



Kurdish report

April 14, 2016

IN THIS ISSUE

The Kurdish Federation in Syria Brings Hopes & Concerns

by Evangelos Diamantopoulos

The Kurds are the largest ethnic minority of Syria and make up more than 10% of the country's population. They have suffered from marginalization for decades before the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011. A large part of them were denied Syrian nationality and were therefore excluded from education, healthcare, land ownership and business opportunities. In addition, they were not allowed to learn their language or practice their traditions. After the gradual withdrawal of the governmental forces from the areas with Kurdish population in 2012, the Kurds filled the power vacuum and established an interim self-administration in three cantons, namely in Cizire, Afrin and Kobane. Furthermore, the Kurds have successfully fought against the Islamic State in the north and northeast of Syria while defending their autonomous rule. However, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) which is the main force in the region, was not invited to participate in the recent Geneva negotiations which aim to reach a ceasefire and decide the country's political future, because of Turkey's objections. Hence, various influential groups of those three cantons and neighboring areas came together recently to take matters into

their own hands and agreed to form a federal system.

On March 17, the delegations of various local organizations of Kurds, Arabs, Syrians, Turkmens, Assyrians, Chechens and Armenians agreed on the establishment of the "Federal Democratic System of Rojava – Northern Syria." The meeting was held in the town of Rmeilan in Hasakah province and after two days the representatives of the local groups managed to agree on a document describing the general principles of the new system as well as to elect co-Presidents (Hadiya Youssef, a Kurdish woman and Mansur el-Selum, an Arab man) and a 31-person Organizing Council.¹ This document emphasizes the new establishment's commitment to democracy, human rights, gender equality, freedom of choice, peaceful co-existence and Syria's sovereignty. PYD is the most dominant force in Rojava and its ideological influence by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) founder and leader, Abdullah Öcalan's latest idea of democratic confederalism is reflected in this new project of governance in northern Syria.²

The Social Dimension of Statelessness in a World of Nation-States

For Kurds, statelessness is undoubtedly a social issue and a matter of identity too.

Page 2

The Role of HDP in the Peace Process

Faith on the solution of the Kurdish conflict has been almost lost and HDP has become the scapegoat of the negotiations.

Page 3

The Kurdish Community in the U.S.A.

The Kurdish diaspora has played a major political role in communicating to the international community the plight of their people.

Page 4

The Evolution of PKK & the Kurdish Left in Turkey (1970s-1980s)

There was a rapid proliferation of the Left in Turkey and the emergence of a Kurdish movement closely associated with it.

Page 5

Israeli-Kurdish Relations: A not so Secret and Intimate Affair

A certain affinity between the two sides has cultivated through the years and it has remained strong to this day.

Page 6

The Syrian government, the opposition, regional powers as well as the USA and Russia rejected the federal system proposed by the authorities of Rojava. The regime does not accept the idea of federalism and does not recognize the new entity while the Syrian foreign ministry warned against anyone who undermines the unity of the country.³ The main opposition alliance, the National Coalition, which is supported by the West, accused the authorities of Rojava of misusing the people's will and renounced their autonomy. In addition, non-Kurdish residents of areas outside Rojava as well as rights groups have often castigated Kurdish factions of "ethnic cleansing" of non-Kurds.⁴ The Kurdish National Council (KNC) also criticized the declaration as a unilateral action which would undermine Syrian Kurds' national aspirations.

For regional powers, federalism in favor of minority groups might set a dangerous precedent in their own countries or neighborhood. Of course, Turkey strongly

opposes the move as it fears that the growing power of the Kurds in Syria might encourage separatism among its own large Kurdish community. Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council also rushed to defend Syria's unity even though they favor opposing sides of the Syrian civil war. Moreover, both Washington and Moscow support the Kurdish forces' struggle against the Islamic State but refused to recognize the new federation. However, Russia and the USA have not completely ruled out federalism as a future scenario in Syria.⁵ All the aforementioned parties agree on the general idea that the people of Syria are the ones who should decide about the system of their future governance even though that sounds like wishful thinking given the current state of affairs. ■

FOOTNOTES

1. Firat News Agency, "Final Declaration of the Federal System Constituent Assembly Announced," (18/3/2016) <http://anfenglish.com/kurdistan/final-declaration-of-the-federal-system-constituent-assembly-announced>
2. Öcalan, Abdullah, *Democratic Confederalism*, London: Transmedia Publishing Ltd., 2011
3. Sheikho, Kamal, "Who Opposes Syrian Kurdish Self-Rule?," *Al-Monitor*, (1/4/2016) <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/syria-kurds-federalism-regime-opposition-rejection.html>
4. Abdulrahim, Raja, "Kurdish Militia's Gains in Northern Syria Stir Ethnic Strife," *The Wall Street Journal*, (28/7/2015) <http://www.wsj.com/articles/kurdish-militias-gains-in-northern-syria-stir-ethnic-strife-1438126414>
5. Carrion, Doris, "Now is not the Time to Talk about Federalism in Syria," *Newsweek*, (18/3/2016) <http://europe.newsweek.com/now-not-time-talk-federalism-syria-438459?rm=eu>

All links accessed on 4/4/2016

The Social Dimension of Statelessness in a World of Nation-States

by Iris Pappa

In a world of nation-states, where, belonging to a state is a way of defining yourself, stateless people often feel invisible and neglected. For the Kurds, the largest ethnic stateless minority, answering one of the most common questions, i.e. "where are you from?," is an uncomfortable situation, due to the fact that their identity has always been a question mark. According to the Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the status of Stateless Persons, (a stateless person is a) "person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law".¹ The causes of statelessness vary, but they could be summarized in the following general cases: gaps in a country's legal regime, loss or deprivation of a nationality, specific laws that limit citizenship to people of certain ethnicities and finally the emergence of new states and changes in borders.²

In the case of the Kurds, the condition of statelessness stems from the fact that there is not a permanent independent recognized Kurdish nation – state and as a result, they inhabit the region that lies mostly within the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In the course of their history, Kurdish people have experienced a series of deportations that have resulted in the formation of a Kurdish Diaspora thousands of miles from the geo-cultural region widely known as Kurdistan. Especially, since the second half of the 20th century, when migration (forced or voluntary) became more frequent, thousands of Kurds began arriving in Europe and America, trying to find their transnational identity.³

In a purely legal context, the condition of statelessness is found in two different definitions: "de facto" and "de jure".⁴ However, due to the nature of the Kurdish issue, Kurds are considered and most importantly they are feeling to be stateless, despite the fact that the majority of them holds a citizenship of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, or a European country. Formal citizenship and other legal connections between a citizen and the state do not lead necessarily to the creation of a strong bond between them, neither can make the stateless person feel part of the state he/she is living in per se. For Kurds, statelessness is undoubtedly a social issue and a matter of identity too, resulting in self-ascription problems that impede them from having the full control of their lives and from maintaining their culture

and history. As Lila, a 24-year-old girl from the Kurdistan region of Iraq, living in the Netherlands says: "You also feel having a deficient identity {..} where you need to fill in the name of the country you are from or you were born. I often write that I am from the Netherlands but when it is written where you were born, I become obliged to write Iraq and I do not feel at all as an Iraqi".⁵

The absence of an independent Kurdish state



in conjunction with the difficulty of the Kurdish minority to assimilate into the society of the country it lives, has resulted in a reality where Kurds acquire the nationality and citizenship of a country that they are not connected, historically, culturally or genetically with, and do not feel part of it. This in turn leaves them socially and emotionally isolated and unprotected as they feel that

they do not enjoy in fact the protection of any country. ■

FOOTNOTES

1. Art 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons <http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb25729.html>
2. UNHCR, "Causes of Statelessness," <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c15b.html>
3. Institute Kurde de Paris, "The Kurdish Diaspora," <http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama>
4. Massey, Hugh, "UNHCR and de Facto Statelessness," *Division of International Protection UNHCR*, (01/04/2010) <http://www.unhcr.org/4bc2ddeb9.pdf>
5. Eliassi, Barzoo, "Narratives of Statelessness and political belonging among Kurdish Diasporas in Sweden and the UK," *International Migration Institute and University of Oxford*, Paper No 114, 2015, 22 <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/narratives-of-statelessness-and-political-belonging-among-kurdish-diasporas-in-sweden-and-the-uk>.

All links accessed on 2/4/2016

The Role of HDP in the Peace Process

by Maria Kourpa

Peoples' Democratic Party - Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP) - is the left wing party that surprisingly enough entered the Turkish parliament last summer as the first pro-Kurdish party. It shares a secular, progressive profile and promotes the rights of minorities in Turkey. HDP has a strong pro-Kurdish identity and a close connection with the Kurdish movement. Considered the powerful pro-Kurdish factor during the June 2015 elections, the party mobilized voters coming from southeastern Turkey, where the majority of Kurds live, giving legitimacy to their demands. HDP searches to bring peace in Turkey through legal and constitutional changes, like the true recognition of Kurdish and Alawite people's rights, within the Turkish state.¹ Consequently, and despite accusations of connections with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), HDP promotes peaceful co-existence of the people of Turkey and not a separate Kurdish state. At the same time, HDP condemns violence and attacks. HDP, founded by the Peoples' Democratic Congress - Halkların Demokratik Kongresi (HDK), is considered Abdullah Ocalan's brainchild as an attempt to change the Kurdish movement into a civilian, legitimate actor, instead of an armed insurgent group. Ocalan has been calling for a ceasefire since 2013 signifying the inauguration of the

solution process with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Turkish president Erdogan. Meanwhile, before HDP was even elected, its chairmen have been meeting with him in the Imrali island prison. At the same time, the party has been part of negotiations with the Turkish government since 2013. In last year's Newroz after the meeting with the Imrali Delegation, Ocalan called again for a democratic solution for the Kurdish question based on 10 demands, including constitutional change and pluralism in Turkish politics.² This time, the Turkish government disagreed with the proposals and boycotted the solution process.³

The elections of June 2015 that brought HDP in the parliament should have given a boost to the solution process. Unfortunately, the ceasefire that was on for almost three years came to an end. Southeastern Turkey is, since last July, deep in blood as the Turkish army decided new operations and bombings in the area and PKK started again its armed uprising. Despite its electoral dynamic, HDP has no power to influence the Turkish government or control PKK on the conflict. The party works as a link between them and its political agenda relies frequently on how the two opponents act.



At this point, faith on the solution of the Kurdish conflict through legitimate ways has been almost lost and, despite being in the middle, HDP has become the scapegoat of the negotiations. AKP accuses HDP of being PKK's tool and supporter while Erdogan's plan is to put into trial its chairmen for terrorism.⁴ The Turkish government uses HDP and the ongoing warfare to further establish its governance. On the other hand, many Kurds find it to be very soft and moderate on the Kurdish matter. Citizens in southeastern Turkey suffer from curfews and civilian casualties and they are not fully persuaded that HDP or the peace process can address their problems effectively. Last but not least, when HDP backed autonomy in the region and hesitated to condemn PKK's actions, it lost much of the secular support coming from western Turkey. The disappointment with HDP was evident during the November 2015 elections. The party entered the parliament but lost 21 positions, 18 of them going to AKP, which formed a government alone. There are fears that even if Ocalan persuades PKK to end its uprising, Erdogan will not give

up on his extreme policies in the area, in order to weaken HDP. Besides, among his plans is a new parliament composition – through new elections - that would not include the pro-Kurdish party. Instead, it could give AKP the sufficient number of members to proceed to a constitutional change.⁵

The Kurdish Community in the U.S.A.

by Alike Sofianou

FOOTNOTES

1. HDP official site, "Who Are We?," <https://hdpenGLISH.wordpress.com/about/>
2. Kurdistan National Congress, "The Peace Process in Turkey-Kurdistan has reached a serious stage," (9/3/2015) <https://peaceinkurdistancampaign.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/KNK-file-peace-process-march2015.pdf>
3. Hafiza Merkezi, "Chronology of Peace Process in Turkey," <http://hakikatadalethafiza.org/en/chronology-of-peace-process/>
4. Stevenson, Tom, "The rise and near fall of Turkey's pro-Kurdish HDP," Middle East Eye, (16/2/2016) <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ri-se-and-falter-turkeys-hdp-1149857874>
5. Gursel, Kadri, "Erdogan's Kurdish gamble," Al-Monitor, (2/2/2016) <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/turkey-erdogan-kurds-presidential-system-new-elections.html>

All links accessed on 3/4/2016

The tumultuous history of the Kurds signified by their bloodshed as well as the negation and depreciation of their identity and the numerous deportations that they have experienced, resulted, in most of the cases, in the creation of many scattered Kurdish communities thousands of miles away from their homeland.¹

Notably, the history of deportations and relocations of the Kurdish communities from the Iraqi, Iranian, Turkish and Syrian territories, first began in the 16th century. There were several and consecutive incidents that led to the persecution and death of tens of thousands of Kurdish people.² Yet, the evacuation and destruction of many Kurdish villages, mainly in Turkey and Iraq, as part of campaigns against them, have increased the modern Kurdish exodus to Europe and North America.

It is estimated that up to 18.000 Kurds reside in the United States of America and over 20.000 in North America as a whole. Kurdish emigration in the United States began in the twentieth century and has increased in recent years. The two regions with significant numbers of Kurdish population are Tennessee and California. Many refugee resettlement programs facilitated the arrival for the majority of the Kurds in America, back in the early 1990s, after fleeing from Saddam Hussein's genocidal campaigns and the Iraqi Kurdish civil war.

Significantly, Nashville (Tennessee) is home to America's largest Kurdish population and hosts most of the Kurdish communities in the U.S.A. They seem to have chosen the town of Nashville due to the temperate weather and the proximity of the mountains there that reflect the geography as well as the climate of the Kurdish homeland in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.³ The first Kurdish refugees settled in Nashville thanks to the help of the Catholic Charities of Tennessee in 1976. The second major group of Kurds arrived in the city after fleeing the Iranian Revolution in 1979. In an area south of Nashville, referred by American Kurds as "Little Kurdistan" there is a

mosque at the center which was built when the first Kurdish immigrants arrived. Moreover, many have opened businesses that range from Kurdish bakeries, shops, and jewelry stores.⁴

It is rather interesting that today, American Kurds are playing a pivotal role in reviving the emerging Kurdish national movement. Actually, the Kurdish diaspora has played a major political role in communicating to the international community the fate and the plight of the Kurdish people in the various countries where they are persecuted. As many other ethnic groups who have suffered and endured persecutions, deportations and some sort of "cleansing," the Kurdish people have a story to tell and a message to convey.

Interestingly, Kurdish communities around the world preserve not only their identity through their language, dialects, literature, and music but they also aim to raise political consciousness and awareness about their long-term sufferings. The preservation of identity seems to be an important issue for every ethnic community or group of people who resides miles away from home.

According to social identity theory, one's sense of self consists of personal and social identities.⁵ Social identities represent identification with various groups in society and therefore are affiliated with a sense of belonging into a particular nation or community. Such is the case for the Kurdish community of the U.S.A. which by acquiring a political identity, appears to have an active role in national politics. By expressing their concerns and fears towards certain policies that touch upon their ethnic issues and affect their homeland and also by stressing the importance of their struggles under the umbrella of a common Kurdish identity, they manage to make their voices heard even far away from their homeland.

To conclude, American Kurds struggle to both preserve their identity and culture while residing abroad but also to integrate in the American society and embrace their new home.■



FOOTNOTES

1. Institut Kurde de Paris, "The Kurdish Diaspora,"

<http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdoram>
a/

2. The Kurdish Project, "Kurdish Diaspora,"

<http://thekurdishproject.org/kurdistan-map/kurdish-diaspora/>

3. Max, "Nashville's Growing Community of Kurdish Americans," The Kurdish Project, (8/6/2015),

<http://thekurdishproject.org/latest-news/us-kurdish-relations/nashville-growing-community-of-kurdish-americans/>

4. Ibid.

5. McLeod, Saul, "Social Identity Theory," Simply Psychology,

<http://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html>

All links accessed on 25/3/2016

imposed on them.³ During the 1970s, there was a rapid proliferation of the Left in Turkey and the emergence of a Kurdish movement closely associated with it. However, it was soon clear that the Turkish leftist parties were loath to address the Kurdish issue openly. The impact of the coup of 1980, which brought even more strict assimilation policies, in addition to the disappointment with the Turkish Left, convinced many Kurdish activists to turn towards themselves.² Nevertheless, the Kurdish movement did not turn away from the Left, as many groups claimed to be Marxist-Leninist, adopting the thesis that Kurdistan is a colony of the Turkish ruling classes, and making a connection



between national and class struggle.

The most radical organization that emerged at the time was the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkari Kurdistan - PKK). At first a small group which emerged in Ankara in 1974 by a group of students closely associated with Dev Genc (Federation of Revolutionary Youth). They were simply called Apocular, or "followers of Apo," as was the nickname of its leader Abdullah Ocalan. He developed his own version of socialism breaking away from conventional Marxism-Leninism and replacing pan-Kurdish aspirations with a new political agenda. Kurdistan was described as a "classic colony," kept in a state of semi-feudal backwardness; the destruction of colonialism was the first step in order to create a democratic and united Kurdistan, based on Marxist-Leninist principles.³ PKK was the only organization whose members were drawn almost exclusively from the lowest social classes – therefore reflecting more accurately the Kurdish society than others - and offered them a simple ideology with lots of opportunities for action.

After 1978, the group entered a period of party construction and development of armed struggle. The latter became an important means of self-defense and to overcome what it considered as obstacles, namely the domination of tribal chieftains or landlords who were exploiting the Kurdish population and were deemed collaborators,

or even rival organizations. In August 1984, PKK carried out its first attack against the Turkish state, signifying the start of the armed struggle to liberate Kurdistan; Therefore, PKK is considered a militant political organization, which used violence based on a political program, when there was no alternative avenue of genuine political expression.⁴

In the course of the 1980s, the PKK would develop into the only Kurdish political party of significance in Turkey. The ruthlessness of the state in trying to suppress any Kurdish national sentiments, with every citizen in eastern Turkey being treated as a suspect, and torture and oppression being the rule rather than the exception, offered the best illustration for PKK's theory of "colonial oppression".⁵ Albeit a segment of the population was alienated by the PKK's uncompromising attitudes, it also gained many sympathizers as it was seen as the only group that actively resisted the Turkish military. ■

The Evolution of PKK and the Kurdish Left in Turkey (1970s-1980s)

by Charitini Petrodaskalaki

The emergence of a Kurdish nationalist movement closely linked to the Turkish Left in the 1970s came to an end after the 1981 military coup. However, the leftist ideology remained an important component of it. The most radical Kurdish group was the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a political party recruiting from the lowest social classes which used violence in order to deal with the exploitative Kurdish landlord class as well as the Turkish state, and in the end became the most significant Kurdish party in Turkey.

Almost until the 1990s, the Turkish state denied the existence of the Kurds as a distinct people, and assimilation policies, including a ban on the use of the Kurdish language, were

FOOTNOTES

1. Van Bruinessen, Martin, "The Kurds in Turkey," Merip Reports, No. 121, 1984, 6

2. Barkey, Henri J. and Fuller, Graham E., "Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning points and missed opportunities," Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No.1, 1997, 73

3. Van Bruinessen, Martin, "Between Guerilla War and Political Murder: the Worker's Party of Kurdistan," Merip Reports, No. 153, 1988, 42

4. Jongerden, Joost and Akkaya, Ahmet Hamdi, "Born from the Left: The making of the PKK," Nationalisms and politics in Turkey: political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish issue, New York: Routledge, 2011, 124

5. Van Bruinessen, Martin, "Between Guerilla War and Political Murder: the Workers' Party of Kurdistan," op. cit.

Israeli-Kurdish Relations: A not so Secret and Intimate Affair

by Costas Faropoulos

Last summer a report by the Financial Times revealed that Israel has been importing up to 77% of its oil supplies in recent months, from the autonomous Kurdish regions of Iraq.¹ While this report exposed a relationship that was more or less already known, it did nevertheless renew a discussion that has been going on for a while, concerning the Israeli-Kurdish relations. These relations span back several decades, and they initially started in the '50s, when both peoples were struggling in an extremely hostile environment, for the survival of their identity. A certain affinity between the two sides has cultivated through the years, and despite the lack of official diplomatic ties between them, it has remained strong to this day.

The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq (KRG), which has been the main partner of Israel in this relationship, has benefited from it a great deal. Reports claim that Israel has been providing arms and training to the Kurds of Iraq, long before their recent encounter with the Islamic State (IS).² Moreover, Israel has been steadfastly supporting the Kurdish aspiration for independence. In January 2016, the Israeli Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked called for «the establishment of a Kurdish state that separated Iran from Turkey, one which will be friendly towards Israel».³ Similar statements have been made also by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli President Shimon Peres in the recent past, indicating a specific Israeli stand on this issue.

The Israeli support for the Kurdish cause has come to be considered by Kurdish leaders an important tool in the international arena, in their pursuit for independence. At the same time though, KRG has not been very fond of publicizing its relations with Israel. It is not an easy task to maintain good relations both with Israel and the Arab world (as well as Iran) at the same time. The hostility towards Israel could, in theory, target the Kurds as well. The accusation that the Kurds aim at creating a "second Israel in the Middle East" is one that

has followed them ever since the beginning of their struggle, and has shaped a certain narrative in parts of the Middle East, regarding their fight for independence.

The main difficulty faced by Israel in this relationship is the fragmentation of Kurdish politics. Israel is forced to deal with four different, autonomous Kurdish political entities (in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey), which do not share a consistent strategy towards Israel, and quite often have very different agendas, regarding their relations with it. Notwithstanding the splintered Kurdish factions, the fact that the Kurdish forces are at this point the most effective adversary of IS, has not escaped Israel's attention. The Kurds have the potential to function as an important ally in the region and a defensive barrier between the Israelis and Sunni and Shi'ite hostiles, like IS and Iran.

Given the successes of the Syrian Kurds in their fight against IS, Israel has been trying to create links with the Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (PYD), the ruling organization in the region, as well. It has sent humanitarian aid, while the Kurds have shown, reportedly, an interest in the procurement of arms, and the eventual furthering of their relation.⁴ In view of the recent announcement by PYD of the creation of a federal state in the Kurdish regions of Syria, the potential for the establishment of some form, at least, of communication between Israel and PYD is not an unfounded assumption.

Notwithstanding difficulties, regional realignments and developments, the Israeli-Kurdish relations have evidently passed the test of time. Given the current flux in Syria and the region in general, where long-standing realities appear to be crumbling, and the Kurdish aspiration for independence seems closer than ever from being realised, the relationship between the two sides is bound to continue flourishing. ■



FOOTNOTES

1. Udasin, Sharon, "Report: Majority of Israeli oil imported from Kurdistan," The Jerusalem Post, (24/8/2015) <http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Israel-importing-77-percent-of-its-oil-from-Iraqi-Kurdistan-report-says-413056>
2. Bengio, Ofra, "Israel and the Kurds: Love by Proxy," The American Interest, (18/3/2016) <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/18/israel-and-the-kurds-love-by-proxy/>
3. Pileggi, Tamar, "Justice minister calls for an independent Kurdistan," The Times of Israel, (20/1/2016) <http://www.timesofisrael.com/shaked-calls-for-an-independent-kurdistan/>
4. Bengio, Ofra, op.cit.

All links accessed on 9/4/2016

Kurdish report

Editor

Evangelos Diamantopoulos

Contributors

Evangelos Diamantopoulos

Costas Faropoulos

Maria Kourpa

Iris Pappa

Charitini Petrodaskalaki

Aliki Sofianou

Centre for Mediterranean, Middle East and Islamic Studies

Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of
Peloponnese

1 Aristotelous str & Leof. Athinon

Corinth, 201 00, Greece

cemmis@cemmis.edu.gr



www.cemmis.gr.edu