Egypt’s biggest mass slayings, committed in a mosque in northern Sinai on 24 November during the Friday congregational prayers, have once again underlined the urgency to locate the causes of this by now rather familiar self-immolation across several Muslim regions. With 305 worshippers including 27 children dead and 135 seriously wounded as a result of an orchestrated bombing and shootings from close proximity by at least thirty perpetrators presumably with some ISIS affiliation, one is certainly flabbergasted at the meticulous and no less gruesome planning of a grievous tragedy.[1]
“…consider the vast influence of accident in war before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong and, to act first, and to wait for disaster to discuss the matter…’’ (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, book one, par. 78).
40 years ago, on Saturday, November 19th, 1977 Egypt’s President Anwar el Sadat’s landed to Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Αirport.
This paper has no intention or ambition to rewrite history and/or teach diplomacy. It simply aims to recollect the facts – some at least – and proceed to the analysis of gains and losses for the protagonists of this extraordinary journey.
Διαβάστε επίσης τη βιβλιοκριτική του Alison Pargeter, Return to the Shadows: The Muslim Brotherhood and An-Nahda since the Arab Spring (Saqi Books, 2016).
A lot of ink has been spilt on the role of political Islam in post-Arab Spring politics. In the beginning, there was an assumption of an almost teleological nature whereby the democratic renaissance of the region would at a minimum bring the forces of political Islam to the fore. There was even the potential for it to be rendered the single most important socio-political actor in part of the region. While the first premise has certainly proved true, Alison Pargeter’s book is a detailed, eloquent attempt at explaining the second: political Islam’s inability to ensconce itself in power, once in its antechamber.
The broader Middle Eastern and Northern Africa region has entered an extended period of turmoil where states are collapsing and regimes are being overthrown. While the roots of these conflicts are long-established, eruptions since 2001 are recurring with a ferocity implying that none will come together again in a capacity of state unity. Patrick Cockburn's indefatigable coverage provides a crucial tour d'horizon of the civil wars and insurgencies that have been shattering the societies' central core while demonstrating the variety of reasons as to why these conflicts are ongoing and foremost, as to why religion in the Middle East is now the glue that holds societies together.
The relationship between the current Egyptian administration and the Egyptian religious authority of al-Azhar has been going through some changes in the past few months. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s ascension to the Presidency in 2014 was welcomed by the Coptic Christian community of Egypt and was supported by the al-Azhar University. Nonetheless, efforts to renew the Egyptian national identity and to push for a “religious revolution” in Egypt was met with discomfort, discontent, and, in some circles, distrust. The role of the al-Azhar university and its Grand Imam Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, as a leading authority on Sunni Muslim affairs within Egypt was believed to being sidelined. Consequently, a light should be shone on the intricacies of the different points of contention which dominate the political and religious fora in Egyptian society.
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