The ongoing process of the “safe zone” establishment in Northeastern Syria and the management of the Idlib province further complicate and strain relations between allies, jeopardizing an already fragile and volatile state of affairs. The reconciliation of the incompatible aims of all parties involved therein is an uphill task. Both the US and Russia struggle to balance the colliding interests of their allies on the ground, whilst maintaining good ties with Turkey appears pivotal for them. For its part, Turkey, pressed by its domestic problems, is using the refugees and the jihadist threat as bargaining chips in negotiations.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Διαβάστε επίσης τη βιβλιοκριτική του Dmitri Trenin, What is Russia Up To in the Middle East? (Polity Press, 2018).

Dmitri Trenin’s book is a welcome contribution to a thin body of print on Russian politics in the MENA region. Rather than enunciating in detail Putin’s regional policies -by definition an impossible task in 140 small pages- Trenin offers a succinct summation of these policies, their short-term impact and their perceptions by the region’s states. Well-versed in Russia’s geopolitical Weltanschauung, Trenin is aware of the country’s perennial interests in the greater Middle East. Far from a newcomer to the region, Russia has after all had a ‘rich history of involvement’. Yet continuities are often punctured by ruptures: the demise of the Soviet Union and the rejection of its mediating initiatives in the First Gulf War meant that the Middle East ‘almost vanished’ from Russian foreign policy. Moscow’s restoration of ties with Israel in the fall of 1991 and its co-chairing of the Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid the same year looked more like spasmodic attempts at survival of a flittering giant.

The decision of the Kurdistan Regional Government to proceed with the independence bid on September 25, precipitated a serious crisis in the region. Seemingly, one important question to be addressed is the consequences the Kurdish referendum engenders to the recently shaped Iran-Turkey-Russia axis, particularly on the Syrian issue. Whereas Iran and Turkey often find themselves at loggerheads over regional issues, their shared concern in preventing Kurdish statehood, seems to provide the necessary fuel towards cooperation, if not alliance-building. Russia, in the meanwhile, has adopted a “wait-and-see” policy on the matter. Still, the extent to this cooperation can be much constrained by their own diverging interests in the region.

In the last decade and a half, most analysts argue that the Russo-Iranian relation is primarily driven by external factors, particularly their desire to counter the US hegemony in the broader region, rather than the bilateral relations. Seen under the prism of a zero-sum game, the rapprochement of Tehran with the West brings many analysts to re-evaluate and question the Russian-Iranian ties. The arguments seem to lean towards Iran shunning Russia, disregarding multiple crucial factors related to the Iranian domestic political scene, their collaboration in Syria and even in the Caucasus. Despite the limitations and the ‘watchfulness’ between Moscow and the Islamic Republic, these factors will hinder any serious regression in their cooperation in the near future.

During most of its modern history, Egypt seemed to follow a more or less similar path in its foreign policy: it would align with one major power after another and would thus gain an advantageous position in the region. During the past two centuries, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States have replaced one another in more or less the same role. Amid the “new Cold War” trend being covered lately in the international press and Sisi’s recent visit to Moscow where he signed the first arms deal with Russia since the 1960’s, many have begun speaking of a renewal of the strategic relationship between the two countries and a consequent chill between Cairo and Washington.