During the past few weeks, it seems that the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on January 3, 2020, should have sent Middle Eastern relations and the fragile regional equilibrium into a spiral. Nonetheless, the repercussions of the US administration’s decision have not yet been observed on a larger international scale, but rather on the domestic one.

 

The economic recession, the dysfunctional political system and the refugee crisis have made Lebanon a vulnerable player in the Middle East region. The economic reforms that the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri, tried to introduce, caused a massive cross-sectarian wave of demonstrations which lead Lebanon to political instability and to the Prime Minister’s resignation. Moreover, Hezbollah’s reaction and the developments in Syria make the situation in Lebanon even more complicated. Rapid developments in Lebanon are leading to a significant alteration in Lebanon’s political system which are affecting the citizens’ lives.

Protests across Sudan are well into their fourth month, consistently defying President Omar al-Bashir’s suppressive response, as well as his superficial political appeasing efforts. That persistence, stemming from economic and political demands highly similar to those expressed in several Arab countries during the so-called “Arab Spring”, interestingly underscores a relevant continuity of the transformative dynamics that emerged back in 2011. In Sudan, similar peaceful revolts have twice -in 1964 and 1985- ended up in the collapse of military dictatorships. Nevertheless, despite the protesters’ determination, the existence of a particularly rigid pro-status quo regional political landscape further complicates the equation that could lead to actual political change. 

The Algerian people massively took to the streets for a fourth consecutive Friday on March 15^th 2019, protesting against the elite, despite President Bouteflika’s maneuver four days earlier, in which he sought to appease the demonstrators by withdrawing his initial candidacy for a fifth term and postponed sine die the elections scheduled for the 18^th of April. The protesters, most of them young and coming from all backgrounds, appear determined, while, at the same time, cracks are visible given the multiplication of defections within the ruling party and the business elites. However, it is of note that the Algerian system, a complex civilian-military-business nexus, would not readily give up its power and profits, and, most importantly, the army’s domination within the system is not easily challenged.

Την ώρα που οι δυτικές μητροπόλεις βυθίζονταν στην εορταστική φρενίτιδα και μέθη των ημερών, το Ιράν βυθιζόταν στην αβεβαιότητα. Εν μέσω των βίαιων διαδηλώσεων που μεταδίδονταν σαν “κολλητική ασθένεια” από τη μία πόλη στην άλλη, η παραμονή πρωτοχρονιάς του 2017-2018 έφερε ένα έντονο άρωμα “Αραβικής Άνοιξης” και σίγουρα θα μείνει αξέχαστη. Παρά την βιασύνη κάποιων να προεξοφλήσουν την αρχή ενός νέου '79 και το τέλος των Ayatollah, η Ισλαμική Δημοκρατία διαχειρίστηκε την κρίση αυτή σχετικά αναίμακτα. Αυτό δε σημαίνει βέβαια ότι δεν είναι υπαρκτή, ωστόσο πως μπορούμε να την αναγνώσουμε;

2014 is the year in which old and new challenges will arise for Israel. As the state heads towards the 66th anniversary of its independence, it faces roadblocks that – in a nutshell – impede the urgency of its finding a solution for its political, financial and refugee crisis. This article lays out the current major issues that confront Israel, prompting a discussion of potential avenues which it can pursue as it heads towards its elections.

The Tunisian Revolution of January 2011 ushered a new era in the states of the Arab World. While its repercussions were plainly perceived in the cases of Libya and Egypt, one needs to assess the revolution’s lasting effects in Tunisia, as well as its influence on the democratic process of the rest of the Maghreb countries.

As the dust settles from Egypt’s so-called “popular coup” on July 3, it has become clear that Egyptian society is deeply polarized. There is a vast gulf between those who supported the army’s actions in removing President Morsi, and those from the Muslim Brotherhood who insist on the illegality of his deposition and demand his reinstatement. In the midst of this standoff, a number of activists have appeared that mistrust both sides, believing that the alternative to Islamic rule is not simply military rule. This article provides an overview of the factors leading to renewed support for the Egyptian military, suggesting considerations for those who see it as a viable alternative to the Brotherhood’s rule.