“…consider the vast influence of accident in war before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong and, to act first, and to wait for disaster to discuss the matter…’’ (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, book one, par. 78).

40 years ago, on Saturday, November 19^th, 1977 Egypt’s President Anwar el Sadat’s landed to Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Αirport.

This paper has no intention or ambition to rewrite history and/or teach diplomacy. It simply aims to recollect the facts – some at least – and proceed to the analysis of gains and losses for the protagonists of this extraordinary journey.

The decision of the Kurdistan Regional Government to proceed with the independence bid on September 25, precipitated a serious crisis in the region. Seemingly, one important question to be addressed is the consequences the Kurdish referendum engenders to the recently shaped Iran-Turkey-Russia axis, particularly on the Syrian issue. Whereas Iran and Turkey often find themselves at loggerheads over regional issues, their shared concern in preventing Kurdish statehood, seems to provide the necessary fuel towards cooperation, if not alliance-building. Russia, in the meanwhile, has adopted a “wait-and-see” policy on the matter. Still, the extent to this cooperation can be much constrained by their own diverging interests in the region.

The audio recording of the Public talk by Mr. Ali Fayyad on "The geopolitical developments and religion in the Middle East" (Athens, April 5, 2017)(Arabic-Greek)

The transcript of the speech. (Greek)

The Two-state solution has been the cornerstone of every single attempt of the international community to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These days the prospect of a peaceful, permanent resolution is fading fast. The Israeli government is following a policy of constant settlement building in the occupied territories, an illegal activity under international law. The Palestinian leadership at the same time, trapped in its own microcosm, aging and failing, is preoccupied with maintaining whatever power it has. 50 years after the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip things are slowly reaching a boiling point, where the pressure could erupt anytime with unprecedented consequences.

Lebanon is a small and internally complicated country, so why should anyone on the outside bother? And since at present it is also tranquil then maybe it is wise just to leave good enough alone. These realities, while true, cannot constitute valid reasons for open-ended benign neglect. Hidden corrosive forces in and around the tiny country are constantly at work, and sudden calamitous setbacks as happened on many occasions in Lebanon's recent past remain a menacing possibility at all times. What sits quietly and unobtrusively on the sidelines could merely out of carelessness find itself sliding into turmoil and thus be swiftly catapulted to center-stage with ugly fallout on the immediate surroundings and possibly far beyond. In this respect Lebanon may not exactly be a ticking time-bomb since it does exhibit a healthy "been there, done that" resilience, but it persists as a delicately cobbled polity with much about it that is unfinished or unresolved, thereby harboring built-in vulnerabilities that are potentially worrisome.