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During the past few weeks, it seems that the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on January 3, 2020, should have sent Middle Eastern relations and the fragile regional equilibrium into a spiral. Nonetheless, the repercussions of the US administration’s decision have not yet been observed on a larger international scale, but rather on the domestic one.
The civil war in Libya has been in progress for more than eight years and the recent conferences in Berlin and Moscow seemed unable to provide a reliable solution. Both efforts aimed at putting an end tο the civil war and agreeing on a ceasefire. Consequently, both conferences were deemed ineffective, especially since the one side of the Libyan civil war, General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA), refuses to compromise with the officially recognized government of Libya, the General National Accord (GNA), which, as the civil war rages on, gradually loses domestic legitimacy and weakens.[1]
After years of turmoil following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and the collapse in the numbers of tourists visiting the country, Egypt’s cultural tourism is back on a fast track for growth. In an effort to rebuild the country’s reputation as a safe destination and win back international tourists, the government has introduced measures to restore security infrastructure, upgrade visitor experience and develop new attractions, such as the Grand Egyptian Museum. Although numbers still remain well behind 2010, this recent rebound makes a strong case for the potential that tourism can offer towards the revival of affected destinations.
Despite speculations of a rocky transition of power, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said’s succession at the Omani throne was swift and according to the wishes of the late Sultan. While he declared that he will follow the principles set by Qaboos in terms of foreign policy, the new ruler will have to prove Oman’s commitment to neutrality and its position as intermediary in negotiations, at a time of great regional turmoil. Meanwhile, Oman has to tackle its economic and social challenges at home, in order to continue to project its international soft power.
The economic recession, the dysfunctional political system and the refugee crisis have made Lebanon a vulnerable player in the Middle East region. The economic reforms that the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri, tried to introduce, caused a massive cross-sectarian wave of demonstrations which lead Lebanon to political instability and to the Prime Minister’s resignation. Moreover, Hezbollah’s reaction and the developments in Syria make the situation in Lebanon even more complicated. Rapid developments in Lebanon are leading to a significant alteration in Lebanon’s political system which are affecting the citizens’ lives.
The October 2019 protests that took place in Iraq resulted in hundreds of casualties and thousands of injuries reported. The protesters mainly reclaim dignified life conditions, higher employment rates and a political system liberated from corruption and external interference. The identity of the protests is not the usual one and the nature of the protesters’ demands also seems to be changing. The authorities had a spasmodic response launching an excessive wave of violence and exposing the government. However, various state and non-state actors participated in the protests and contributed each one in its way.
Since the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011, the country’s cultural heritage has been subjected to different kinds of annihilation. With the conflict nearing some kind of end but external forces still destabilizing the region, ongoing plans for the reconstruction of Syria’s archaeological casualties generate a multifaceted debate over when they should be taking place, the motivating factors behind these projects, their purpose and who are the stakeholders coordinating their implementation. Τhe reconstruction of post-conflict archaeology in Syria could be providing a valuable opportunity for sustaining communities through participatory initiatives that appropriate the traces of war.
The ongoing process of the “safe zone” establishment in Northeastern Syria and the management of the Idlib province further complicate and strain relations between allies, jeopardizing an already fragile and volatile state of affairs. The reconciliation of the incompatible aims of all parties involved therein is an uphill task. Both the US and Russia struggle to balance the colliding interests of their allies on the ground, whilst maintaining good ties with Turkey appears pivotal for them. For its part, Turkey, pressed by its domestic problems, is using the refugees and the jihadist threat as bargaining chips in negotiations.
Protests across Sudan are well into their fourth month, consistently defying President Omar al-Bashir’s suppressive response, as well as his superficial political appeasing efforts. That persistence, stemming from economic and political demands highly similar to those expressed in several Arab countries during the so-called “Arab Spring”, interestingly underscores a relevant continuity of the transformative dynamics that emerged back in 2011. In Sudan, similar peaceful revolts have twice -in 1964 and 1985- ended up in the collapse of military dictatorships. Nevertheless, despite the protesters’ determination, the existence of a particularly rigid pro-status quo regional political landscape further complicates the equation that could lead to actual political change.
The Iranian leadership remains trapped in a revolutionary ideology that is sustained by a nationalist narrative, especially in times of hardship. Appealing to the patriotic sentiment of the people has worked in the past, but in the current circumstances the public, especially the millennial generation who have no memory of the Revolution or the Iran-Iraq war, have lost faith in this narrative. Faced with a stifling economic and employment crisis, excruciating sanctions and mounting international pressure, the Iranian political, military and clerical establishment is more than ever challenged to adapt to the changes that have driven the society in 40 years, or face protests that could get out of the control of Tehran. Although the regime is aware of the crucial momentum, any promises for reform remain unfulfilled, as a wide array of unelected bodies is still capable of blocking any initiative of the elected government. The US stance boosts the narrative and the anti-US sentiment, thus making an implosion or a regime change à la US unlikely to materialize anytime soon.
The Algerian people massively took to the streets for a fourth consecutive Friday on March 15th 2019, protesting against the elite, despite President Bouteflika’s maneuver four days earlier, in which he sought to appease the demonstrators by withdrawing his initial candidacy for a fifth term and postponed sine die the elections scheduled for the 18th of April. The protesters, most of them young and coming from all backgrounds, appear determined, while, at the same time, cracks are visible given the multiplication of defections within the ruling party and the business elites. However, it is of note that the Algerian system, a complex civilian-military-business nexus, would not readily give up its power and profits, and, most importantly, the army’s domination within the system is not easily challenged.
Following an eight-month-long political deadlock, a new Lebanese government was ultimately formed on January 31. Although many key politicians have retained their presence in the new administration, the reflection of last May’s national election results, and the dynamics generated thereof, is evident. PM Saad Hariri’s significant electoral losses were translated into gains for the Shi’i coalition that also includes Hezbollah. Domestically, the latter’s increased cabinet share indicates a political elevation, which in turn causes considerable anxiety to the West, Israel and the Gulf. More importantly though, its growing influence, if combined with other political forces, may as well impact significantly the country’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Syria
Saudi Arabia seems to slowly lose grip of its allies in the Gulf, and it is getting more evident in the war in Yemen. What started as a matter of a few months’ time and a strategic win for the new Prince turned into a headache for the Saudi monarchy. The country is losing the war against the Houthi insurgents day by day, but is also having a hard time holding the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) together, as well as continuing to persuade the West on its mission against Iranian influence in the region. Saudi Arabia remains as the head of the coalition in Yemen, while the rest of the GCC countries are pursuing their own agendas and pushing for their own views on the region’s stability. In the meantime, soft powers within the GCC, such as the Kingdom of Oman, move forward as a new, soft, temperate player and Qatar wins the PR war against the Saudis in the West. The Yemen war seems to be the place where Gulf political elites exercise their clout for regional prevalence.
Almost two years after the imposition of a blockade to Qatar by the Anti-Terror Quartet (ATQ), what started as an effort to force Doha into the Saudi sphere of influence has now turned into a power struggle between the Gulf monarchies. Despite the fact that there is no clear winner in this rivalry, the tiny but resilient Gulf state is now posing as a strong adversary to Saudi Arabia, emerging as an aspiring leader with conflicting economic interests and significant involvement in vital Saudi operational theaters, such as the Yemeni one. In what way has the Gulf crisis reshaped conditions in the region and is there any chance for reconciliation?
Το Κέντρο Μεσογειακών,Μεσανατολικών και Ισλαμικών Σπουδών φιλοξενεί πληθώρα διαφορετικών απόψεων στα πλαίσια του ελεύθερου ακαδημαϊκού διαλόγου. Οι απόψεις αυτές δεν αντανακλούν υποχρεωτικά τις απόψεις του Κέντρου. Η χρήση και αναπαραγωγή οπτικοακουστικού υλικού για τις ανάγκες της ιστοσελίδας του ΚΕΜΜΙΣ γίνεται για ενημερωτικούς, ακαδημαϊκούς και μη κερδοσκοπικούς σκοπούς κατά τα προβλεπόμενα του Νόμου 2121/1993 (ΦΕΚ Α' 25/4-3-1993) περί της προστασίας της πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας, καθώς και του άρ.8 του Νόμου 2557/1997 (ΦΕΚ Α' 271/1997).
