CENTRE for MEDITERRANEAN, MIDDLE EAST & ISLAMIC STUDIES

Protests across Sudan are well into their fourth month, consistently defying President Omar al-Bashir’s suppressive response, as well as his superficial political appeasing efforts. That persistence, stemming from economic and political demands highly similar to those expressed in several Arab countries during the so-called “Arab Spring”, interestingly underscores a relevant continuity of the transformative dynamics that emerged back in 2011. In Sudan, similar peaceful revolts have twice -in 1964 and 1985- ended up in the collapse of military dictatorships. Nevertheless, despite the protesters’ determination, the existence of a particularly rigid pro-status quo regional political landscape further complicates the equation that could lead to actual political change. 

Egypt’s biggest mass slayings, committed in a mosque in northern Sinai on 24 November during the Friday congregational prayers, have once again underlined the urgency to locate the causes of this by now rather familiar self-immolation across several Muslim regions. With 305 worshippers including 27 children dead and 135 seriously wounded as a result of an orchestrated bombing and shootings from close proximity by at least thirty perpetrators presumably with some ISIS affiliation, one is certainly flabbergasted at the meticulous and no less gruesome planning of a grievous tragedy.[1]

Klaus Wivel's book is one of those books that, as per Franz Kafka, resemble the axe hitting the frozen sea. In the post-9/11 world there has been no shortage of bibliography regarding the Mediterranean/ Middle East. By contrast, one could make the case that there has often been an abundance of bibliography, focusing excessively on issues such as terrorism, Western attempts at a normative reconstruction of the region and the intricacies of political Islam.

The civil war in Yemen began in March 2015, after the overthrow of the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi by the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia-led movement and the commencement of an air campaign against the former by a Saudi-led coalition. The conflict has a distinctly international undertone, as it involves all important regional actors and hasn’t escaped the attention of international ones. In addition, it is fought for both pecuniary interests (securing unimpeded access to the Red Sea through the Bab al-Mandab strait, where much of the world’s oil shipments pass through)[1] and ideological ones (checking what is seen by the Gulf States as Iran’s burgeoning hegemonic ambitions following the July 2015 nuclear deal). Not too dissimilar to Syria, regional power projection has left an already poor country in tatters and led to one more humanitarian disaster. The Guardian’s Simon Tisdall put it best when he wrote that Yemen today has become “another Syria, on a smaller scale”.[2]

Since its auto-proclamation of independence, Somaliland has committed itself to democratic principles and has maintained relative peace and stability within its territory. Southern Somalia, on the contrary, has thus far been unable to form any kind of government and to bring peace to its population. Yet what forms a complete paradox is that, today, while the Republic of Somalia (which de facto disintegrated in 1991 and whose southern part constitutes a perfect example of a “failed state”) is still recognized as a State by the international community, whereas Somaliland, which has a functioning and democratically elected government, remains unrecognized.

From Iraq in the north down to the Arabian Peninsula and west all the way to Morocco, tribal values have had a strong influence on shaping the political culture and state-society relations in the Middle East. Historians remind us that throughout the span of the Middle East’ history, tribes have often posed a credible threat to central governments, and have played an important role in the making and dismantling of ruling dynasties.

"Al Qaeda is a political movement with a demonstrated military ability which has sought to bypass the state while co-opting its attributes and channeling its resources. It has, after concluding that the Arab state system is dying and incapable of defending the people's interests, claimed the right to defend Arab States against their external enemies and most of all the USA. Forging itself as a vanguard, it has separated two tactical fights: the domestic war against failed states, and the international war against the "far enemy".