore, the Syrian rebellion broke out in a period of political turbulence in Lebanon[2]: In the shadow of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Saad al-Hariri’s Government collapsed in January 2011 under pressure from the Hezbollah-backed March 8 Alliance and, to this day, no strong Administration has been established in order to deal with current flaming issues.
Since then, violence has erupted anew within the Lebanese borders at increasing intensity: by virtue of the Syrian on-going fighting, Tripoli, Sidon and other cities have been witnessing a rise in violence between the Sunnis and the Shiite or the Alawi community, who are considered al-Assad’s supporters. The assassination of a Sunni top security officer in Beirut last year was also seen as a direct result of the neighbouring crisis and the religious animosities in Lebanon.
The Syrian refugees, a humanitarian issue, is a security problem for the Lebanese as well: the Sunnis of Lebanon, empathising with their co-religionists who cross their borders, assist in weapon smuggling and enable the Syrian rebels in their fight against al-Assad’s regime, while Hezbollah is openly fighting on Assad’s side; in a way, the Lebanese are fighting their own war in Syria and efforts are being made not to fight one in their home country.
The “Syrian spillover” in Lebanon culminated in the recent suicide attack against the Iranian Embassy (on November 19th) which caused the death of more than 20 people and the injuring of many others. With the assailants of this attack being of Lebanese and Palestinian descent, this bombing shows a “homegrown radicalization trend, a result of the narrative tying the Sunni community’s fate to the outcome of the fight in Syria”.[3] According to Jean Aziz, a Lebanese commentator, this suicide attack marks a new kind of terrorism in the country as the perpetrators were Lebanese Sunnis (in contrast to the past being Shiites) and the victims were also Lebanese (and not foreign targets).[4]
This perpetual crisis brings to mind the complex political system in this small Middle-Eastern country. Sectarianism has always caused troubles for Lebanon which, apart from internal reasons, seems to be fighting civil wars on the behalf of others or for causes “inspired” by foreigners. Back in the Ottoman times, when Maronite and Druze populations dwelled in Mount Lebanon, foreigners (in this case British agents and Ottoman figures) manipulated religious sentiments, eventually causing the strife which ended in a bloodbath for Christians in the 1860’s. In modern history, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s ideology fuelled the crisis of 1958 which led to a US intervention and, in 1975, the Palestinian issue was the central factor that caused the 15-year-long destructive civil war, for which Henry Kissinger writes: “And each of the factions was able to enlist some outside power on its behalf. All this turned Lebanon into a miniature model of all the Middle East conflicts rather than, as it had been historically, a symbol of their resolution.”[5]
It seems therefore that religious fragmentation in the region goes back to the Ottoman millet system. During the French mandate, this distinction wa
s preserved and with the Lebanese independence there came the National Pact, an oral agreement among the sects, which maintained this state of affairs. After the end of the civil war, the Ta’if Accord of 1989 further perpetuated the sectarian politics.
In theory, Lebanon, a deeply divided state, is a model for “consensus democracy”, to use Arend Lijphart’s term, i.e. “a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority”.[6] It is argued that plural countries like Lebanon are ruled by elites which outbalance each other and contain the outbreak of violence among the various ethnic, religious, cultural and other types of groups.[7]
Lebanon however is such a fragmented society that has even gained a unique entry in Larousse dictionary. In 1991, the term Libanisation (Lebanization or Lebanonization), was introduced to mean the “process of fragmentation of a state, as a result of confrontation between diverse communities”[8] and soon it was expanded by academics to refer to “situations where the state has lost control of law and order and where many armed groups are contending to power”.[9] So in Lebanon’s case, it is argued that Lijphart’s model has not managed to prevent conflicts among its various cultural and political groups; instead it has fueled social and economic inequality, which have in turn led to a civil war and other forms of violence.[10]
This consociationalism in politics, which in Lebanon’s case is called “confessionalism” as the divisions are mainly religious, makes sects prone to foreign affiliation and interference, which often turn to the outside for protection: the Christians mainly toward France, the Sunnis toward Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Shias toward Iran and the Druzes have historically been looking to Britain and the Soviet Union.
So foreign meddling in Lebanese affairs runs high. In the Arab world, Iran and Saudi Arabia are into a “proxy war” for interests in the country and Qatar has recently entered the game. In the West, France has been exhibiting high-end diplomatic efforts to cease any “fires” that occasionally break out and maintain stability. The United States have also been involved in Lebanese affairs mainly for reasons of strategic interest (proximity to Israel, Hezbollah classified as a terrorist organisation etc); after all, Lebanon is a constitutional democracy (despite its problems), offering a liberal and cosmopolitan environment, easy for the American interests and values to spread.[11]Lately, Britain has openly joined the pacifying forces: on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Lebanon, the British Diplomat in the country released an “open letter” in which he expressed his admiration for the Lebanese people and their strength to overcome their differences, and asked for the national interest to be put above all other priorities and the “foreign patrons”.[12]
Under the circumstances, in an attempt to save their country from further descent into the abyss, the Lebanese politicians have been exhibiting a high degree of mobilization. The Lebanese (in Caretaker capacity) Prime Minister visited Paris, where the French Government reaffirmed its position towards a national dialogue in Lebanon. PM Najib Mikati also visited Qatar and discussed the issue of the Syrian refugees and matters of economy and tourism[13] and the Lebanese Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, visited Iran to discuss the rise in tensions between Sunnis and Shias.[14] In a way, the visits of the top Lebanese officials reflect the multi-sectarian politics of the country and their approach towards the various influential actors in Lebanon.
In the meantime, the country has been run by a Government in a caretaker capacity for months, so institutionally there is a threatening power vacuum. The Syrian refugees have also “swamped” the country and social frustration is growing by the day.
Given the circumstances des
cribed hereinabove and the theoretical framework of internal Lebanese politics, many warn of a looming civil war; there are however others who claim that this will not easily be the case. Thanassis Cambanis, an expert on Lebanese affairs, sees more interests for every political section in maintaining the status quo, with Lebanon serving as a neutral ground where every faction can develop economically and politically.[15] This view that the political elites have every interest in avoiding a civil war is further consolidated in a research paper by Tobias Schwerna who argues that despite “popular perception both inside and outside of Lebanon, Lebanese political leaders’ consistent efforts in crisis management and de-escalation have prevented an escalation of violence”[16] since 2005. In this “consociational conflict”, the political actors make rational choices, carefully calculate their actions and use “a variety of strategies to increase their power while cautiously avoiding civil war”.[17]
Franck Salameh is optimistic: the Christians’ strong ties with France as well as Lebanon’s democracy (with all its faults) will not easily allow for a full-scale war in Lebanon.[18]It might also be the fresh memory of the 1975 civil war in the Lebanese conscience which has prevented the outbreak of a new one. After all, there is a difference between random acts of violence and “a large-scale political, financial, and military mobilization of all the major communities with the goal of reshaping power politics in a way that is definitive and difficult to reverse”.[19]
Lebanon is currently home to eighteen recognised religious and ethnic groups. In 1988, Professor Antoine Messarra wrote something that strikes as familiar and timely: the intercommunal coexistence in Lebanon “deserves to be defended not only for ecumenic, human and political reasons, but also for international considerations: the contemporary international system is composed of a constellation of states, the majority of which are forced to deal with their pluralism so as to consolidate national unity and concord”.[20] It is therefore in everyone’s interests, especially the long-suffering people of Lebanon and the ideal this country represents, that another civil war is avoided.
All links accessed on December 10, 2013.
[1] Quoted in Turkmen-Dervisoglu, Gulay, “Lebanon: Parody of a Nation? A Closer Look At Lebanese Confessionalism” The Yale Review of International Studies, February 2013 http://yris.yira.org/essays/316
[2] Meier, Daniel, “The effects of Arab Spring and Syrian Uprising on Lebanon”, Centre of Lebanese Studies, May 2013, p. 2 http://lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/daniel-May-.pdf
[3] Shaheen, Kareem, “Homegrown terrorism taking hold in Lebanon”, The Daily Star (25/11/2013) http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Analysis/2013/Nov-25/238800-homegrown-terrorism-taking-hold-in-lebanon.ashx#axzz2letpWK9c
[4] Azziz, Jean, “Lebanon enters 'third stage' of suicide bombings”, Al-Monitor (19/11/2013) http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/lebanon-suicide-bombing-iran-embassy.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=8594
[5] Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (1999) as cited in Khalaf, Samir, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 204.
[6] Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999, p. 33.
[7] Lijphart, Arend, “Consociational Democracy”, World Politics, Vol. 21, No.2, January 1969, pp. 207-225.
[8] Khalaf, Samir, op. cit. p. 11
[9] Ibid.
[10] Makdisi, Samir & Marktanner, Marcus, “Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon”, Lecture and Working Paper Series No. 1, Institute of Financial Economics, American University of Beirut, Lebanon, 2008 http://www.aub.edu.lb/fas/ife/Documents/downloads/series%201_2008.pdf
[11] Saab, Bilal Y., “Levantine Reset: Toward a More Viable U.S. Strategy for Lebanon”, Analysis Paper No. 21, Saban Center, Brookings Institute, July 2010.
[12] Fletcher, Tom, “Dear Lebanon: An Open Letter”, Foreign and Commonwealth office blog, http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/tomfletcher/2013/11/21/dear-lebanon-an-open-letter/ (21/11/2013)
[13] Gulf Times, “Lebanese PM hails ties with Qatar” (28/11/2013) http://www.gulf-times.com/qatar/178/details/373030/lebanese-pm-hails-ties-with-qatar
[14] The Daily Star, “Berri’s Iran visit aimed at ‘defusing sectarian tensions’” (28/11/2013)
[15] Cambanis, Thanassis, “How much to worry in Lebanon once more?”, Thanassis Cambanis blog, (19/11/2013) http://thanassiscambanis.com/2013/11/19/how-much-to-worry-in-lebanon-once-more/
[16] Schwerna, Tobias, Lebanon: A Model of Consociational Conflict, Peter Lang, European University Studies, 2010, p. 11.
[17] Ibid., p. 49-50.
[18] Salameh, Franck, “Lebanon's Resilience”, The National Interest (04/04/2013) http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/lebanons-resilience-8306
[19] Blanford, Nicholas, “Why Syria still isn't tipping Lebanon into civil war”, Christian Science Monitor (23/10/2013) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1029/Why-Syria-still-isn-t-tipping-Lebanon-into-civil-war
[20] Messarra, Antoine N., “Prospects for Lebanon: The Challenge of Coexistence”, Centre of Lebanese Studies, 1988 http://lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/62b9ab52.-challenge-of-coexistence-.pdf
