As the Syrian civil war nears its end, the regime’s imminent victory against the remaining opposition forces in Idlib tends to be overshadowed by several emerging issues that threaten to trigger a new circle of instability. In the meantime, irrespective of any outcome in the north, another ‘war’ still rages and will continue to rage in the country. The one between Iran, which struggles to recover from the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, and Israel, which meticulously tries to fend off the former’s entrenchment in the country.

The US House of Representatives and US Senate have both recently adopted resolutions formally recognizing the Armenian Genocide, expressing that it is the sense of both chambers of Congress that the policy of the United States is to “commemorate the Armenian Genocide through official recognition and remembrance.”[1]The resolutions also set the historical precedent for such a move, stating: “Whereas the United States has a proud history of recognizing and condemning the Armenian Genocide, the killing of an estimated 1,500,000 Armenians by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, and providing relief to the survivors of the campaign of genocide against Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Arameans, Maronites, and other Christians.”[2]

The economic recession, the dysfunctional political system and the refugee crisis have made Lebanon a vulnerable player in the Middle East region. The economic reforms that the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri, tried to introduce, caused a massive cross-sectarian wave of demonstrations which lead Lebanon to political instability and to the Prime Minister’s resignation. Moreover, Hezbollah’s reaction and the developments in Syria make the situation in Lebanon even more complicated. Rapid developments in Lebanon are leading to a significant alteration in Lebanon’s political system which are affecting the citizens’ lives.

Recent years have witnessed warming ties between Egypt and Israel. Far from forging a deeper and more comprehensive relationship between the two countries, this rapprochement has successfully glossed over long-standing differences with an eye to addressing immediate geopolitical challenges. A natural corollary of converging strategic, economic and security interests and challenges, the rapprochement is likely to remain intact in the mid-term. It can thus be seen as a continuation of the ‘strategic peace’ established during the second decade of President Mubarak’s rule.

Among the promises the U.S. President Donald J. Trump has made is the formulation of a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. To that end, the task was assigned to Jared Kushner, senior adviser to the White House and his son-in law.[1] However, the details of the plan known as the “Deal of the Century” are yet to be released. In the meantime, recent developments, generated by the actions taken by the U.S. administration and their implications on the both Israel and Palestine need to be taken seriously into consideration, as they directly influence the already fragile situation on the ground.

Guy Burton’s book is a highly timely and readable account of the rising powers’ policies vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. The emergence of regional powers in the post-Cold War global setting has spurred an increasing volume of literature on their Middle Eastern policies. The author situates his work within this trend. His contribution is thus threefold: Burton puts together an assemblage of these states’ policies in one volume, which is a first. He addresses one of the conflict’s literature’s key disadvantages, which is the predominance of the great and super power vantage point. And by detailing both the contributions and shortcomings of the BRICS’ policies, the book serves as an innuendo on the BRICS’ potential to help resolve the world’s most intractable conflict and perhaps other conflicts too.

“…consider the vast influence of accident in war before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong and, to act first, and to wait for disaster to discuss the matter…’’ (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, book one, par. 78).

40 years ago, on Saturday, November 19^th, 1977 Egypt’s President Anwar el Sadat’s landed to Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Αirport.

This paper has no intention or ambition to rewrite history and/or teach diplomacy. It simply aims to recollect the facts – some at least – and proceed to the analysis of gains and losses for the protagonists of this extraordinary journey.

The decision of the Kurdistan Regional Government to proceed with the independence bid on September 25, precipitated a serious crisis in the region. Seemingly, one important question to be addressed is the consequences the Kurdish referendum engenders to the recently shaped Iran-Turkey-Russia axis, particularly on the Syrian issue. Whereas Iran and Turkey often find themselves at loggerheads over regional issues, their shared concern in preventing Kurdish statehood, seems to provide the necessary fuel towards cooperation, if not alliance-building. Russia, in the meanwhile, has adopted a “wait-and-see” policy on the matter. Still, the extent to this cooperation can be much constrained by their own diverging interests in the region.