Syria’s north-western region of Idlib remains the stronghold of the opposition forces, with the most prominent jihadist groups operating there, as well as the most committed opposition forces against Assad’s regime. As Aron Lund states, the rebel-held areas are governed by a patchwork of sharia courts, local councils, exile government departments, and direct rule by armed groups. However, instead of forming a unified opposition, those non-state actors are competing against each other for control over Idlib.
This analysis aims at underlining the economic and political crisis in Iraq that led to widespread protests around the country since October 2019. The government’s inability to deliver basic services to society has created a series of protests with demands for better living conditions. The Iraqi security forces and armed militias are using extreme force to tackle the demonstrations with many protesters injured or killed. Hence, the question that presents itself is how foreign interventionism affects the country’s society and sense of security, as well as its economy.
Almost 6 years since the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, the long-term and largely neglected conflict, is still going strong, albeit turning to several internal conflicts between local actors benefiting from the weakness of central government and the numerous divisions of societal and state structures that favor the prevalence of local authorities. Even though frontlines have not changed significantly over the last couple of years and most local actors have established their authority in certain regions, the war has not been called and conflict persists in key areas of the country. In the governorates of Marib, Taiz, Hadramawt and Al- Hudeydah, clashes persist and neither of the two main conflicting parties has consolidated its authority in these areas, despite Houthis gaining significant ground over the last year.
Despite the latest ceasefire in Idlib, tensions are once again rising across Syria. In the northwest, the high mobility in Idlib indicates that renewed fighting is rather a matter of timing, while in the south and east, escalating assassination campaigns in Daraa and Deir ez-Zor generate new dangerous dynamics. In central and eastern Syria, the resurgence of ISIS cells further exposes a severe security vacuum that opens way for intensive influence competition between the Kurds and the regime. Last but not least, the unprecedented economic crisis that face the country threatens to derail even the minimum stability enjoyed in Syria at the moment.
Recently, Israel has improved its relations with the Gulf. This development was formalized via the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain and the silent approval of Saudi Arabia. The normalization between Israel and the Gulf is the result of a process some 20 years in the making, as 27 years have passed since Rabin, Arafat and Clinton signed the Oslo Declaration of Principles, which for the most part is now inactive. The questions that arise are how these accords can potentially affect the regional balance and whether more accords are likely to come.
Israel’s normalizing relations with various Arab countries brought the Palestinians once again before the bitter realization that time is working against them. It appears that this realization triggered a process of reconciliation among the Palestinians. Yet, will these efforts suffice to influence the course of the Palestinian Question within a rapidly changing regional environment?
Οι αρχικές επιτυχίες του Μπακού, λόγω και της μορφολογίας του εδάφους, συνάντησαν την αντίσταση των αρμένικων δυνάμεων. Η διεθνής παρέμβαση φαίνεται να πέτυχε την πρώτη εκεχειρία μεταξύ του Αζερμπαϊτζάν και της Αρμενίας που όμως έχει ήδη παραβιαστεί. Η διαμάχη για την περιοχή χρονολογείται από τον καιρό της διάλυσης της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης και οι ένοπλες συγκρούσεις επανέρχονται περιοδικά. Γιατί όμως εκτραχύνθηκε τώρα η κατάσταση μεταξύ Αζερμπαϊτζάν και Αρμενίας;
Israel has been through 3 elections in less than a year. In the shadow of the skyrocketing COVID-19 outbreak, political stability seems to be one of the country’s main needs. Benjamin Netanyahu - despite being legally persecuted - reached a deal with Benny Gantz, for a unity government led by the first. Netanyahu’s political maneuvers will keep him at the helm of Israeli government and the deal between the two sides points out many thought-provoking aspects of the country’s politics.
As the Syrian civil war nears its end, the regime’s imminent victory against the remaining opposition forces in Idlib tends to be overshadowed by several emerging issues that threaten to trigger a new circle of instability. In the meantime, irrespective of any outcome in the north, another ‘war’ still rages and will continue to rage in the country. The one between Iran, which struggles to recover from the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, and Israel, which meticulously tries to fend off the former’s entrenchment in the country.
During the past few weeks, it seems that the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on January 3, 2020, should have sent Middle Eastern relations and the fragile regional equilibrium into a spiral. Nonetheless, the repercussions of the US administration’s decision have not yet been observed on a larger international scale, but rather on the domestic one.
The civil war in Libya has been in progress for more than eight years and the recent conferences in Berlin and Moscow seemed unable to provide a reliable solution. Both efforts aimed at putting an end tο the civil war and agreeing on a ceasefire. Consequently, both conferences were deemed ineffective, especially since the one side of the Libyan civil war, General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA), refuses to compromise with the officially recognized government of Libya, the General National Accord (GNA), which, as the civil war rages on, gradually loses domestic legitimacy and weakens.[1]
After years of turmoil following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and the collapse in the numbers of tourists visiting the country, Egypt’s cultural tourism is back on a fast track for growth. In an effort to rebuild the country’s reputation as a safe destination and win back international tourists, the government has introduced measures to restore security infrastructure, upgrade visitor experience and develop new attractions, such as the Grand Egyptian Museum. Although numbers still remain well behind 2010, this recent rebound makes a strong case for the potential that tourism can offer towards the revival of affected destinations.
Despite speculations of a rocky transition of power, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said’s succession at the Omani throne was swift and according to the wishes of the late Sultan. While he declared that he will follow the principles set by Qaboos in terms of foreign policy, the new ruler will have to prove Oman’s commitment to neutrality and its position as intermediary in negotiations, at a time of great regional turmoil. Meanwhile, Oman has to tackle its economic and social challenges at home, in order to continue to project its international soft power.
The economic recession, the dysfunctional political system and the refugee crisis have made Lebanon a vulnerable player in the Middle East region. The economic reforms that the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri, tried to introduce, caused a massive cross-sectarian wave of demonstrations which lead Lebanon to political instability and to the Prime Minister’s resignation. Moreover, Hezbollah’s reaction and the developments in Syria make the situation in Lebanon even more complicated. Rapid developments in Lebanon are leading to a significant alteration in Lebanon’s political system which are affecting the citizens’ lives.
Το Κέντρο Μεσογειακών,Μεσανατολικών και Ισλαμικών Σπουδών φιλοξενεί πληθώρα διαφορετικών απόψεων στα πλαίσια του ελεύθερου ακαδημαϊκού διαλόγου. Οι απόψεις αυτές δεν αντανακλούν υποχρεωτικά τις απόψεις του Κέντρου. Η χρήση και αναπαραγωγή οπτικοακουστικού υλικού για τις ανάγκες της ιστοσελίδας του ΚΕΜΜΙΣ γίνεται για ενημερωτικούς, ακαδημαϊκούς και μη κερδοσκοπικούς σκοπούς κατά τα προβλεπόμενα του Νόμου 2121/1993 (ΦΕΚ Α' 25/4-3-1993) περί της προστασίας της πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας, καθώς και του άρ.8 του Νόμου 2557/1997 (ΦΕΚ Α' 271/1997).
