The way the Arab and Muslim people in the region react to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)reveals the boundaries of the Islamic State (IS) identity formation. Even though ISIS aspires to supplant other religious, Arab and national identities, in reality the IS cannot unshackle itself from these identities.

As the United States has been undertaking an air strike campaign in Iraq and Syria for several weeks, the familiar question in US foreign policy debates reappeared: can airpower alone do the job? Wrong questions, though, lead to wrong answers. Too much focus on military means and ways results in the tacticization of strategy and the neglect of the political context. The United States should strive to defeat the Islamic State strategically, employing military force if necessary, but not by force alone, because weapons can win battles but cannot win wars.

Throughout its history, Lebanon has always seemed to be fighting the wars of others at the expense of its national unity. Due to the current surge in violence, analysts and politicians have been expressing fears of its descent into a civil war for a long time now. The question is: how come it hasn’t erupted yet?

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Syrian crisis and its regional repercussions in three circles. The first circle refers to Syria’s neighbourhood i.e. Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon. The second circle concerns the Arab-Israeli conflict comprising Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan. The third one is the great regional circle, which refers to the antagonism for regional hegemony and includes Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and of course the USA.

In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon that came into force provided the EU with a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a newly devised European External Action Service that was formed in January 2011.  The Arab uprisings and the civil wars in Libya and Syria constituted early and delicate test benches for the new CFSP. Nevertheless, assessing the CFSP during the Syrian crisis cannot be decoupled from the role played by the European member states most involved in the events on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

The article is about the Iraqi stance on the Syrian crisis and in particular of the official government, the Sunni minority in Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds and the tribes in Iraq. Each party has its own goals and interests in the outcome of the Syrian civil war and we will see them unfold below.

As a result of the Syrian crisis, Shia’a and Sunni sporadic clashes are taking place mainly in northern Lebanon, including vindictive abductions and even arrests of politicians. Many analysts and politicians have been warning of a highly possible spillover of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. First due to the intense sectarian character and vulnerability of Lebanon and second due to Hezbollah’s influence -backed by Syria and Iran- in the Lebanese political arena. The domestic realities of Lebanon and the critical situation of Hezbollah’s allies are bringing Hezbollah to a crossroad: will it join the fight to support Assad or not? The decisions to be made by the ‘Party of God’ at this point will be decisive not only for itself but for Lebanon as well.

This article seeks to explain the absence of legal reasoning behind the inaction in Syria, especially after the imposition of a No-Fly zone in Libya. After briefly explaining the legal framework regarding intervention today, the action in Libya is explained under that framework, while the situation is compared to that in Syria. The main goal of the article is to show that the only possible reasoning behind staying still in front of the massacres committed is basically realpolitik. However, it will be shown that intervention is not and should not by all means be cure-all.  

Last year’s events have caused a domino effect in the region of the Middle East and the developments could not have left the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan unaffected. The impact of these events became apparent both on the domestic issues and on the relations of the Kingdom with other states and actors. To some extent the developments in Jordan resembled those in the rest of the Arab World. On the total, though, Jordan’s case is different.

After nine months of protes ts, escalating violenc e, and an es timated 5 ,0 0 0 civilian deaths, it appears that government and anti-regime forc es have reac hed a s talemate. T hough on the brink of a “slow motion collapse”, the Assad regime is determined to remain in power, and will continue its bloody campaign agains t dissenters at all cos ts. In the interes t of s tability and the regional balanc e of power, the United S tates and the international community have several potential polic y options to address the growing turmoil. T he urgenc y of the situation grows daily, as ac tors settle in for a “long winter of Arab discontent”, amids t signs of an emerging civil war.