Syria’s north-western region of Idlib remains the stronghold of the opposition forces, with the most prominent jihadist groups operating there, as well as the most committed opposition forces against Assad’s regime. As Aron Lund states, the rebel-held areas are governed by a patchwork of sharia courts, local councils, exile government departments, and direct rule by armed groups. However, instead of forming a unified opposition, those non-state actors are competing against each other for control over Idlib.

Despite the latest ceasefire in Idlib, tensions are once again rising across Syria. In the northwest, the high mobility in Idlib indicates that renewed fighting is rather a matter of timing, while in the south and east, escalating assassination campaigns in Daraa and Deir ez-Zor generate new dangerous dynamics. In central and eastern Syria, the resurgence of ISIS cells further exposes a severe security vacuum that opens way for intensive influence competition between the Kurds and the regime. Last but not least, the unprecedented economic crisis that face the country threatens to derail even the minimum stability enjoyed in Syria at the moment.

Διαβάστε επίσης τη βιβλιοκριτική του Frédéric Pichon, Syrie, une guerre pour rien (Les Éditions du Cerf, 2017).

Frédéric Pichon’s diminutive book is more of a scathing indictment of what Western nations, France in particular, have done wrong in Syria. It is by no means a history of Syria’s war, which the reader ought to be familiar with before reading. French scholarship on Mediterranean affairs has been in no shortage. By virtue of its former regional status as a great power and an ever-sophisticated academia, France counts many knowledgeable pundits. Yet, an overwhelming preponderance of Anglophone international relations literature and the more introverted nature of the French academia has meant that francophone publications have made less noise.

On February 22, 2014, Matteo Renzi, Secretary of the Democratic Party, was appointed as Prime Minister by the President of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, and was nominated to form a new coalition government. A few months later, Daesh militants declared an Islamic State in the territories of Syria and Iraq, further complicating the ongoing Syrian crisis. The above raise the question of what are the Italian interests at stake in Syria? Is the Renzi government’s position on the Syrian conflict in contrast or not with the policy adopted by the previous administration? Is an Italian involvement in Syria still possible and realistic considering the traditional importance of Libya for the country?