Almost 6 years since the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, the long-term and largely neglected conflict, is still going strong, albeit turning to several internal conflicts between local actors benefiting from the weakness of central government and the numerous divisions of societal and state structures that favor the prevalence of local authorities. Even though frontlines have not changed significantly over the last couple of years and most local actors have established their authority in certain regions, the war has not been called and conflict persists in key areas of the country. In the governorates of Marib, Taiz, Hadramawt and Al- Hudeydah, clashes persist and neither of the two main conflicting parties has consolidated its authority in these areas, despite Houthis gaining significant ground over the last year.
Recently, Israel has improved its relations with the Gulf. This development was formalized via the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain and the silent approval of Saudi Arabia. The normalization between Israel and the Gulf is the result of a process some 20 years in the making, as 27 years have passed since Rabin, Arafat and Clinton signed the Oslo Declaration of Principles, which for the most part is now inactive. The questions that arise are how these accords can potentially affect the regional balance and whether more accords are likely to come.
Israel’s normalizing relations with various Arab countries brought the Palestinians once again before the bitter realization that time is working against them. It appears that this realization triggered a process of reconciliation among the Palestinians. Yet, will these efforts suffice to influence the course of the Palestinian Question within a rapidly changing regional environment?
Protests across Sudan are well into their fourth month, consistently defying President Omar al-Bashir’s suppressive response, as well as his superficial political appeasing efforts. That persistence, stemming from economic and political demands highly similar to those expressed in several Arab countries during the so-called “Arab Spring”, interestingly underscores a relevant continuity of the transformative dynamics that emerged back in 2011. In Sudan, similar peaceful revolts have twice -in 1964 and 1985- ended up in the collapse of military dictatorships. Nevertheless, despite the protesters’ determination, the existence of a particularly rigid pro-status quo regional political landscape further complicates the equation that could lead to actual political change.
Saudi Arabia seems to slowly lose grip of its allies in the Gulf, and it is getting more evident in the war in Yemen. What started as a matter of a few months’ time and a strategic win for the new Prince turned into a headache for the Saudi monarchy. The country is losing the war against the Houthi insurgents day by day, but is also having a hard time holding the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) together, as well as continuing to persuade the West on its mission against Iranian influence in the region. Saudi Arabia remains as the head of the coalition in Yemen, while the rest of the GCC countries are pursuing their own agendas and pushing for their own views on the region’s stability. In the meantime, soft powers within the GCC, such as the Kingdom of Oman, move forward as a new, soft, temperate player and Qatar wins the PR war against the Saudis in the West. The Yemen war seems to be the place where Gulf political elites exercise their clout for regional prevalence.
Almost two years after the imposition of a blockade to Qatar by the Anti-Terror Quartet (ATQ), what started as an effort to force Doha into the Saudi sphere of influence has now turned into a power struggle between the Gulf monarchies. Despite the fact that there is no clear winner in this rivalry, the tiny but resilient Gulf state is now posing as a strong adversary to Saudi Arabia, emerging as an aspiring leader with conflicting economic interests and significant involvement in vital Saudi operational theaters, such as the Yemeni one. In what way has the Gulf crisis reshaped conditions in the region and is there any chance for reconciliation?
The Khashoggi case has put a magnifying glass on the instability of relations among Middle East countries and especially on the turbulent relationship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is in no position to take head on the Saudi kingdom regarding the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi; at the same time Erdogan cannot ignore such an overpublicized incident. Khashoggi may be the opportunity Erdogan was looking for in order to re-approach Saudi Arabia and the US, and establish Turkey as a strong middle power in the region. Only time will show if the rapprochement will be considered as a prudent diplomatic move by Erdogan.
Saudi Arabia is undergoing significant political change as it moves from family rule to a one man state. Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman is undertaking a series of reforms with implications both to Saudi society and economy and to the regional strategy of the country. His aspirations to restructure the economy and provide some freedoms to segments of society are combined with an aggressive foreign policy resulting in the war in Yemen and tensions with other neighbors such as Qatar. However, these initiatives might be an indication of the efforts for a greater concentration of power on the hands of the Crown Prince and have led to what has been described as a “palace coup”.[1]
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