After nine months of protes ts, escalating violenc e, and an es timated 5 ,0 0 0 civilian deaths, it appears that government and anti-regime forc es have reac hed a s talemate. T hough on the brink of a “slow motion collapse”, the Assad regime is determined to remain in power, and will continue its bloody campaign agains t dissenters at all cos ts. In the interes t of s tability and the regional balanc e of power, the United S tates and the international community have several potential polic y options to address the growing turmoil. T he urgenc y of the situation grows daily, as ac tors settle in for a “long winter of Arab discontent”, amids t signs of an emerging civil war.

The wave of regional uprisings reached Syria in mid- March, with opposition organisers and protesters being rounded up daily. The Syrian regime responded immediately using disproportionate force in order to quell protesters and emphasise the consequences of dissent. However, Syria’s internal frustration is of particular importance due to the country’s regional significance.

Though not in the forefront of the mass media coverage of the Middle East and often overshadowed by more spectacular but not necessarily more important players, Syria remains the key to many issues in the Middle East. The Syrian regime has survived American neo-conservative regime-change assault on the region and at the same time it plays a pivotal role in four interdependent fields of regional antagonism: Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the regional Arab order and, last but not least, the issue of Iranian hegemony.

Cataclysmic territorial encroachment by the IS/ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) towards Baghdad and in Iraq's Kurdish region beyond Mosul remains as ascendant as it is in northern Syria despite the aerial attacks and some external assistance to the recently installed Haider al-Abadi administration in Iraq. With the air campaign proving less effective, the United States and other Western allies have accentuated pressure on Turkey to commit its troops on the ground so as to blunt the IS forces. Interestingly, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, the main antagonist for the IS, Ankara and the NATO, may be receptive to the idea of Turkish troops fighting fellow Sunnis so as to provide him both a needed legitimacy and some respite since President Tayyip Erdogan remains a persistent foe for the Baathist regime in Damascus. Concurrently, the Kurds divided across several post-colonial states and often seeking sovereignty and unification, begrudge Turkey for not helping their co-ethnics in Syria and for keeping its involvement limited to strictly settling down displaced Arabs and Kurdish refugees. In the same vein, the Iranians are equally engrossed in this fratricide on the side of a beleaguered Assad and a vulnerable Baghdad regime while poised against the troubadours of a Sunni Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In fact, they are relishing a field day since their favourite Shia Houthis obtained an upper hand in a war torn Yemen. Another major Iranian ally, Hezbollah, is already well-ensconced in Lebanon besides fighting the Sunni opposition to Assad, whereas rest of the world seems to be largely focused on IS's assault on Ain-al Arab (Kobani), a strategic town straddling the Turkish-Syrian borders. If the IS was able to capture this town, it would have the entire swathe of territory from Kirkuk in Iraq to Aleppo and eastern Mediterranean in Syria under its control bestowing it some of the most fertile valleys along with facilitating the munificent export of gas.

The presence of the USA in Iraq, the threats by former US defense minister Donald Rumsfeld in 2003 against Syria, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party coming to power in Turkey, the isolation of the Syrian regime due to the cold relations with Lebanon’s and Jordan’s governments and the economic cooperation with Syria were the main causes of strengthening the relations between Turkey and Syria during the period 2003-2010[1]. However, the spread of the Arab Spring in Syria cast a shadow over the good relations between Ankara and Damascus. As a result, reservation and suspicion obscured the communication between the two states.

"ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror" follows ISIS throughout the years of its existence, with the scope of defining not only its origins but also the dynamics that transformed it from a minor jihadist group to a powerful worldwide menace. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan track ISIS since its very beginning as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) up until the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, using the method of original interviews with US military intelligence and officers and western diplomats, as well as with ISIS fighters or people who got in touch with key people of the group. Their goal is to offer the readers the chance to form their own judgment about the growth of ISIS, by presenting the facts objectively and staying to the point.

Under different circumstances Abu Musíab al-Suri could have been an established academic as he is characterized by strict methodological adherence, intellectual arrogance, inclination to self-citation, strained relations with colleagues and thirst for recognition. Nevertheless, the current international situation renders his candidacy for a university chair out of question. Hence, he rightfully occupies a position in the unofficial intelligencia of militant jihadi Islamism and he holds the undisputed chairmanship in the ëdepartment of strategics. However, more than that and besides his intellectualism, he is an ëadeptí heir of the tradition of field guerrilla warfare theoreticians. If unconventional warfare is doomed to irrelevance in the face of superior technology, organization and intelligence of the modern armies, Suri appears to give it a new breath.

The revolutions and the uprisings in the Middle East changed the balances in the region and, consequently, Russia’s perspective on it. Russia had to face the risk of losing relatively new gains, as well as dilemmas on which side to favour, especially in the case of Libya and Syria. It can be said that Moscow generally remained a “royal realist,” standing on the side of its interest and trying to adapt its policies to the ad hoc developments. The way Russian policy will develop and the extent to which the already made choices have been successful or not are both still “under process.”