The “Arab Spring” and the uprisings ac ross the region led to two “paradoxes” that few antic ipated at the outset. F irst, the ascent of the Saudi Kingdom as the Sunni regional hegemon and the second, the newrole of the USA as the mainstay of democ ratic change not against radical regimes, as it was the neo-conservative case, but at the expense of regional friendships and allegiances in E gypt, Tunisia and Yemen. In other words, the democ ratic wave has strengthened the regional position of the most undemoc ratic and pre-modern political and soc ial system in the Middle E ast and has enhanced the American soft power in a region where antiAmericanism was skyrocketing.

With the Arab Spring still unfolding in its backyard, the EU has proven incapable at playing a substantive role in the international politics. The uncoordinated policies of the EU have been widely criticized as the succession of revolts in the Middle East fertilize fears of collapse of the Schengen Agreement and “paralysis” in the implementation of European Common Foreign and Security Policy

The 2011 Arab Spring has not only tested the Turkish and the American role in the MiddleEast. Rather, it constitutes a major challenge to the consistence and the achievements of the AKP’s (Justice and Development Party) “zero-problems” foreign policy, and threatens the preservation of Turkish and American regional interests. However, the Arab uprisings also have the potential to engender other, more positive changes in the context of the Turkish-American relationship.

One of this year’s most remarkable events (and probably the most remarkable) is the Arab Spring, which began in the Maghreb and, in a perfect domino effect, has so far “infected” Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Bahrain in different ways. But what has not been sufficiently analysed is what Israel thinks of these recent events in the Arab world.

Three main factors seem to affect the stance of Iran towards the wave of uprisings that have shaken the Arab world since January. The first is the ideological paradigm of the Islamic revolution while the second comprises the real strategic possibilities for Iran to exploit the situation and gain pre-eminence in the region. The last factor is the internal political situation, which has demonstrated that the regime is not immune to similar popular upheavals.

The wave of regional uprisings reached Syria in mid- March, with opposition organisers and protesters being rounded up daily. The Syrian regime responded immediately using disproportionate force in order to quell protesters and emphasise the consequences of dissent. However, Syria’s internal frustration is of particular importance due to the country’s regional significance.

On March 19, millions of voters rallied to polling centers to take part in Egypt’s first free and fair elections in nearly six decades. At least 25 million of Egypt’s 40 million eligible voters came out in an unprecedented turnout to cast their vote for a series of amendments to Egypt’s constitution[i], passing the referendum with the endorsement of 77 percent of voters[ii]. Specifically, the amendments limited the presidential term from six to four years, and imposed a two-term limit on each nominee. Newly elected presidents are now required to appoint a vice president within 60 days of resuming office, and presidential authority to declare a state of emergency has been circumscribed. Moreover, an article that empowered the state in the fight against terrorism was abolished due to the huge abuses of power it legitimated under the Mubarak regime. Finally, the referendum supported full judicial supervision of votes, a measure intended to ensure that free, transparent elections are held. The passing of the referendum will effectively pave the way for parliamentary elections to be held in June, followed by the presidential elections in August or September.

Last week’s popular protests in Bahrain and Yemen have revived some strategic questions. The regimes of both countries are important U.S. military allies in the region and their internal affairs have strong reverberations on Saudi Arabia's security. The possibility of Iran exploiting the situation to expand its influence in the region and the penetration of Al Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula are further elements of concern.

The flight BA2886 from London to Tunis on the 30th of January 2011[i] was not just another ordinary air cruise. Among the passengers, over 20 years the exiled Mohammed Ghanouchi, the leader of Nahda party was finally about to step on Tunisian soil, marking the end of Ben Ali’s era. An era which is reshaping the politics of Middle East, known for its sclerotic and archaic regimes. While the triumph of the Arab Street toppling the 23 years Tunisian President surprised many, the world’s attention turned over to the Egyptian protests for more than two weeks, demanding the end to Hosni Mubarak’s presidency who is ruling the country since 23 Jul 1952 and by Emergency Law since 1981.

Όπως κάθε γεγονός, η Αραβική Άνοιξη έχει αφήσει πολλούς κερδισμένους και πολλούς χαμένους. Από τους περιφερειακούς παίκτες όμως, ποιοι κερδίζουν και ποιοι χάνουν; Θα προσπαθήσω να απαντήσω στην ερώτηση, μιλώντας κυρίως για την περίπτωση της Συρίας η οποία βρίσκεται στην κρισιμότερη ίσως καμπή της σύγχρονης ιστορίας της.